As we wait for the second and final pas de deux in the election ballet of Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Alexis Tsipras (with Nikos Androulakis running for second place), the hellish second four years of post-colonialism resurface in the minds of many. These quadrennials were won by parties and prime ministers with glory and honors, but soon turned into periods of rivalry, crisis, political hell, burnout, and ultimately voter disapproval (since no prime minister has ever won a third quadrennial). Kyriakos Mitsotakis has achieved what Konstantinos Mitsotakis has not, namely victory in two national elections in a row, but what can he do to avoid the “curse” of the second four years?

1977-1981 The work has already been done

First, let’s figure out why the four second four-year plans of the post-colonial era – Konstantinos Karamanlis, Andreas Papandreou, Kostas Simitis and Kostas Karamanlis – did not crown with laurels and all of them, without exception, ended ingloriously. For the period 1977-1981. interpretation is more or less settled. The political proposal of Karamanlis, the consolidation of Democracy and integration into the EEC were implemented and ceased to be a project and a dilemma. After all, this is what Karamanlis himself expressed with his attitude when he took over as president of the republic in 1980. At the same time, the need for political and social change arose, led by PASOK and Andreas Papandreou, a politician with history, charisma and education. In other words, the second four-year term of Konstantinos Karamanlis brought about political change, not because Karamanlis had failed, but rather because the success of his policy (for its main purposes) helped to ripen the conditions for that political change—political change. with social and historical features. In other words, some governments become victims of their own success.

1981-1985 Economic and moral exhaustion

In turn, PASOK, after the first four years (1981-1985) and the exhaustion of the potential of the economy due to expansionary economic policies, was forced to pursue a stabilization policy in the second four years (1985-1989), which caused a weakening of the enthusiasm of its voters. Add to this the decline of Andreas Papandreou’s interest in exercising power, the health problems he faced, and the emergence of scandals such as the Koskotas scandal, which was caused by an attempt to control the media, that is, the shame of power.

Telemachos Citiris, who was a close associate and minister of Andreas Papandreou and Kostas Simitis during their second four-year term, sees the “problem” of a second four-year term as a combination of factors. “Every government faces some kind of reaction to its work, which accumulates over time and breeds discontent. In the second four years, dissatisfaction is aggravated by the fact that shortcomings and mistakes now turn out to be many and urgent, and successes are taken for granted and are quickly forgotten.

Another reason, according to Khitiris, is that in the second term in almost all countries of the world, all kinds of non-state centers begin to interfere in governments even more, i.e., the so-called “entangled interests”, which affect the balance sheets, causing scandals, friction and decay. Another element that amplifies the deterioration, in the experience of the former minister, is that especially in Greece, reforms wear out quickly because the “affected” are resourceful and find ways to weaken them or simply not implement them. That is, the parliament votes for reforms that are only partially implemented, minimally or nominally, as a result of which, after two years, the respective government must reform its reform again. This process builds up friction, with the result that governments are exposed as weak and helpless.

The government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis stalled in its first four years of existence and could not be re-elected. “The main reason for this was that it started with 151 deputies,” says Stefanos Manos, who served as economy and finance minister in the Mitsotakis government (1990-1993). “A weak parliamentary majority left the government vulnerable to the strongest intra-party opposition, while at the same time facing a formidable opponent Andreas Papandreou and a strong and organized PASOK party that had nothing to do with either SYRIZA or Tsipras. Manos believes that the victory of Kyriakos Mitsotakis is due to the right choice and the overall political strategy of the Prime Minister, and the fact that “he had no rival”.

“After joining the EMU, the atmosphere was that it was time to reward people for their efforts. The insurance reform proposal prompted an immediate reaction.”

2000-2004 Revenge of the unions

Opinions differ on Kostas Simitis’s second four-year term. Many consider it “bad” because the reforms were frustrated, especially the insurance one. Others believe that the reforms and projects that have been implemented either provoked a strong reaction (for example, the decision not to indicate religion on identity cards) or were taken by public opinion as guaranteed and self-evident (for example, the Olympic projects and other large public buildings). “During the first four years of Simitis, trade unions and all public figures showed restraint in their demands, because no one wanted to be accused of undermining the national goal of the EMU,” says Tasos Giannitsis, who served as Minister of Labor in the second government of Simitis. “After joining the EMU, the atmosphere was that it was time to reward people for their efforts. The proposal for insurance reform immediately provoked a reaction from the party, from the entire political system and from a significant part of public opinion, but the same reaction will still appear, as the evolution of insurance in all subsequent years has shown.

To all this, it must be added that the inner-party controversy, which Simitis always faced, escalated during the second four-year period. However, the completion of large projects, the stabilization of Greece in the EMU, the introduction of the euro, the Greek presidency of the EU, the entry of Cyprus into the EU. in 2003 are the accomplishments of Simitis in his second four-year term, which, according to Giannitsis, is a gift to the country as we continue to see their value and importance in the present.

2007-2009 With a lame majority

Karamanli’s second four-year term, in 2007, came in early elections on the economy, the prime minister said. Finally, over the next two years, in the adverse conditions of the 2008 financial crisis, already existing economic problems multiplied, the government was unable to formulate an effective response to them, as all the measures taken were insufficient in the face of an ever-increasing crisis. challenges while social issues escalated, culminating in December 2008, coinciding with the burning of the center of Athens (then newly elected President of the Coalition Alexis Tsipras and his associates played a central role in the escalation of the “protest” as they did in 2011-2012 years with “Indignant”). Karamanlis called new national elections in 2009, in which he promised austerity and lost to PASOK, which created an atmosphere that “there is money.”

“We won in 2007, but N.D. elected only 153 deputies, and this made Karamanlis realize from the first moment that he did not have the necessary majority to push for deep reforms,” ​​says ND MP. Thodoris Roussopoulos, who was then government representative. created and which, in retrospect, turned out to be meaningless.” In these two years, the scandal of the Vatopedi monastery with property rights (chrysobula) on Lake Vistonida monopolized the interest of public opinion (Roussopoulos was accused of acting in favor of the monastery, but was acquitted), as well as other scandals (structured bonds, best men, etc., etc.).

However, many Karamanliks even today insist that the morbid image of that era was due to the strategy of part of the media trying to curry favor with the prime minister, who had lost interest not only in arbitrating between “interests”, but also in governance. (since he reportedly believed that Greece, with confused interests, was “unruly”).

2023. Strength without a counterweight

But all this is history. Today’s question is the same: will Kyriakos Mitsotakis be more fortunate than his predecessors, who also won a second four-year term (and probably regretted it, judging by what they suffered later)? “Yes, if the reforms start immediately,” says Stefanos Manos. Thodoris Roussopoulos emphasizes that Mitsotakis’ second victory does not look like a “second chance” but a continuation of the first, as “the world recognizes that due to the pandemic and the energy crisis, the prime minister really did not have a full four years to implement his program.” One of the virtues of Mitsotakis, which his predecessors, who won a second four-year term, did not have, is that he is likely to have a strong parliamentary majority, facing neither internal party divisions nor strong opposition. This triple combination has not been repeated in history, except for the first four years of the reign of Konstantinos Karamanlis, and is a unique gift for the Prime Minister.

Telemachos Khythiris says the success of the second four-year term will depend on the government’s willingness to move quickly on reforms. “If it recovers quickly, it will change the sense of time because it will flow faster than wear and tear.” Finally, according to Khythiris, it is essential to the progress of any government that the prime minister has the intelligence and flexibility to deal with unforeseen events. “Many big and unforeseen events happened to Mitsotakis, and the world credited him with the fact that he immediately made the necessary efforts to deal with them.”