Now that it has become more clear than ever that Bashar al-Assad is not going anywhere and that his regime will remain in power for the foreseeable future, a number of Middle Eastern states are intensifying their efforts to reintegrate the Syrian dictator into normal life. region and its political and economic structures. The Arab League held a meeting in Cairo on Sunday, bringing together the foreign ministers of member states who voted to readmit Syria to the organization as a full member. The Syrian leader visited the United Arab Emirates in March this year, and the foreign minister on Monday took part in a joint meeting with his counterparts from Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the capital Amman. According to some reports, which are currently unconfirmed, Riyadh will prepare to host a visit by Bashar al-Assad shortly after Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan’s visit to Syria in April. There is also such information regarding a possible meeting with the current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Also worth noting is Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Damascus on Wednesday, the first since the start of the civil war in 2011, which the Iranian leader described as a “turning point” in relations between the two countries. of the state Raisi’s visit took place just a few weeks after the signing of an agreement in Beijing on the normalization of relations between Tehran and Riyadh, mediated by Iraq and Oman. In total, 15 agreements were signed between the two leaders, documents that should “open a new page in the field of economic cooperation.” Among other things, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who is part of the presidential delegation, met in Syria and with the exiled leaders of some Palestinian groups. Under these circumstances, the regime in Damascus has the opportunity to become part of the regional political and economic structures and restore its legitimacy, undermined by the sinister crimes committed during the civil war against the Syrian population in general and against the opposition in particular.

The economic aspect of Ebrahim Raisi’s visit is particularly relevant for understanding the sources of enthusiasm of some countries in the region regarding the normalization of relations with Syria. The destruction caused by the war, which has been going on for more than a decade, has created real humanitarian disasters. However, this now creates a huge economic opportunity for states willing to invest in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction. According to some estimates, the cost of rebuilding partially or completely destroyed cities and any infrastructure can reach more than 400 billion dollars.

For the Persian Gulf countries, Syria may not be a priority at the moment. However, keeping Bashar al-Assad in power is useful for security reasons, when the Syrian leader shows a willingness to cooperate in this area, of course, in situations of interest to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, as well as for reasons related to the predictability of the regime. The UAE’s view is that gradual normalization will distance Syria from Iran’s influence, and this will produce better results than imposing harsh reforms. Saudi Arabia is somewhat more cautious and, aware of the dangers of a fragmented Syrian state, wants to see Iran’s influence diminish and Assad’s position change before relations improve. Jordan, a country neighboring Syria, has made several attempts to normalize relations with the Damascus regime, but without much success. One of the most serious problems facing Amman on its border with Syria is the cross-border drug trade, including captagon, an alternative to amphetamine.

Returning to the economic aspect, the interest of the Gulf countries is not to invest billions in a bankrupt economy for humanitarian reasons for the welfare of the Syrian population. In a context where opposition to the al-Assad regime has been tamed and the Islamic State virtually irrelevant in Syria, it is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad faces no significant obstacles to maintaining his dictatorship. Thus, the utility of investing in post-conflict reconstruction of Syria is political because money buys influence. Let us not forget, however, that al-Assad remained in power during this tumultuous period with the help of Iran and Russia. Its attraction to the sphere of influence of the Persian Gulf monarchies means distancing itself from the temptations of Tehran. On the other hand, Bashar al-Assad, for his part, needs to diversify the sources of financial support given the current circumstances in Iran.

At the same time, the regime in Tehran realizes that the reduction in the intensity of the war in Syria and the reduction of the main opposition groups to Damascus require a significant change in the role of the Revolutionary Guard, for example, in Syria. conflict. Iran-backed armed groups in Syria, including Hezbollah, will soon lose their relevance and legitimacy in the absence of real threats to Bashar al-Assad. Such a situation will push Tehran to transform the functions performed by these structures, whose physical presence in Syria will remain a necessity in the near future. To remain a significant player in the Syrian landscape, the Iranian regime will have to make a transition from a war logic in which resources are invested in weapons or military personnel, for example, to a post-conflict logic in which the emphasis is on infrastructure reconstruction and service provision. In addition, Tehran is fully aware that the temptation of the Persian Gulf monarchies will take Syria out of its sphere of influence, so it is beginning to attach great importance to the economic dimension of its relations with Damascus.

However, important obstacles to rebuilding Syria remain. One of them is the regime of sanctions imposed by the West on the Arab country, measures that currently prevent large investments. Both the United States of America and the European Union lack a clear vision for Syria, and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes it a marginal topic on the international agenda. At the same time, however, the ability of economic sanctions to induce behavioral change is being questioned, including in the Gulf states, Iran being the closest example of the limitations of this mechanism. The fact that the situation in Syria in no way indicates that Bashar Assad will leave power in the near future, and the efforts of the countries of the region to normalize relations with Damascus will probably lead to the gradual lifting of sanctions in the future. or at least a tacit acknowledgment of their violation to allow investment in post-conflict reconstruction.

In summary, the decision of states such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan to accelerate the reintegration of the Bashar al-Assad regime into the political and economic structures of the Middle East by normalizing relations with him comes, most likely, for reasons that may be pragmatic . The devastation caused by the war in Syria opens up huge economic opportunities, which, on the one hand, are of interest to the Gulf monarchies in order to buy political influence and distance Damascus from Tehran. On the other hand, Iran realizes that significantly reducing threats to the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime requires a significant transformation of the role of armed groups supported by Tehran and the Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria. Read the whole article and comment on Contributors.ro