A number of mistakes that led to the tragedy of Tempe and the death of 57 people are analyzed in his report by the former technical director of the EfE, John Papamichael. In fact, he distinguishes between two levels responsibilities.

V firstfinds a number of errors:

“We are seeing complete ignorance by the station attendants of the process of automatically drawing a route from the board in front of him. All movements during automatic route planning are recorded. The automatic engraving also ensures that all keys are in the correct position to avoid human error. We should also note that the panel worked fine. The consequence of this ignorance was that he made movements on the table by hand, as a result of which they were not recorded.

After 22:12 (less than an hour before the collision), no further movement was recorded because the other stationmaster left before the end of his shift (which ended at 23:00). He actually resigned from his post, and someone or someone tried to cover it up after the fact by forging a service sheet with a form!!!

Finally, the duties of the inspector, who had the “inspiration” after the incident to take a month’s sick leave, and the supervisor who signed the shift, are serious, since they entrusted the station exclusively to this particular person.

And continues:

“Before driving off the fatal train, the stationmaster made another mistake. At 22:30 I received a commuter train from Thessaloniki from the descent line. He left Volos the key 116 upside down and the driver warned him (which is recorded) and he had to back up so that the master could manually correct the key from the console so that the train went to the third line to throw it away people. At 23:02 enters Larissa station from no. 62 INTERCITY. After disembarking and landing in Thessaloniki, there are two drivers in front of him and a third driver who is returning to his headquarters.

The stationmaster gives the order, by radiotelephone, which is recorded (rather than the written pattern 1001), to the train drivers to leave without telling them which line. There are only two stereotypical suggestions for this process: you go Normal and out of the Anode, or you go out the other way and out of the Downside.

Train drivers, since the stationmaster did not tell them where to get off, had to ask for clarification before leaving. They didn’t and, even worse, left without filing a Notice of Departure despite the Rules. If they had asked for clarification before the start, the stationmaster would have told them OK and from the Anode, since he forgot that the key 118A was turned to the Cathode. Thus, when passing key 118A and entering Down, they had to slow down, contact again by radiotelephone for reverse, enter Anode again, the station master manually corrected key 118A to Anode, and only then would they leave. Instead, they continued on their way to destruction!

If, finally, the stationmaster had been in front of the scoreboard, he would have seen the train route highlighted in red on the console, and the collision could have been avoided! It is certain that the stationmaster was inadequate.”

G. Papamichael explains his phenomenon glitter and fire at the time of the collision.

“I would like to explain the phenomenon of the huge flash and fire resulting from the collision, because arbitrary interpretations circulate. It is known that electric machines are powered by 25,000 volt electromotive cables located above the railway tracks. The speed at the time of the frontal collision was 160 km/h for the passenger train and about 100 km/h for the commercial train. It is clear that the relative approach speed was 260 km/h.

Upon impact, the two cars did not fly up, but turned into a single shapeless mass. At the next stage, the first car (class A) and the second car (restaurant) were thrown onto the engine wreckage and, before they came into contact with high-voltage cables, powerful electrical discharges occurred.

In fact, two carriages were struck by lightning. In a millisecond, millions of kilowatts of energy were released, most of which was converted into heat, causing the temperature on the outside of the cars to rise by thousands of degrees Celsius. From the hell of electric shock, it was impossible for the passengers of the first two cars to survive.

“Since 2013, a modern radio communication system (GSM-R) has been installed between stations, trains and R.K. (stationmasters, train drivers and R.K. are talking to each other), the so-called “red” telephone. Train drivers were trained to work with the system in 2014. OSE unilaterally manages the system in stations, while TRAINOSE refuses to operate the system on trains under the pretext that it is not certified by the Railway Regulatory Authority (RAS).

In fact, they are delaying it because the GSM-R system is not compatible with the Silver Arrows, the “new” (actually old) wires of the Hellenic Train, a sample of which the Italians installed at Thessaloniki station in 2019 for use in elections. . TRAINOSE and RAS are responsible for the delay in certification. If the GSM-R system installed on the trains also worked, the collision could have been avoided!

In 2015, the Minister of Transport cut OSE’s funding from €120 million to €45 million due to OSE’s failure to meet obligations to maintain the network and repair damage or sabotage. Thus, these projects were handed over to ERGOSE and have been carried out with contractors ever since. Due to my experience on the line, I will not expand on the huge safety issue that has since arisen on the line as it is not responsible for this particular accident. However, in order to prevent fatal derailments in the future, the problem must be urgently reconsidered.”

How was the stationmaster hired?

“In order to urgently fill the vacant positions of station chiefs, the OZE Administration, instead of applying to ASEP, hired 73 station chiefs (with an age limit of 48 years) and a minimum of transfers (without limitation) from a block from the “list”. The administration also downplayed the importance of training future masters of stations, unacceptably reducing its duration (4 months of training! and 1 month of practice!).

Finally, he appointed a decorative commission of three people for the exams, which did not cut anyone out, for the first time in the annals of the OGE (they also made sure that the 59-year-old laborer would soon retire with a station chief salary)!

It should be noted that the metro applies psychotechnical tests to its recruits, the cost of which in private is about 170 euros per person. But there is also the General Aviation Hospital (GNA) which does free tests for OSE as well as other DEKOs. The responsibility for not using psychotechnical tests in the selection of personnel is criminal today, because the increase in speeds and the automation of movement require a perfectly balanced staff. If they had done these tests, many candidates would have been laid off, as is usually the case.”

He also mentions that the route of the draft list, which is the beginning of a tragic end, is up for investigation.

“The OSE administration is responsible for organizing and implementing the specific recruitment process. It goes without saying that the list is not a modern invention (this is how the former government hired machinists).

The urgent issue is to restore the “Melon” Law for ASEP in the form in which it is, with the only provision that in emergency cases, vacancies are temporarily filled by recalling pensioners in the energy sector, without cutting their pensions.

Concluding my report, I consider it necessary to conduct an immediate judicial investigation so that the perpetrators can be brought to justice as soon as possible. At the same time, the necessary administrative interventions must be immediately taken for the completely safe re-operation of the railway in order to prevent the recurrence of such criminal inactions.

The intervention of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court for the judicial investigation of all incidents over a period of 15 years would be useful, on the strict condition that it does not delay the end of this particular case for a minute.

Exhibition

“In order to assist in the investigation of the tragic incident, I, as a former OSE Technical Director, have compiled a report that I am sending you, trying to be completely honest about the assignment of blame and noting the criminal political and administrative interference that led to the terrible head-on collision.”

And he adds: “I decided to write this report to help clear up the confusion created for angry citizens by various ‘experts’ roaming the channels with no knowledge of the subject. I note that in recent decades, the development of technology has made it possible to modernize lines around the world, increase speeds, condense train traffic and provide reliable passenger service. The movement of trains is regulated by strict regulations, the implementation of which is ensured by multifaceted control that excludes the consequences of human error and clear disciplinary provisions in cases of violation of the regulations.

I will try to document the inexcusable negligence of those responsible for the enforcement of security rules and political duties in administrations and governments, focusing on points that will be the subject of a judicial investigation.