A few days ago, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu once again revealed all of Turkey’s claims in the Aegean Sea, many of which have been known since the 70s and 80s. Added to the demilitarization, which has appeared almost daily in the last two months, is (again) the famous theory of the division of the resources of the Aegean Sea, based on the distance between the Greek mainland and the coast of Turkey, with the Greek islands in between. provision, but only 6 nautical miles of territorial waters. A point slightly east of the 25th meridian as the border of Turkish jurisdiction effectively leaves without influence (always in accordance with the Turkish perception) everything that lies further east of the imaginary line that starts from the coast of Xanthi, continues to Lemnos, Paronaxia and the eastern part of Crete, starting near Heraklion. And this means that such islands as Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, the entire Dodecanese and even most of … Mykonos are located on the continental shelf of Turkey.

Shortly after Mr. Cavusoglu’s statement, first by Defense Minister Hulusi Akar about a dialogue that would end in a “fair share” in the Aegean, and then by a representative and secret partner of the Turkish President, Ibrahim Kalin, regarding the threat he presents to Turkey that the presence of Greek troops in the islands of the eastern Aegean rather served as an addition to an artificial structure that does not deviate from the usual rhetoric emitted by Ankara in recent months.

It is quite clear that part of the new revisionist noise generated by Ankara is related to the debate that has begun in Greece in recent weeks – about everything that threatens south of Crete if Libya eventually asks Turkey to conduct surveys on the proposed continental shelf – about expanding territorial waters from 6 up to 12 nautical miles. The restoration of the casus belli by Mr. Tsavusoglu is regarded by Athens as such an attempt.

The common point in the reports of all three was a manifestation, pretentious or not, of a readiness for dialogue. However, at the moment, with the sole exception of the link between Defense Ministers Nikos Panagiotopoulos and Hulusi Akar, there is no fixed line. Even some contacts at a higher diplomatic level are more social and less substantive. Turkey’s next move at the UN level is also expected in Athens, where it is believed certain it will try to add another stone to its revisionist narrative.

Election results in Israel do not favor plans for a quick rapprochement with Turkey.

Even more worrying is what Libya can do in this direction, as a possible presentation of the outer limits of the UN continental shelf to Tripoli and, at the same time, commissioning the Turkish Oil Company (TRAO) to explore in southern Crete (as before from several days threatened itself Erdogan) will lead to an immediate crisis. The reports received by Ankara in recent days do not inspire optimism. Aside from the – symbolic – reminder that the UN Security Council has given the Tripoli government of the limitations it has in discussing issues that bind Libyan foreign policy, as well as State Department interference, perhaps the most disturbing message for Ankara has come from Cairo and.. .Jerusalem.

There were two reports from Cairo: Initially, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shukri said that intelligence contacts with Turkey were interrupted due to the situation in Libya. There is no one in Cairo, least of all President Sisi, who will agree to turn Libya into a vast Turkish military base. The second message sent to Ankara from Cairo in various ways is that the electrical connecting cable between Egypt and Greece (Crete), and therefore Europe, is running normally. Arab diplomacy is known for its often complex and vague language, but support for power grid interconnection with statements from Egypt’s ambassador to Athens is a clear signal of Cairo’s willingness not to renege on the EEZ delimitation agreement it struck with Greece in August 2020.

Another message came to Erdogan from Israel, where Benjamin Netanyahu has made a powerful comeback after nearly a year and a half in opposition. Although no drastic changes are expected in efforts to bring Turkey and Israel closer together, it is assumed that the pace may slow down. And this is because Netanyahu, unlike his less experienced successors and predecessors, has his own network of international contacts and acquaintances, and therefore is less subject to pressure. In any case, the next few months will be critical.

Erdogan’s nationalist rhetoric not only against Greece, but against everyone (“non-bloc” position in the war in Ukraine, anti-Americanism, anti-Europeanism, the projection of the environment syndrome and other tried and true recipes) is a recipe that will be followed without exception, at least until the elections in Turkey. There are several indications for this. A few days ago, one of the vice-presidents of the AKP parliamentary group, Mahit Unal, was forced to resign as his comments upset far-right MHP president and government partner Devlet Bahceli. In addition to proving the personal nature of the AKP (Erdogan’s party), Bahceli’s special weight was also seen in the change in the electoral law, which was adopted last spring and will come into force on April 1, 2023. The entry threshold for Parliament is being cut from 10% to 7% in the hope that Bahceli’s party will be able to pass it.

An even more important detail is that under the new electoral law, the largest party is favored over others in smaller constituencies. For Erdogan, the first round of elections is of great importance, because if he manages to overcome the 50% threshold, then the second round, including the parliamentary one, may become procedural. The other two elements are the behavior of the 10 million new voters (Turkey is one of the most demographically dynamic countries on the planet), as well as the Kurds, which remains a question without a clear answer.