The withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the Kharkiv region of Ukraine sowed panic, disappointment and surprise among pro-war activists. Their channels on the Telegram messaging app are filled with anger at the authorities and questions about how the failure happened. This is one of the most serious political challenges to the Kremlin since it began to destroy the anti-Putin opposition, the Moscow Times writes.

The Russian authorities have always had difficult relations with the pro-war segment of the population. For many years it was marginal: only a small group of fans of the Novorossia project – a hypothetical confederation of states in the southeast of Ukraine from Kharkiv to Odesa, which had little influence on the political agenda – followed the fighting in Donbas. .

However, the invasion of Ukraine not only radicalized the pro-war party, but also strengthened it with important political leaders.

The conservative anti-Western majority – including the ruling party, the security forces (secret service agents) and the systemic opposition, which is not really opposed to Putin – fully supported the president’s decision to invade Ukraine and even tried to put a pro-war leader at the helm.

For a while, the gap between the pro-war opportunists in the government and the anti-Kyiv opportunists almost disappeared, creating a sense of broad socio-political support for the war.

However, in the face of setbacks, the two groups are once again divided, with the establishment trying to justify the Kremlin’s every decision, while pro-war activists complain, criticize and even question the ability of the Russian armed forces to succeed.

Two parallel spheres appeared

In the first, official, realm of “peace”, with its political curators and television propaganda, everything is going great in Russia, all goals will be achieved at the front, and the West is doomed.

In the second, the realm of “war”, thousands are killed and wounded, there are victories and defeats, and the struggle is for life and death.

There is now a gulf between those who see a “holy war” and those who recognize only a “special military operation” with unclear objectives and uncertain time frames.

Why Putin is losing support

At the beginning, the difference between these two positions was limited, which allowed the Kremlin to enjoy consolidation: support for almost all institutions of power grew rapidly; the public expressed solidarity with the Kremlin; no one dared to make waves; the non-systemic opposition was crushed and the systemic opposition joined the military camp.

Thanks to all this, the regional and local elections held on September 11 were peaceful.

However, over time, the kingdoms became more and more distant from each other. Recent polls have shown that Russians are growing weary of news about the war and are even becoming irritated by those who use the war for political gain.

The Kremlin has realized that pushing the military agenda too far can be dangerous, and is simulating “peaceful life” in the country.

Meanwhile, defeats and challenges on the front line were mounting, with fears that Russian troops would not only never reach Kyiv again, but might even lose the war entirely.

The kingdoms of “peace” and “war” could have existed for a long time if not for the devastating retreat of Kharkiv.

In recent months, the kingdom of “war” has grown and matured, creating a social base and winning over hundreds of thousands of Russians. Recent military defeats have brought this area to the fore, much to the Kremlin’s dismay.

At the root of this split is Putin’s strange attitude towards Ukraine.

In his opinion, Russia should never have defeated the Ukrainian army on the battlefield or led a long campaign.

Putin’s reluctance to mobilize troops, his willingness to retreat, and his leisurely talk betray his belief that Ukraine is historically doomed without major fighting: eventually, he believes, the country will be exhausted, the West will withdraw its military aid, and the elites will accept capitulation.

But Putin misjudged Ukraine’s ability and readiness to strike back.

Read the full analysis below Moscow Times.