On Thursday, CavusogluConcerning the scenarios for expanding our territorial waters by 12 nautical miles to the west and south of Crete, he confirmed the unanimous resolution of the Turkish National Assembly of June 1995. casus belli for the Aegean. However, Ankara’s opposition to any expansion of territorial waters from Athens is manifested by returning the threat of war in an aggressive form. This is a modification of the policy of the period 1995-2022 so that it now applies to all the seas that Greece has access to, with the exception of the western part, which has already been expanded, but is also the smallest. And the neighbor goes even further to lock us up at 6:00 pm, claiming she won’t accept an extension even before 1:00 pm. more 6. We will find out if he really means it when we proceed to expand to the whole of southern Crete (without any discounts) in order to challenge practically and de jure another part of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum.

From there, Turkey, as it were, is looking for an alibi for the quasi-expansion of the casus belli beyond the Aegean Sea, blaming Greece for this decision, according to the constant tactics, where it presents its actions as an allegedly forced reaction to ours. It is also known in diplomatic circles that since the summer of last year, Ankara has been communicating to us through channels about its dissatisfaction with the possible expansion of Crete to the south, without implying, however, a similar expansion of the casus belli. But what does Cavusoglu’s timing say? Is this being done from a position of strength, or does it show some anxiety that concerns not only Greece, but also the general architecture that is being built in the Eastern Mediterranean?

First, Ankara feels the need to fire another warning shot at Athens, perhaps because it feels it cannot justify any reaction to Crete’s southward expansion as it is not authorized to do so and believes the Tripoli government is quite weak. react, even with the Turkish rear. In addition, his threat is also aimed at the American factor in the following direction: braking towards Turkey, so as not to cause a crisis with Greece, including movements from Greece, such as the expansion of territorial waters. At the same time, the Turkish leadership believes that a rude threat will mitigate our expressed intention or force us to limit the expansion of our territorial waters to points that do not cause concern not only to Turkey, but also to Libya.

Ankara believes that other actors do not take the Turkish-Libyan pact seriously.

There are, of course, two more reasons to explain Turkey’s irritation. The intensification of work on the discovery of hydrocarbons against the backdrop of pressure to wean the European market from Russian natural gas and changes in regional ratios to the detriment of Turkey with the leading role of Egypt. The most frustrating thing for Erdogan is that in both these cases he is paying the price for his wrong choice and that, despite the fact that Turkey, as a very large market, needs energy, it has not been able to secure access to most of the sources of the eastern Mediterranean. This shakes the doctrine of the “Blue Motherland”, as well as the effectiveness of the policy of a country that wants to dominate the region. Although its position is strengthening on other fronts, it is currently weakening in the Eastern Mediterranean. And this is largely due to the confidence Americans place in Greece and Egypt, with the latter taking on the role that Turkey has played for decades in American plans. However, Ankara avoids going against Cairo even after its unilateral disengagement. Washington’s search for alternatives, albeit forced ones, to manage Ankara’s insecurities and its penchant for Moscow, by adopting an ambiguous stance, creates the risk that Turkey will be drawn into developments rather than control them.

In short, Ankara believes that the Turkish-Libyan pact is not taken seriously by the other participants, and wants to avoid creating a fait accompli by expanding territorial waters, and therefore puts forward direct threats to Greece. It seems that because of the Ukrainian, who in other areas is clearly pro-Turkish, the US presence in the eastern Mediterranean is becoming more active and the need for a quick “shutdown” of energy projects becomes more urgent, while it seems that the plan is being prepared – with the American press – to settle at least part of the unresolved issues from which the region suffers. On the eve of the elections, it would be unbearable for Erdogan if Athens expanded the territorial waters on Crete, which would further discredit the Blue Motherland and give strong arguments to the Turkish opposition to blow it up. Therefore, it is serious that the active intervention of those who “burn” hydrocarbons in the region, forming a new security architecture, further dramatizes Turkey’s foreign policy.

* Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of American Affairs and Professor of International Relations at the American College of Greece.