On July 11-12, Vilnius will host the annual NATO summit, which Lithuanian officials consider to be the largest in the country’s history.[1]and international military experts, political commentators and security analysts increasingly believe that this edition is unlikely to be ordinary given the unusual circumstances.

Of course, there are firm agreements that the leaders of the states will make public in the context of participation in the summit, but at the same time, there is also a lot of room for disappointments or unpleasant surprises, depending on the expectations of each participant. At first glance, the agenda of the event seems to be devoted to Ukraine, which would be natural in the current historical context, but aside from the headlines, the real and ultimate beneficiary of this summit will be the Alliance itself. A state that is not (yet) a member of NATO cannot benefit from its decisions any more than the members of the Alliance itself.

A healthy perspective is to look at the event in all its complexity: NATO has reached 31 member states, including 12 founding members and 19 who joined later. The summit in Vilnius is a first for Finland, the first Scandinavian country to join NATO from the three Nordic countries that were among the founding members in 1949. The fact that Sweden’s actual entry is delayed by Turkey’s objections only complicates the situation on the northern flank even more.

Lithuania, the host country of the summit, is part of the eastern flank and is best placed to advance its agenda of interests and one of the goals it has officially committed to, including through a unanimous vote in parliament.[2], consists in supporting Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Romania is also part of the eastern flank, which also supports the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO, but in clear tandem with Poland[3] and together with intensive lobbying of the interests of the Republic of Moldova. “Above all,” Poland continues to strengthen its role as a geopolitical resistance to both the Northeast and the Southeast, through common positions consistently demonstrated with Romania and the Baltic states.

Of course, the picture is much more complex and full of variables that can complicate understanding the stakes of the Vilnius summit, so it’s useful to have constants that we can distinguish. For example, to accept the fact that the bone of contention between the members of the Alliance is not the actual accession of Ukraine to NATO, in the near term, but the unequivocal commitment of the member states in this direction, or, in other words, moving from the question “what if?” to the question “when?”.

Perhaps, as it is not paradoxical, the success of the entire undertaking depends to a large extent on Ukraine itself: on achieving victory in the military confrontation with Russia, on the careful deployment of diplomatic forces together with the members of the Alliance who support its entry, on the persistent development of its own internal ability to play in fact, the role of a NATO member. There are three plans that Kyiv must advance simultaneously and patiently, because neither the defeat of Russia nor integration into NATO can happen only in due time.

In Romania’s case, it took a decade to go from NATO partner status to membership: in 1994, it was the first[4] which signed the framework document of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), but the moment of accession came in 2004. Ten years during which enormous efforts have been made to increase military interoperability throughout the country, as well as to increase political maturity in Bucharest.

In the case of Ukraine, military interoperability is a case in point, as it is the only NATO candidate state that has advanced in this direction under actual combat conditions, while engaged in a large-scale war with a neighboring aggressor with obvious technology and manpower. head. Is Ukraine an exceptional candidate? So. Can he create special admission conditions? No, and the reason for the negative answer is related both to the expanded format that NATO has achieved, and to the insufficient maturity of the Ukrainian political class, from among which future politicians will emerge who are called to be part of the decision-making process. Alliance.

Returning to the case of Romania, support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory is conditioned by the failure of the NATO summit held in Bucharest in 2008. It could be said that it was too early for a newly joined state to be lucky enough to win with such an ambitious plan. At that time, Germany and France did not want to “upset” Russia and opposed the steps taken by the USA, Poland and Romania regarding the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance. In fact, the Franco-German duo defended their interests in relations with Russia, not taking into account the interests of the allies, and the results are already obvious: Russia unleashed a total war against Ukraine, and Georgia found itself on the brink. mercy of the former prime minister, now a billionaire, who copies Vladimir Putin in extravagant gestures[5].

The NATO initiatives promoted by Romanian diplomacy in recent years demonstrate a mobilization that has developed gradually, mostly with Poland, and from which Romania also seeks to benefit the Republic of Moldova. The general picture shows the obvious concern of some states that joined the Alliance during the enlargement wave of 1999 and 2004 to assert their will at least on an equal footing with the old members. Countries that are serious about joining NATO today must understand that such internal rivalries or regional alliances are normal within the broad framework of the Alliance and do not jeopardize its fundamental mission.

The meeting of the European political community is organized[6] Mimi Castle from Bulboaca, Republic of Moldova, was an exceptional event and benefited from NATO support, which provided aerial surveillance[7] necessary for the protection of 50 present leaders of the states. A month later, the Republic of Moldova was invited[8] to take part in the summit in Vilnius, as stated by Mircea Joane, Deputy Secretary General of the Alliance.

Joint statement[9] of Presidents Klaus Iohannis and Volodymyr Zelensky, which is a request for Ukraine’s integration into NATO, took place on the sidelines of the meeting in Bulboac, having a symbolic meaning, as it was done on Moldovan soil. At the same time, the text of the declaration mentions extremely different moments in the recent history of the Alliance, in particular the Bucharest Summit in 2008, when the NATO-Russia partnership became a reality, and the Strategic Concept adopted in 2022. NATO, according to which “the Russian Federation represents the most significant and direct threat to the security of the Alliance.”

The context of 2023 is very different from that of 2008, as evidenced by regional cooperation formats initiated by Bucharest or joined by Romania, such as the Bucharest Nine (B9) and the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). ), they strengthen the political support provided to Ukraine by the states on NATO’s eastern flank. In 2008, this simply did not exist. Although the “Bucharest Nine” also interested the Balkan states, the “Three Seas Initiative” aims to reduce the economic differences that exist between the states of Western Europe and the countries of Eastern and Eastern Europe. central Europe to develop their political voice to the same level. Both formats announced themselves[10] constantly as supporters of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

It can be concluded that Romania’s bet is to achieve now, in 2023, what it failed to do in 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia did not receive what would have been reasonable to offer them then, namely the Plan actions regarding the acquisition of membership. (MAP – Membership Action Plan). Limited consultations took place in The Hague[11]at the invitation of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, is in this respect a good sign that precedes the participation in the summit of those states that support Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

This idea was proposed by Ukrainian Minister Dmytro Kuleba in April 2023[12]to completely abandon the MAP, given the exceptional case of Ukraine, was renewed in June 2023 by British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace[13]. Tempting as it may be, it is impossible within the current official and statutory framework under which the Alliance operates. Maybe an announcement[14] of Deputy Secretary General Mircea Joane, according to which “in Vilnius we will approve the most important transformation of NATO’s military doctrine in the last half century”, foreshadows radical changes that will allow equally radical events in the future of the Alliance.

These aspects are not easy to predict, as long as there are enough pros and cons at the debating table, we cannot quickly and clearly distinguish what is actually being discussed. For example, it is clear that the accession of Ukraine to NATO will bring advantages to the states on the eastern flank that are already members, such as Romania, Poland and the Baltic States, but it cannot be ignored that this will mean in the future that NATO’s border should be on the border with by the Russian Federation. At the moment, no one is ready for such a scenario. – Read the entire article and comment on Contributors.ro