Christos Tsakas
With an Eye on Europe: Greco-German Relations After the War University Publications
Krita, 2023, p. 352

Christos Tsakas belongs to the younger generation of historians and has already established himself in Greece and abroad. With his book A View of Europe: Greco-German Relations After the War (published in Greece by the University Press of Crete and abroad as Post-War Greco-German Relations, 1953-1981 by Palgrave MacMillan), three decades of economic history were squeezed into approximately in 300 pages, covering the period from the government of Anxiety to the first major turning point of the government of change.

Tsakas has done extensive research in Greek and foreign archives, through which he is essentially rewriting the history of Greece’s industry, as well as redefining the country’s relationship and aspirations with Europe. The book begins with the Anxiety government’s efforts to secure industrial capital under very difficult conditions, and outlines the Greek shipowners’ interest in Greek industry, which he writes was the result of a double setback: the cancellation of Onassis’ plans to transport Saudi ships. oil and preventing the shipowner (but also Stavros Niarchos) from entering the West German shipbuilding industry. According to Tsakas, it was these investments that paved the way for the rise of Greece’s position in the international economy.

Focusing on Greek-German relations, Tsakas analyzes the contribution of shipowners to the reconstruction of the West German shipbuilding industry and shows that the Greek state from the very beginning tried to use Greek shipping as a negotiating weapon to achieve its goals, such as the absorption of Greek tobacco from Germany, which, according to in fact, it ran counter to the interests of German industry. In addition, the book sheds light on the joint efforts of Onassis and Niarchu to extract a stake from the German shipyards in which they placed orders for ships, which, however, were canceled after Nerchu’s cooperation with the American authorities in the prosecution of Onassis by the FBI.

In addition, through the German archives, he delves into the connections that contributed to the Greek efforts to obtain resources from West Germany after the signing of the Greco-German Pact of 1953, which opened the way for German companies such as Krups, Siemens, etc. Telefunken is more actively returning to the Greek market .

In fact, Ioannis Vulpiotis, representing Siemens, and Prodromos Bodosakis-Athanasiadis appear in the context of these fermentations. The two businessmen behind the scenes played a critical role in bringing about a Greco-German rapprochement through their networks in Germany, and were also the main recipients of West German loans in Greece. Vulpiotis had open connections with the occupiers during the occupation, achieving among other things the transfer of British Cable & Wireless to Telefunken in just 12 hours, thus securing his position as CEO of Hellenic Radio.

At the same time, Tsakas reveals Bodosakis’s secret relationship with the Germans during the occupation. Although he was outside of Greece, he entrusted the protection of his interests to one of the leaders of Rheinmetall, who was arrested at the businessman’s house in Psychiko, where he continued to reside from the period of occupation until the spring of 1946. Tsakas, in fact, speaks directly about the post-war attempt to cover up the traces of the occupation, the disclosure of which threatened the very existence of these companies in Greece.

Three decades of economic history are full of mysteries, interweaving of interests and many political backgrounds.

It should be noted that the economic agreement of 1953 exceeded all expectations of Greece, since from the 100 million marks that were originally planned to be used, it reached 200 million marks, funding critical projects such as the development of Ptolemaida lignite, nickel at Larimna, an alumina plant, a refinery and the expansion of the OTE telephone network – Bodosakis and Vulpiotis moved the strings underground, and because of the latter, a scandal broke out in Greece with Siemens.

The cause of the scandal was a direct purchase agreement from OTE to Siemens, which, however, did not specify the price and which turned out to be significantly higher than those that the company originally offered. According to Tsakas, this contract was in exchange for a loan from West German financial markets, but a rift between Papagu and Marchesini eventually led to its suspension. After a conflict within the Emergency Government (between Panagis Papaligouras and Konstantinos Papakonstantinou, who was backed by Transport Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis), Athens finally proceeded to hold an international competition and the Germans abandoned Vulpiotis.

This unfortunate episode of the Greco-German rapprochement was of great benefit to Bodosakis, whose group absorbed 270 million of the 345 million marks of German loans. In fact, Tsakas reveals CIA documents that indicate that Bodosakis started the first major political crisis that Karamanlis now faces as prime minister.

It all started in 1957, when National Bank Governor Vassilis Kyriakopoulos resigned due to pressure from Deputy Prime Minister Andreas Apostolidis to soften the bank’s lending policy towards Bodosakis, as well as publisher Dimitrios Lambrakis.

According to CIA documents highlighted by Tsakas, it is widely believed that Apostolidis had the support of both palaces and powerful private individuals. Soon, however, Kyriakopoulos’ resignation will be canceled and the National Bank will approve a new loan to the Hellenic Company of Chemical Products and Fertilizers of the Bodosakis group, which will increase the bank’s total claims on the company to 180 million drachmas. having actually exceeded, after a special permission of the Currency Commission, the legal limit of 20% of its share capital. In the spring of 1958, the bank’s management agreed to continue negotiations for a new loan to the company, succumbing to government pressure in favor of Bodosakis. But for this, Tsakas notes, it was necessary to change the government in early March, after the defection of 15 ERE deputies, in connection with the election law, which forced Karamanlis to resign and call elections.

Karamanlis’ victory in the elections also brought him revenge. The rebaptized prime minister directly attacked Bodosakis through the nationalization of LIPTOL, which became a PPC monopoly, pushed the National Company to increase its share in the Asia Minor business group companies, and strengthened third business actors to harm interests. These actions led Bodosakis to leave the refinery, handing over his share to Stavros Niarchos, and also led to the emergence of new players in the Greek business such as Aristotle Onassis, Stratis Andreadis, Tom Papas and Pechini. The fruit of this ferment was an agreement between Messrs. Niarchos and Andreadis, whereby the latter was persuaded not to open the Elefsina shipyards until 1968, so that the former’s shipyards could operate without competition.

Tsakas does not stop at the interweaving of eras, but expands his narrative to the first steps of Athens towards Europe, which passed through Bonn and Brussels and the association agreements between Greece and the EEC, the subsequent tariff disarmament and harmonization of the country’s agrarian policy, the attraction of the first European funds and the forgotten fears of 1960 -s about whether joining the EEC is beneficial. At the same time, it describes the dynamic infiltration of French interests into Greece and Germany’s reaction to it, describes the country’s industrial transition through the junta’s policies, and how it worked between “freezing” annexation efforts and tolerance. Western capitals in their efforts to create (or keep) jobs in Athens. And this highlights the BSE’s ambivalent attitude towards the April 21st regime, as well as the shipowners’ embrace with the conspirators.

He then analyzes post-colonial state interventionism, EEC accession negotiations, and the exhaustion of Greek industry’s ability to remain competitive. In fact, Tsakas points out that ending the accession effort as a means of stabilizing democracy is the most common post-colonial myth, and argues that, in reality, stabilizing democracy was not a goal, but a condition for a country’s accession to the EEC.

Finally, it describes the negotiations between Greece and the EEC to obtain benefits for sectors of the economy during the country’s transition period, until its obligations and rights were assimilated into the Community. While this highlights PASOK’s initial ambivalence towards the EEC, the strange relationship between Change and Brussels, and the Movement’s hard-line redistributive policies that eventually led to the first austerity measures of the Andreas Papandreou government, signaling the exhaustion of the dynamics of the post-war Greek development model.

Mr. Achilleas Hekimoglu is a writer and researcher.