With Russian troops in Ukraine hastily retreating and Kyiv’s victory looming, Putin’s promise to restore the USSR appears unlikely. Putin’s imperialist project will be not only his personal failure, but also a moral, political and economic disaster for the entire country. In this context, it is impossible to imagine that he will stay in power, writes Ann Applebaum in an editorial for The Atlantic, reports Rador.

Over the past six days, the Ukrainian army has broken through Russian forces in the northeastern part of the country and advanced on a wide front to the east, liberating town after town from the territory it had so far occupied. First Balaklia, then Kupyansk, then Izyum, a city located at the junction of important transport routes. Perhaps these names mean little to a foreign audience, but these are places that were inaccessible, that Ukrainians could not contact for months. Now they were detained again after a few hours. As I write this text, Ukrainian forces are said to be fighting in the suburbs of Donetsk, a city occupied by Russia since 2014.

Much about this advance is unexpected, especially the location: for weeks the Ukrainians have been trumpeting their intention to launch a major offensive further south. The biggest shock is not the Ukrainian tactics, but the Russian reaction. “We are really surprised that the Russian troops are not counterattacking,” Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told me yesterday morning in Kyiv.

Russian troops do not counterattack. What’s more: when given the choice between fight and flight, many Russian soldiers seem to run as fast as they can. For several days now, the military and others have been posting photos of hastily abandoned equipment and other military equipment, as well as footage of long convoys of cars – most likely collaborators trying to escape from the occupied territories. In the message of the Ukrainian General Staff, it is said that some of the Russian military are shedding their uniforms, changing into civilian clothes and trying to return to Russia inconspicuously. The Security Service of Ukraine has created a special hotline for Russian soldiers who want to surrender, and has also published recordings of their calls. The fundamental difference between Ukrainian soldiers fighting for the existence of their country and Russian soldiers fighting for pay has finally started to matter.

Of course, this difference may not be enough. Despite the fact that the Ukrainians are better motivated, the Russians have a much larger stockpile of weapons and ammunition. They can still inflict suffering on civilians, as evidenced by today’s apparent attacks on power grids in Kharkiv and other cities in eastern Ukraine. Many other brutal options – horrible ones – are available even to Russia, whose soldiers no longer want to fight. The Zaporizhzhia NPP remains in the war zone. Russian propagandists have been talking about nuclear weapons since the beginning of the war. Although Russian troops are not fighting in the north, they are still resisting the Ukrainian offensive in the south.

But even though there may be many more rounds of hostilities, the events of the last few days should make Ukraine’s allies think twice. A new reality was created: Ukrainians could win the war. Are we in the West really ready for a Ukrainian victory? Do we know what other changes it might bring?

In March, I wrote that it was time to imagine the possibility of victory, a victory that I defined quite clearly: “This means that Ukraine remains a sovereign democracy with the right to choose its own leaders and conclude its own treaties.” Now, six months later, some adjustments are needed to this succinct definition. I witnessed Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov’s speech yesterday in Kyiv, according to which victory must now include not only the return of Ukraine to its 1991 borders, including Crimea and eastern Donbas, but also war reparations and war crimes tribunals. victims as much justice as possible.

These statements are in no way outrageous or extreme. This was not a simple war for territory, but a military campaign aimed at genocide. Russian troops tortured and killed civilians in the occupied territories, arrested and deported hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed theaters, museums, schools, and hospitals. Russian bombings of cities far from the front line have killed civilians and caused billions in damage. A simple return of territory in itself cannot compensate Ukraine for this catastrophic invasion.

But despite the fact that the Ukrainian definition of victory is justified, it is extremely ambitious. Frankly, it is difficult to imagine how Russia could satisfy any of these demands – territorial, financial, judicial – as long as the current president is in power. Do not forget that Putin has put the destruction of Ukraine at the very center of his foreign and domestic policy and considers it the core of the legacy he will leave to posterity. Two days after the failed offensive on Kyiv began, a Russian state news agency mistakenly published (and later retracted) an article that prematurely declared success. “Russia has restored its integrity,” the article says. The collapse of the USSR – “the tragedy of 1991, this terrible catastrophe in our history” – was resolved. A “new era” has begun.

The initial mission has already failed. There will be no “new era”. The USSR is not resuscitated. And when the Russian elites finally realize that Putin’s imperial project is not only his personal failure, but also a moral, political and economic disaster for the entire country, including themselves, then his claims to be the rightful ruler of Russia will dissolve. When I write that Europeans and Americans should prepare for a Ukrainian victory, I mean this: we should expect that a Ukrainian victory – and certainly a victory as defined by Kyiv – will also bring the end of the Putin regime.

To be clear: this is not a prediction; this is a warning. There are many strange things in the current political system of Russia, and the strangest thing is the complete absence of a mechanism of succession to the throne. Not only do we have no idea who could or could replace Putin; we have no idea who could or could have chosen this person. In the USSR, there was a Politburo, a group of people who theoretically could make such decisions, and very rarely. In Russia, on the contrary, there is no transition mechanism. There is no crown prince. Putin has refused to allow Russians to even consider an alternative to his vile and corrupt version of kleptocratic rule. However, I repeat: it is impossible to imagine him remaining in power if the cornerstone of his legitimacy – the promise to revive the USSR – turns out to be not only impossible, but also ridiculous.

Preparing for Putin’s departure does not mean that the Americans, Europeans or any other outsiders should directly interfere in Moscow’s politics. We have no tools capable of influencing the course of events in the Kremlin, and any attempt to intervene will necessarily lead to a negative reaction. Which in no way means that we should help him stay in power. As Western heads of state, foreign ministers and generals ponder how to end this war, they should not seek to perpetuate Putin’s vision of himself and the world, nor his retrograde definition of Russian greatness. They should not plan to negotiate on his terms at all, as they may be dealing with a completely different person.

Even if they prove ephemeral, the events of the past few days are indeed changing the nature of this war. From the very beginning, everyone – Europeans, Americans and the global business community in particular – wanted a return to stability. But the path to stability in Ukraine, long-term stability, could not be seen. After all, any premature truce may be viewed by Moscow as an opportunity to rearm. Any proposal for negotiations may be viewed by Moscow as a sign of weakness. But now is the time to ask questions about the very stability of Russia and include them in our calculations. Russian soldiers are fleeing the front, abandoning equipment, demanding surrender. How long will we have to wait for people from Putin’s inner circle to do the same?

The possibility of instability in Russia, a nuclear power, scares many. But from now on it may be inevitable. And if this is what awaits us, then we must anticipate it, plan for it, think about what opportunities it might bring, but also what risks it might bring. “We have learned not to be afraid anymore,” Reznikov told his audience in Kyiv on Saturday. “Now we ask the rest of you to stop being afraid.”