While the attention of the international community is focused on Ukraine, the recent conflicts in Libya have become a reminder both of the country’s fragile state and that Turkey has cemented its position in Tripoli by playing an active role.

Despite periodic international conferences, declarations, proclamations and road maps, the situation has changed little in recent years, a civil war is smoldering, and no solution is in sight. The country is de facto divided, with two parallel governments and two “prime ministers”, Dabeiba is based in Tripoli and Basaga (once a staunch friend of Ankara) is based in Sirte.

In practice, the situation is even more complex and volatile: a large number of local “chiefs”, patricians and religious leaders exercising local power and changing affiliations, sometimes go one way and sometimes the other. The elections, which should have been held in December last year, are constantly being postponed because no one wants them – not even domestic actors, not even Turkey – unless they “guaranteed” to win them in advance.

In this unstable environment, various government institutions and services operate inefficiently, if not completely collapsed, the same happens with the infrastructure and the economy itself. As always in such cases, the population suffers. In a country of just 7 million people, the richest in energy resources in all of Africa, blackouts occur daily, often up to eighteen hours, with temperatures in excess of 40 degrees Celsius. Frequent and sometimes violent protests, fueled by desperation, in both Tripoli and Benghazi, do nothing but increase chaos and insecurity.

In addition to the two opposing camps and numerous local “militias”, Turkey and Russia are foreign powers operating on the ground. The two countries are violating both a UN embargo and an international agreement to withdraw foreign mercenaries. However, the presence of the Russians in Wagner gives Turkey an excuse to act as a deterrent to Russia, even though chronologically Turkish intervention preceded the Russian presence.

The foreign powers on the battlefield are Turkey and Russia, which are violating both the UN embargo and the international agreement to withdraw foreign mercenaries.

In particular, Turkish drones proved to be decisive in the outcome of conflicts. Although not officially confirmed, it is established that with their help, forces loyal to Dabaiba repelled an attack by Basaga militias on Tripoli. After all, Turkey has made it clear that Tripoli is its red line and is intervening on the basis of the “military assistance agreement” it signed with Sarraj, Dabaiba’s predecessor. Essentially, of course, he is interfering in order to preserve the parallel agreement of the “Turkish-Libyan” memorandum. The irony is that Bashaga, being at that time the Minister of the Interior, was one of the main participants in these agreements.

Turkish strategy in Libya unfolds on two levels. First, he wants to maintain control over the “government of Tripoli” at any cost. In this, he managed to strengthen his position and prevent both in the past and now the occupation of the capital. At the second level, he wants to mediate between the warring factions and initiate a solution that will serve his interests. Eastern Libya is especially needed by her, because an illegal memorandum demarcated her coast. In this context, he invited House President Aguila Saleh to Ankara in August and two “prime ministers” to Istanbul in early September in an attempt to mediate. However, the condition he places on the leaders of eastern Libya for their support is the adoption of a “memorandum.” So far, it seems that this goal has not been achieved.

Greece, due to its geographical proximity, due to historical relations, as well as the memorandum poisoning them, cannot remain either aloof or inactive. We actively participate in Operation Peace, but we cannot even go beyond the European Union and international legality. With the opening of our embassy in Tripoli, as well as the consulate general in Benghazi, our country is pursuing a policy of soft and measured penetration. Last year, we had repeated visits from the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while under the EU programs we train officers of the Libyan Coast Guard at the Maritime Intercept Center in Chania. We have also financed the renovation of the stadium under the United Nations Sport for Peace program.

However, our main activities are the planned Benghazi-Crete air link and mainly the financing of the reconstruction of the port of Benghazi in the context of the relevant UN World Food Program (WFP) initiative. Especially the latter is a strategic infrastructure of great commercial and energy importance. If this is accompanied by the connection of Benghazi with the Greek port, our country will be even more actively connected to the trade networks of Europe and Africa.

In a shifting environment of unstable equilibrium, where former friends become enemies and tumble, no one can predict what will happen and nothing can be ruled out. But there are also constants that no one can ignore, such as geographic reality and Libya’s “next day” dependence on the EU to rebuild it. Greece is playing the long game. Whatever the situation in the future, Greece will be present and Libya will need it both for receiving European assistance and for its connection with Europe and the outside world.

* Mr. Alexandros Diakopoulos is Vice Admiral PN, former National Security Advisor.