Her first assessments of the railway tragedy in Tempe presented on Friday morning by a five-member independent commission of inquiry into the accident, which includes experts appointed by the families of the victims.

The Committee consists of Mr. George Vlassopoulos, Phaedo Karaiosifidis, Kostas Lakathosis, Vassilis Papadopoulos and George Perivoliotis. These are people of various specializations, striving to highlight all the dark sides of the tragedy and come to the conclusion “Are they to blame for this?” for a fatal accident.

Thus, after an autopsy carried out by members of the commission at the site of the collision of two trains, as well as from the analysis of the collected data, the following conclusions were drawn:

• Throughout the OSE and TRAINOSE/Hellenic Train organization, very serious long-term and systemic problems are evident. a common point is the absence or non-observance of specific procedures, such as: non-standard wireless communication between stations-trains, non-standard execution of train movement procedures, non-standard training with specific lesson plans in the practical training of new Station Masters, incomplete evaluation and certification process, deficiencies in risk management and crew resource management (CRM) issues.

Regarding communication between station masters and machinists, the researcher Mr. Vlassopoulos explained that phraseology is very important for the smooth passage of routes. “When communication is not done properly, problems arise. Here we heard nicknames, “leave”, “come”, this is unacceptable. “It is assumed that one of the two speakers graduated a week ago. It is inconceivable that a person who graduated a week ago would say so. If the phraseology was correct and standardized, and the driver answered that he understood, then most likely nothing would have been done.”

At the same time, Mr. Vlasopoulos stressed that should be a checklist. That is a list of actions to be taken. “Some things didn’t happen here. Some act as they remember, without a specific list of actions to be taken. So something is wrong with the training of station masters and machinists,” he added.

• There are serious shortcomings in the radio communication system. between stations and lines that compromise traffic safety (traffic control with inadequate VHF FM simplex system with known gaps in coverage, GSM-R system with implementation delays and limited suitability for traffic control).

As for the radio communication system, the researchers reported that it was insufficient, as there was no signal on many sections of the route, adding that there should usually be two communication systems. Both the VHF system and the GSM-R system.

• They are mentioned delays in project implementation for ETCS and remote control systems.

With regard to safety systems, committee member Giorgos Perivoliotis stressed that the ultimate cause of the accident was the lack of automatic safety systems. “If we had automatic systems, the accident would not have happened, because two trains would never have entered the same line,” he explained.

• They are observed unreasonably long repair times for existing systems vital for road safety (traffic sign – photo sign).
• A risk/operational safety study has not been carried out.
• Eat gaps in relevant legislation on fire safety and fire protection.

With regard to fire safety and fire protection, committee members stressed that there is no relevant legislation, resulting in a lack of adequate security systems. Indicative is the fact that the train did not even have a traffic light so that passengers could see and be able to get out of the car.

• Further investigation required abnormal and expected ignition pattern a large amount of unknown fuel, which, according to estimates, is associated with the development of a fire that followed in specific cars of a passenger train.

In particular, regarding the large fire that occurred after the train collision, Mr Kostas Lakafosis stated that the committee had not yet concluded what caused it, adding that an investigation was underway both into what was inside the train and what what was outside.

“We don’t know if it was something on the train or outside. We explore everything. Even if there was something wrong with the construction or something could be moved. What was heard that the fire originated from an electric arc is not true, ”he said characteristically.

At the same time, in addition to the initial findings mentioned above, the committee also made safety recommendations OSE, Hellenic Train and regulators and legislators.

OSE committee recommendations

• The immediate installation and full operation of a modern remote control system and ETCS is recommended.
• A radical review of the evaluation-certification procedures for all specialties after the completion of theoretical and practical OJT (training on the job) is recommended, since the success rates presented indicate problematic procedures.
• The institute of periodic evaluation is recommended to ensure that factors such as advanced age or the introduction of new digital technologies do not affect the performance of an employee.
• It is recommended to insist on training, evaluation and supervision of strict adherence to critical procedures without the right to reject.
• The immediate development of a network of repeaters and repeaters of the analogue radiotelephone system (VHF) along the railway network is recommended in order to completely cover the (somehow strictly defined) route of any train to any point in Greece, corresponding to its special radio connection. networks EL.AS., P.S. or “Olympia Radio” delivery.

Committee recommendations for Hellenic Train

• It is recommended that all train drivers be immediately trained and equipped with portable GSM-R devices that will act as a secondary/auxiliary communication system in the event of a failure of the VHF and GSM-R systems of each locomotive.
• It is recommended to immediately activate the installed GSM-R terminals on the machines and install the GSM-R terminals on those machines that do not have it yet.
• It is recommended to review and update radio communication procedures between train drivers and train masters (Hellenic Train) and station masters (OSE).
• The Cockpit Voice Recorder+Video expansion module is recommended to be supplied and installed to an already installed Hasler recording system so that sound and video can also be recorded from the driver’s cab.

Committee recommendations to regulators and legislators

• Creation of fire safety and fire protection rules and regular inspections together with PS
• It is recommended to review the technical characteristics of fire protection and structural materials of the inner lining and electrical equipment of trains.
• It is recommended to create a special service with the jurisdiction of direct security checks.
• It is recommended to institutionalize the obligation to prepare a Risk Analysis on behalf of the authorities involved for each parameter and each change in the conditions of railway traffic.