In addition to illegal monitoring with the Predator system, about which the European Parliament informed him. Nikos Androulakis was also officially controlled by EYP for undisclosed reasons. In other words, this second wiretapping was “lawful” because it was ordered by the competent prosecutor.

This is a new element that arose the day before yesterday and led to the resignation of the commander of the EMP and the director of the Prime Minister’s Office, who exercised the relevant control. Because, as was said, the Prime Minister considered it unfair to follow a political leader without being informed.

If the above is true, then there is a major political problem. Because this version would be tantamount to admitting the possibility of prosecuting the leader of a political party as a suspect in an encroachment on national security or in committing a particularly serious crime (Article 19 of the Constitution). And this is with a simple prosecutor’s decision, without any additional guarantees, such as, for example, the decision of the Council of Judges or the implementation of the relevant proposal of the Authority for ensuring the confidentiality of communications, known to all ADAE. So far, the Prime Minister knew about this and, apparently, gave the go-ahead. Should anyone remind Mr. Mitsotakis that such interpretations led to the resignation of President Nixon in 1974 in the context of the famous Watergate scandal?

The above is a political aspect of the Androulakis case, which is certainly exacerbated by the close relationship of Mr. G. Dimitriadis to the Prime Minister. I would like to believe that an appropriate investigation – indeed, why Mr. Dogiakos is hesitant – will reveal the truth and assign appropriate duties.

But there is also a constitutional aspect of the case, which has not been given due attention. There is no doubt that after the illegal wiretapping scandal broke out in 1989, which, as I recall, almost led Andreas Papandreou himself to the Special Court, important steps were taken, first with Law 2225/1994 and then with the establishment ADAE, with Law 3115/2003, the creation of which is provided for by the Constitution itself. However, the technology has developed at such a rapid pace that the guarantees introduced today have fallen sharply behind. I will focus on a few typical examples:

• Bearing in mind that today more than 80% of legal supervision is carried out for reasons of “national security” and that, according to the law, such supervision can be requested by a competent prosecutor, and not only by a judicial authority (for example, an investigator in the case of espionage), but by any “other military, police or government agency” is aware of the extent of abuse that can be committed. Why, no matter how honest, noble and independent the prosecutor may be, the question arises, what evidence will he dispute the proposal presented to him by the EMP or any other authority claiming that X systematically informs Turkey about the movements of our fleet? In other words, while fully respecting the principle of separation of functions, if necessary, especially in cases of national security, provide that requests from the EMP and other competent authorities, before they are transferred to the competent prosecutor, are sent to the review of the FSA?

The list of “especially serious crimes”, the investigation of which Article 19 of the Constitution allows supervision as an exception, has recently been overly expanded.

• The list of “especially grave crimes”, for the verification of which Article 19 of the Constitution also allows supervision as an exception, has recently expanded excessively. Suffice it to consider that with the recent amendment, cases have been added in which the Competition Commission is investigating. Should this list be narrowed down?

• With another amendment by the current government – and despite the strong protest of the president of the National Anti-Corruption Commission – last year, the obligation to inform the affected parties by the competent authority was canceled last year, so that in case of unjustified interception, they can claim compensation. It should be noted that the decision of the Strasbourg court has long been passed on this issue, which further burdens the responsibility of the government.

• And finally, and most importantly, unlike what happens in other countries – I mean France – the current legislation does not provide for a “ceiling”, ie. the maximum number of permitted surveillances, as a result of which in recent years it has multiplied to such an extent that it is literally uncontrollable.

The conclusion drawn from the foregoing is that, in addition to political responsibility, which should be assigned as soon as possible, there are institutional gaps in the field of electronic eavesdropping that a government that wants to respect the rule of law and human rights must comply with. deal with as quickly as possible and with the seriousness that is imposed. Only in this way will he be convinced that he means everything he says.

* Mr. Nikos K. Alivisatos is Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law at the University of Athens.