Expert: Minsk awaits tough sanctions in case of deployment of nuclear weapons
Since the beginning of the political crisis in Belarus, the EU has adopted six sanctions packages. For comparison: regarding Russia, after a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 10 packages have already been accepted. Which sanctions were the most painful for the Belarusian regime and did they become effective? DW asked these questions to Rosa Turarbekova, a political scientist and researcher at the Center for Eastern European Studies at the Justus Liebig University (Giessen, Germany), who, among other things, analyzes sanctions imposed by the EU.
DW: Were the sanctions imposed on Belarus effective?
Rosa Turarbekova: First, the purpose of sanctions is to punish acts that violate international law. Secondly, this is a warning – so that there are no more similar or more serious violations.
Unfortunately, we can only talk about results from the fourth package, when sectoral sanctions against Belarus were introduced. After a Ryanair plane was forcibly landed in Minsk, which could be considered piracy, restrictions on flights to Belarus, sanctions against Belavia and measures to fly in Belarusian airspace were imposed. Then, sectorial sanctions were also adopted, which apply not only to individuals and legal entities (and until then such sanctions were in force), but also to a specific economic sector.
The fifth and sixth sanctions packages were already sectoral packages. But sanctions do not take effect immediately from the moment the decisions are taken. To assess how this affected Belarusian foreign trade, the functioning of enterprises in a given industry, for example in potash, oil refining, woodworking and export opportunities from Belarus, a time lag is needed.
“The result is”
– So far, it seems that the more time that passes since sanctions were imposed, the more opportunities the regime has to circumvent them.
– In this regard, the EU had a soft spot. For example, in the United States there is a principle of secondary sanctions, that is, the extension of these sanctions not only directly to offenders, but also to those who help them to circumvent these sanctions. Until recently, there was no such mechanism in the European Union.
The EU began to deal with this and adopt certain legal documents only in connection with the war (Russia vs. Ukraine. – Ed.). Analysts and experts even say that there has been a revolution in opinions on sanctions on the part of the European Union, a hardening of approaches to this instrument and its application.
Therefore, with regard to Belarus, I repeat once again, the fourth, fifth, sixth package and sanctions can be considered broad-based sanctions, taking into account the fact that there have been changes regarding the judgment of violators in the Union European.
– But why is there no noticeable effect of sanctions?
– The fifth package of sanctions was adopted in connection with the migration crisis, artificially created by the Belarusian authorities in late summer and early autumn 2021. Now there is no such large-scale migration crisis, the influx of migrants has been greatly reduced. Can this be considered the result of sanctions? I think in part yes, because, above all, the effect of sanctions is political and psychological. When such a decision is made, the punished party, on whom restrictions are imposed, must figure out the cost of his action and possibly change his behavior. In this case, we see that behavior has changed, the migratory crisis has been temporarily resolved.
“The Belarusian military did not cross the Ukrainian border”
– The most severe was the sixth sanctions package, adopted in connection with Belarus’s complicity in Russian aggression against Ukraine. Did he influence anything?
– The effect is still difficult to assess. But the fact remains: Lukashenka still did not allow the army of the Republic of Belarus and himself to be drawn into the war in the truest sense of the word. I’m not saying he didn’t participate. As an expert, I assess this as complicity – consent and provision of Belarusian territory for Russian troops, the possibility of using Belarusian territory as a springboard for land and air invasion of Ukraine.
But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that until now the Belarusian army, the Belarusian military did not cross the Ukrainian border as representatives, military of the Republic of Belarus. Is this the result of a sixth round of sanctions, constant warnings? I believe it influenced.
Yes, there is a lot of skepticism about this, because so far there are many ways around sanctions. Lukashenka received some compensation from Russia. But in addition to sanctions, he also lost the Ukrainian market – and this was a real blow to the Belarusian economy, much more than, probably, any pressure from sanctions.
“The situation has changed”
– If the same severe sanctions were introduced or linked to the release of political prisoners, would there be progress on this topic that is so sensitive for Belarusians?
– I think so. And this is evidenced by the news about the release of Anzhelika Boris (president of the Union of Poles in Belarus, detained in March 2021, was recently released from criminal prosecution. – Red). The Poles partially achieved their goal – transport isolation, closed intersections, queues of trucks.
Minsk did not make any concessions, a propaganda campaign was carried out, that this does not harm us at all, and so on. But the result remains the result. He is.
And this indicates that the severity of sanctions against dictatorial regimes achieves a certain result, because, unfortunately, the language understood by these regimes is the language of coercion and punishment. Appeals, promises, humanitarian considerations do not work. This has been clear since 2020. It seems to me that the point is precisely that in 2020, tough sanctions were not adopted directly on persecution. They were symbolic, they gave the regime an understanding that you can do whatever you want with civil society in Belarus.
You cannot persuade a dictator to be less dictatorial. It is very difficult for Europe to rebuild itself in this sense, because the EU has chosen dialogue, positive encouragement, sanctions as its main instrument – to a lesser extent, in a very restricted way. Only now is Europe beginning to acquire thorns. Previously, this was not so – this was the philosophy and value system. In fact, I think it was a great example for the whole world. For Europe, this was an important conclusion of the two world wars, and it was true. Thanks to this, we have lived in peace since 1945. There was a cold war, an iron curtain, but there were no such hot conflicts, a hot war that Russia has now unleashed on Ukraine. And that, among other things, is the merit of Europe and the European vision of international relations and security. Now, unfortunately, the situation has changed and Europe will have to change.
– Can statements about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus still lead to a new package of sanctions? And does the EU still have the opportunity to tighten these sanctions against Belarus?
– Of course, Poland also showed how to tighten sanctions – transport isolation. I don’t presume to judge which direction European thinking will go in this regard, but I do think that sanctions will be tightened in response to concrete actions – if nuclear weapons are indeed deployed. And I think they will be tough sanctions, probably sectoral in nature. The deployment of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law in the sphere not even of regional, but global security. The issue is, in my view, about the possible adoption of international sanctions.
Source: DW
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