During the last period, Greece provided its defensive armor. France achieved the same before the war with the “Mazino line”. But when the German offensive began, the conditions of the war changed, what was during the First World War was overcome.

Similar changes have been made in recent years, aided by the successful defense of Ukraine. Non-material elements of power have become more important than material ones. Lightweight devices, incorporating the latest technology, destroy much more expensive weapons systems. The use of information from the air makes it possible to neutralize significant forces on land and at sea. It is expected that artificial intelligence will turn all data about war and propaganda upside down.

These developments amplify the influence of great technological forces, both public and private, such as those that support Ukraine. Thus, the war extends to influence on world public opinion, since it largely determines the choice of these powers. The local nature of conflicts over territories and borders is now spilling over into geopolitical, communicational, and technological networks that are evolving across geographic scales.

In this demanding environment, its prevalence Tayyip Erdogan introduces a new period in Greek-Turkish relations. In this final term, the Turkish president must, on the one hand, ensure unity and stability in a polarized, divided Turkey, and on the other hand, this is his last chance to remain in Turkish history equal, if not superior, to Mustafa Kemal. Ataturk. These challenges lead in the same direction – to the great neo-Ottoman imperial idealism. Erdogan’s personal vision is the only unifying narrative: it connects coastal nationalists dreaming of international recognition with Islamists at home yearning for an Ottoman past. The sea is central to the narrative, which is why Greece is presented as an obstacle.

Turkey had many opportunities to introduce a new logic of confrontation. She has been involved in conflicts in her wider circle for decades, she has twice been involved in the Ukrainian crisis, so she is ideally placed to learn the lessons of the greatest military school of our time. Military equipment and industry are developed here.

The Greek “Mazino Line” has saved us so far. However, catalytic revisions will be required today and in the near future. This is not limited to the Department of National Defense, which by definition is aware of current rates. The new defense doctrine needs a radically restructured Foreign Office. Technological and industrial autonomy is also vital, which obviously implies a reform of universities and the research sector. Relations with the diaspora should be reviewed. Finally, the shipping world must have its say.

A century after our allies in Asia Minor left us, we must not forget that defense against the “great powers” depends on our own diplomatic and communication skills.

The last term of Tayyip Erdogan may be marked by a critical showdown. We have the necessary capacity inside and outside of Greece to cope with the conflict, the essence of which is gradually moving from material to non-material factors. However, the rigidity and isolation of the Greek political system must be overcome.

The recent election results in Greece have raised hopes – that is, that many of the old stereotypes, civil or dictatorial, have ceased to hamper Greece’s adaptation to a rapidly changing world. This development allows you to return lost time. The revision of the “Mazino Line” syndrome should become a priority in the initiatives and plans of the new government. This is a vital issue, the proper promotion of which can contribute to a broader modernization of our country, as happened in Israel.

* Giorgos Prevelakis is Professor Emeritus of Geopolitics at the Sorbonne.