The second round of the presidential elections did not hide much surprise. President Erdogan was re-elected relatively easily, but he never won a triumphant or convincing victory over his opponent.

Kılıçdaroğlu has been defeated again in the past 13 years and it remains to be seen if he will remain active in politics and leadership of his party. The fragmented alliance he created failed to overthrow the presidential system of power and is unlikely to remain cohesive the day after the election.

More generally, the social and political polarization between the two worlds colliding in Turkey 2023 remains sharper than ever, and the victory of nationalism recorded two weeks ago will continue to shape the political views of (almost) all sides of the political spectrum. , range.

A look at the election map confirms two things that were already revealed on May 14 and have been confirmed again. First, conservative and deeply religious central Anatolia remains the stronghold of the “Erdogan revolution” and identifies with the president, in addition to the economic consequences of his policies. Secondly, secular and Western-oriented Turkey coupled with the vote of secular Kurds (not all Kurds are the same, most of them have always supported Erdogan) continues to vote against Erdogan and what he expresses in terms of aesthetics and political practice.

Erdogan talks about Turkey’s new century as he drives, but nearly half of Turks disagree with the driver and the course he charts.

After the failed coup in 2016 and beyond, Turkey’s brightest minds (and those who could afford it) fled abroad. It is clear that the brain drain will continue.

Turkey’s next day remains as difficult as ever, especially on the economic front. Between two rounds of elections and in a desperate attempt to keep the lira against the dollar, the Turkish central bank burned an additional $2 billion in foreign exchange reserves.

The fund is now (more than) in the red, and turning to the IMF is not the political choice of a president who is proud of his country’s economic dynamics and weaning from the “economic system” of the West.

As for the problem of immigration and refugees, its instrumentalization by the opposition did little, but contributed to the further growth of xenophobia.

Finally, in the realm of foreign policy and beyond the Greek-Turkish issues, Turkey is called upon to resolve yesterday’s deadlock regarding its own role in relations between Russia and the West, as well as the resumption of relations with Assad’s Syria, a prospect that she herself ruled out and is now forced to accept. The future is predicted to be uncertain and difficult.

*Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Institute of Technology, USA and Fellow of the Turkish Program of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)