More August 9 Turkish floating drilling rig “Abdul Hamit Khan” sailed from the port of Mersin setting sail not to some distant and disputed destination, but to Yorukler 1 point within the Turkish continental shelfonly 55 km from the coast of southern Turkey.

Of all the scenarios that Athens worked out with an eye on “Abdul Hamid Khan”this was admittedly the most restrained, a fact which then caused moderate “relief” outside the Turkish borders, but also internal strife on – if anything “flammable” – the Turkish political scene itself.

At the time, nationalist circles were quick to accuse Erdogan of “yielding to Western pressure” by sending a fourth neo-Ottoman Turkish drilling rig “Abdul Hamid Khan”, “too close to Turkish shores.

At the same time, however, nationalist circles have recently accused Erdogan of many other things, especially the refugee issue, condemning as “unfortunate” – or worse, as “catastrophic” – his treatment of Syrian refugees who arrived “along with Erdogan.” blessings” and that “now they must return to their own country.”

At the same time, public opinion polls signal the difficulties of the president and the governor of Turkey. Justice and Development Party (AKP) on the way to the next dual (presidential, parliamentary) elections in Turkey, which are usually scheduled for spring or summer 2023, but it is possible that they could take place earlier.

According to Ozer Senjar of Turkish MetroPOLL, AKP has now fallen to almost 33% (from the 42.56% he received in the previous 2018 parliamentary elections) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) from Devlet Bahceli approaches 7% (from 11.1%), while opposition parties, on the contrary, are growing: Republican People’s Party (CHP) from Kemal Kilicdaroglu from 22.6% to 23.2%, the so-called Good Party (AI) from Meral Axener from 9.96% to 13.7% and pro-Kurdish HDP from 11.7% to 13.4%…

If there were elections on Sunday, which party would you vote for?
After complaining that the table we used earlier was confusing and incomprehensible, we are sharing its shorter and easier to understand form. pic.twitter.com/EtxUs0MiNP

— Ozer Sencar (@ozersencar1) September 6, 2022

The Islamist-nationalist AKP-MHP bloc is infiltrating the far right. It is not only (coming from the extreme right MHP) Meral Axener, which increases due to balance changes, is also a newly formed faction Zafer also far-right (“star” of social networks) Umit Ozdag which is now close to 2.5%, while fugitive mafia Sedat Peker is emerging from Turkish far-right circles, who “strike again” a few days ago with new allegations of “presidential corruption” aimed at Erdogan’s circle.

In such a context, and while very practical and tangible, mostly economic, the problems of everyday life continue to worsen for the majority of voters in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is about to raise the nationalist tone against Greece, making direct threats against our country with open links to the catastrophe in Asia Minor, as well as to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Since August 11, the Turkish President has attacked Greece at least seven times (August 11, 22, 29, 30 and 31, September 3 and 6), not counting the parallel verbal attacks by Mr. tone. And all this against the background of increasing Turkish flights and the instrumentalization of refugees/immigrants, which also shows signs of escalation from Ankara.

“Greece is not going to follow Turkey in the daily outrageous and endless stream of statements and threats,” the Greek Foreign Ministry said in a statement on September 3, and Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias today returned to this issue, emphasizing strongly, with French Foreign Minister Catherine Kolonas is on his side that Greece “rejects neo-Ottoman hooligans”.

However, the “neo-Ottoman machinations” are on the rise as we approach the 2023 elections, a springboard (and this is perhaps the most disturbing) not only for the selfish electoral methods of Erdoğan and Bahceli, but also Turkish “supra-partisan” revisionist statements, which have also provocatively escalated to an extremely disturbing degree in recent years, especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016. (see the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, the rhetoric of the two states on the Cyprus issue and the rejection of the DDO, overflights, an attempt to link the militarization of the Greek islands with the issue of their sovereignty, obsession with gray areas, fake news, instrumentalization of refugees/immigrants, etc.).

By the way, according to the well-known Turkish journalist Murat Getkin, elections in the microdistrict should be held after April 6, 2023 in order to “save” Devlet Bahceli’s MHP, changes in the electoral law have been activated since then. , a change whereby the threshold required for a party to enter the Turkish National Assembly is lowered from 10% to 7%.

Hyper-propaganda of “external enemies” “traditionally” serves as a means of rallying the electoral audience, especially in times of international restructuring and deteriorating security. On the other hand, of course, one cannot fail to notice how this instrumentalization poisons relations between states, generating suspicion and thus drugging not only the pre-election present, but also the post-election future.