Because right from the start invasive the Russians are unexpectedly weak militarily and what is the Aleppo strategy? Richard Schultz, professor and director of the Fletcher School of International Security Studies at Tufts University, analyzes these questions.

“The life and health of our soldiers is a priority.” With these words, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson. The Ukrainian flag was raised in triumph, although the Ukrainians remain wary. They fear a trap, the possibility that the Russians will blow up the Nova Kakovka dam and flood the entire area, as they did during World War II, to thwart the advance of the Nazis (1). Despite the fact that the Russian army was unable to hold the supply line and retreated east of the Dnieper.

Before the start of the war, no one believed that the Russian army would cope so poorly and at the same time the Ukrainian side would cope so well. Neither Putin nor the US intelligence agencies. While the course of the war months later remains a mystery, one observation remains unchanged: Russia’s war machine is well below initial expectations. How is this explained? “I think they made a classic mistake when they judged the strength of an army by its new equipment.» Professor Schultz explained to us.

Russia has invested in recent years in per-arms “move away from nuclear deterrence and move towards conventional deterrence” (2), said in 2017 the long-term chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the mastermind behind the modernization of the Russian armed forces, Valery Gerasimov.

A quick visualization of how Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 clearly showed a significant disparity in the equipment of the two countries.

Compared to Ukraine, Russia has more than three times the population and nearly ten times the numbers in comparative tables such as defense budget, aircraft, helicopters, vehicles, etc. (3)

“The problem with these estimates is that you don’t evaluate how well the forces can use this equipment and how well this equipment can be maintained. In both cases, there was a major failure.”, Professor Schultz continues. “Equipment maintenance is terrible. No truck tires, no engine oil or anything like that. So, there is a big problem. Second, the military. The army is not ready for the modern battlefield. The Ukrainian army was prepared for the modern battlefield.” The professor told us how NATO prepared the Ukrainian military for the conditions of the modern battlefield, so that local commanders could take the initiative, while the Russian military made decisions in the rear.

Also, as economist Daniel Gross has written, in terms of the money Russia spends on defense, although it is a significant percentage of its GDP, the total—about $20 billion in 2020—is not particularly large for a country that sees itself as “superpower” (4).

“The military budget is particularly affected byhuge corruption, which there is in the administrative system. That’s why there were no spare parts…” explains Mr. Schultz.

Also, the weakness of the Russian apparatus is visible in the fact that they failed tosuch as the destruction of communications and other electronically controlled systems, and the inability to carry out cyber threats.(4)

The Russian military machine cannot win this war by conventional means, so Putin is conducting civilian terrorist drone operations, destroying Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and threatening to use nuclear weapons. More than 30% of the country’s energy infrastructure has been destroyed, and flooding has occurred in many places (5). Ukrainians are preparing for a possible total blackout. (6)

In fact, Putin’s army is losing this war, Mr. Schultz explains, so he is now in the place where, in his opinion, “ How can I force Ukrainians to do what I want? To line them up completely, that’s what I call his strategy Aleppo. When Russia went to save him Assad in Syria, one of their main areas of ISIS and other groups fighting it Assad, it was Aleppo. The Russian army did it in they did the same in Grozny removed in the early 2000s. They literally razed the city to the ground. If you look at his photographs Aleppo and his Groznysimilar.”

As a consequence, we see a war in which there is no morality and where war crimes reach the greatest extremes. “War crimes are an integral part of the Russian strategy” Mr. Schultz said characteristically and gave us the example of explosions in schools. “Russia bombed 200-300 schools in Ukraine (7). This cannot happen by accident. This is the planned destruction of infrastructure.»

Asked if we will see Putin face trial for war crimes in the future, Professor Schultz replied that “ It will never go to trial. But I think that the international community should hold a virtual Nuremberg about this. And not only Putin, but the top leadership around him and the generals responsible for this scorched earth policy. All of them must be judged, even if they abstain.”

The winter will be difficult due to energy shortages, but the West will continue to support Ukraine, Mr. Schultz said. Nobody knows how this war will end. “I know Putin has put himself in a position where he can’t back down.” … “Everyone believesthat wars can be short. My study of war – and I have studied war for a long time – shows that this is not the case. Wars are always amazing. And almost always live their lives. And that’s what’s going on here.”

“When this war ends, the consequences for Russia, not just for Putin, will be severe. The country will be called to pay for what it has done in Ukraine. Russia will become a pariah.”.

Sources:

1. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/02/second-world-war-dnieper-dam-blown-up-by-russians-1941
2. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military-technology-russia/03-putins-super-weapons
3. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?country1=ukraine&country2=russia
4. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russian-military-weaker-than-expected-ukraine-resilience-by-daniel-gros-2022-03
5. https://www.politico.eu/article/simson-eu-to-help-ukraine-repair-and-replace-lost-energy-infrastructure/
6. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/05/world/europe/kyiv-ukraine-electricity-russia-infrastructure.html
7. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/05/world/europe/kyiv-ukraine-electricity-russia-infrastructure.html

*Marilisa Anastasopoulou is a researcher and journalist. He edits a program of interviews and podcasts on international issues related to Greece, which is supported by NATO’s Office of Public Diplomacy. The discussion-interview with Professor R. Schultz took place as part of the podcast cycle “Ty Space”.