Reassessing the ability of the European Union (EU) to defend itself against military threats from the East is becoming an emergency rather than just a strategic priority. Two years after the start of Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine, it has become clear that both the EU and the US are partners whose pro-Ukrainian consensus seems to be reaching a limit when discussions touch on national interests in the electoral and/or financial spheres. However, any major failure on Ukrainian soil can affect the course of election campaigns in the US and Europe.

From February 2022 to the end of 2023, tens of billions of dollars and euros from the national budgets of NATO-EU countries were invested to support the Ukrainian state against Russian military aggression. Thus, in the period from February 2022 to January 2024, the EU allocated 77 billion euros from the total promised 144 billion euros, and the United States – 74.3 billion dollars. Therefore, the Ukrainian topic is not only a security issue, but also has political implications with electoral resonance. The negative socio-economic consequences of the war in Ukraine can be exploited by Eurosceptic forces (IPN, January 2024). The first test will be the European Parliament from 6 to 9 June, where the scales are expected to tip to the right (ECFR, January 2024).

Political processes in the EU and NATO are important for revitalizing solidarity around the Ukrainian cause. Both NATO and the EU, together and individually, could face dire new consequences for the European security architecture if an anti-transatlantic geopolitical egocentrism emerges in the event of Donald Trump’s victory. Dissonance at the Euro-Atlantic levels of decision-making in favor of Russia, which is preparing for new offensives against Ukraine in May (Reuters, February 2024), was practically invited by Trump to attack NATO countries that do not pay 2% of GDP for defense. The prospect of a Trump-led US presidency that favors transactional relations in NATO is a wake-up call for EU states that need renewed and strengthened security guarantees that are not currently available under the EU umbrella. Or Article 42 of the EU Treaty offers military assistance in the event of aggression (“mutual defense clause”), but it cannot in any way invoke any principle of collective defense (theoretically, under the auspices of the US), according to the model provided by Article 5 of the NATO Treaty .

Meanwhile, the EU’s southern neighborhood has not calmed down. The situation in the Middle East remains dire due to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza (2.2 million people at risk of starvation), which the Israeli leadership ignores and the EU and the US tolerate, undermining international authority. On the other hand, outside of Ukraine, other hotspots in the Eastern neighborhood generate uncertainty, demonstrating a limited degree of anticipation and reaction to random events. This can be seen in the example of speculation regarding the possible “annexation” of the Transnistrian region of Moldova by Russia (EESC, February 2024). Despite the fact that the separatist regime, with the permission or in coordination with the Russian special services, conducted a false flag operation in non-controlled Moldovan territory, the West missed an opportunity to demonstrate that it can effectively recognize and debunk Russian scenarios. . Another weak point in the eastern neighborhood is the existing tension in Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan, where the EU’s mediation service has apparently broken down due to suspicions that Charles Michel and the EU are respectively benefiting Armenia. Apparently, Germany has decided to take on the role of (informal) mediator in the process of normalizing the dialogue between Yerevan and Baku (Reuters, February 2024), but the prospects of this effort are murky, including the fact that Berlin’s help in the context of the Transnistrian settlement did not lead to real results. obligations between conflicting parties.

The Ukrainian element and EU-NATO borders

Despite other geopolitical crises, the crisis in Ukraine is returning to the fore because its failure to deal with it could lead to strategic advantages for Russia and other geopolitical rivals of the US and the EU in the Middle East, Africa and/or Southeast Asia. The current White House administration is trying to unlock $60 billion in US financial aid for Ukrainian military needs, which remains highly politicized. Any delay in this aid will be grounds for placing responsibility on the US for the advance of Russian troops in Ukraine, as was already seen after Ukraine lost control over the city of Avdiyivka in the Donetsk region (BBC, February 2024).

At the same time, the EU completed the decision-making procedures for the creation of a new financing mechanism for Ukraine for the period 2024-27 with the allocation of 50 billion euros (about 35% in the form of grants). However, it lags behind in the supply of ammunition, although Ukraine has tripled its domestic production of weapons, attracting about 500 local companies working in the national defense sector (100 state-owned companies). Even if Germany plans to allocate about 7 billion euros to help the Ukrainian army, the problem lies in the production and supply of ammunition at the European level, which will be increased to meet the needs of Europe and Ukraine no earlier than 2025.

In addition, the competition for the position of the future Secretary General of NATO may cause some misunderstandings if those proposed by the Eastern European countries – Estonia (Kaya Kallas) and Romania (Klaus Johannis) – are ignored in favor of the Dutch prime minister. Minister Mark Rutte (Reuters, February 2024). States on the eastern flank believe that strengthening NATO’s presence in the region is important to prevent scenarios of Russian invasion of the Baltic states. NATO enlargement with the recent acceptance of Sweden creates a positive perception of regional security, provided that it is reinforced by practical measures (military exercises, the presence of NATO troops, etc.). If the failure to provide Ukraine with a sufficient number of weapons is not overcome, and the new NATO leadership does not take into account the fears of the Eastern allies, then not only the reputation of the transatlantic alliance, but also the capacity of NATO will be under attack. NATO-EU tandem to demonstrate power beyond European borders, beyond Russia.

The specificity of the eastern flank is to the borders of NATO and beyond them

Doubts spreading over Trump’s claims about the reliability of NATO’s Article 5 are raising serious concerns for the EU’s own security. Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal to create a “defense” portfolio in the future College of Commissioners of the European Commission is a step in the right direction, including the idea of ​​appointing a representative of EU states from the eastern flank to this position. (Politico, February 2024). But in order to talk about collective defense in the EU, regardless of the decisions of future US presidents within NATO, synchronization of actions at the level of the state (political) and the private sector (military industry) is required. Currently, European military companies number around 2,000 entities, 7 of which have registered a total revenue of more than €40 billion in 2022, and four of this list are French. This explains why Emmanuel Macron for some time opposed the proposal to purchase ammunition for Ukraine from third non-European countries. However, even in crisis situations, individual economic interests of the country can replace strategic thinking with pan-European interests.

However, the need to speed up the EU’s defense readiness inevitably becomes a trend of opinion among European politicians. The current head of EU diplomacy, Josep Borrell, called this one of the main tasks at the moment, along with accelerating aid to Ukraine, intensifying contacts with the “global South” and ending the violent events in Gaza. Even if the production of ammunition in the EU increased by approximately 40% from 2021, this speed does not allow to provide the EU and Ukraine with the necessary amount of military consumables. In any case, the ultimate goal is the creation of national defense capabilities that can be interoperable at the European level, not the creation of a “European army”. Some positive trends in intra-European military cooperation emerge from the 236 proposals, an increase of more than 70% in 2023 compared to 2022, for post-2023 funding of around €1.2 billion from the European Defense Fund (created in 2021). . However, no investment in military production compensates for the inviolability of the secrets of military plans at the level of national structures in the NATO-EU countries. The recent scandal involving the leak of confidential information about aid to Ukraine from the German military echelons jeopardizes the goal of strengthening intra-European military cooperation (Deutsche Welle, February 2024). For this reason, in addition to increasing military production capacity in the EU, it is imperative to combat mistrust among allies by identifying and addressing integrity gaps in NATO-EU military counterintelligence structures.

On the eastern flank of the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – demonstrate a high level of awareness of Russian threats to the security of NATO’s eastern borders. Given the negative scenarios, the three NATO countries and the EU intend to invest at least 60 million euros to build a line of fortifications in the path of a possible land attack by Russia (Politico, January 2024). If the events in Ukraine lead to a “freeze” of the war or “artificial peace” and Trump becomes the US president who disarms NATO, then the Baltic states risk becoming the targets of future/possible waves of Russian territorial revisionism. Those who are one step closer to the EU, but very far from NATO, will find themselves in a difficult situation. Although candidate countries for EU accession (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) or countries where EU missions are deployed (including Armenia) can develop defense cooperation with the EU, they remain in the danger zone where Russia can minimally intervene in a hybrid form. The very least the EU can do is to clarify its own potential to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, where separatist actors can be drawn into reintegration processes through a combination of incentives and constraints, taking advantage of the isolation caused by events in Ukraine. On the other hand, the EU should use the lessons learned in Ukraine and Moldova to more effectively manage the situation in the separatist regions of Georgia. In addition, security risks in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan must be eliminated by involving both countries in investment projects related to the “Middle Corridor”, possible in exchange for the final normalization of relations with mutual recognition of borders. – Read the entire article on Contributors.ro