When his third presidential term ends in 2028, Tayyip Erdogan and his party will lead Turkey for over 25 years. Much more than any other Turkish politician and certainly the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal. His contribution is already organically integrated into the national political culture and decisively shapes the social, political and economic character of the country. Unless something drastically changes in President Erdogan’s perception of Turkey’s place in the world, then in the next five years, Turkish foreign policy preferences will continue to support the vision of a large “strategically autonomous” country, which does not mean that on a regular level, Ankara’s choice will not adapted to the current situation and any changes in regional and global relationships.

The Turkish strategy is formed on the basis of both structural and modern determinants. The former emphasize continuity and refer to geography, historical experience, and cultural understanding of the “national self” and the role of “others” over the past two centuries. The latter mainly concern changes in domestic and international politics. It was they who led in the first place to the great strategic transformation of Turkey’s behavior, which was codified in the “Blue Homeland” doctrine and the belief that the 21st century will be the “century of Turkey”.

The most important of these determinants are the structural opportunities resulting from changes in the international balance of power. Aggressive Russian revisionism on the European periphery, US strategic “restraint” in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, China’s decision to project economic power and compensate for it with increasing political interference in critical geopolitical regions have formed a privileged environment for Turkey and its powerful president, whose far-sighted priority is the geostrategic liberation of the country. An emancipation that has at least three parameters:

Erdogan’s re-election marks the end of waiting in many capitals. Greek foreign policy is called upon to evaluate (and evaluate at every moment) its possibilities.

First, it allows Turkish elites to ally with non-Western and especially anti-Western major powers and undermine the hierarchical, post-war international order established in the US. Second, at the same time, Turkey’s foreign policy can remain institutionally tied to the West, with the latter tolerating Ankara’s strategy and not making it pay the costs that might be expected for behavior that clearly does not serve the West. actors and their authoritarian, populist leaders. A group of “strong men”, which includes the President of Turkey.

Finally, it “imposes” greater independence from Western technology and a strong domestic defense industry as an absolute national priority. Turkey has managed to reduce its dependence on foreign technology to 30% from 70% in 2010. If in 2002 there were only 56 companies operating in the defense sector, today there are almost 1,500 of them, while exports have increased tenfold and exceeded $3 billion, while the outlook is even more positive. Between 2011 and 2022, Turkey reduced imports of defense materials by 60%, and if in 2011 it was the third largest importer of American weapons, today it is in 19th place.

In this context, Greece’s foreign policy must evaluate (and evaluate at any moment) its possibilities in Greek-Turkish relations. After the June 25 elections, Athens will face a strategic dilemma. For five months now, the de-escalation in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean by Turkey has been absolute. Most likely, this will last at least until the end of the summer. Erdogan’s re-election also marks the end of waiting in capitals crucial to Greek interests. The normalization of Turkish-Egyptian relations will proceed at a rapid pace, while Washington will manage Turkey less effectively. Mediation efforts are intensifying in Berlin. Athens has been planning its strategy for years, knowing that the environment is dynamic. From the very beginning, the main position was that after the de-escalation, more positive interaction could begin within the framework of a carefully designed deliberative process. We need internal stability and strategic confidence.

Mr. Costas Ifantis is Professor of International Relations at Panteillon University and Director of IDIS.