Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the broader attack on the European security order raise questions about pan-European cooperation outside the EU.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, along with several other fateful events in and around Europe, have reopened a fundamental question about the precise interests and values ​​that various European countries may or may not share. The extraordinary events that took place after the annexation of Crimea ten years ago, and especially after the start of the full-scale war that began two years ago, have changed the political priorities of the EU and its member states, as well as European countries outside the EU, including Turkey. In the light of these and other recent developments in Eastern Europe and the ongoing discussions about them, the upcoming reshuffle and reconstruction of the EU’s main institutions in 2024-2025 has taken on new dimensions.

Until now, in the parliaments, commissions and councils of the EU, the main political debates and decisions revolved around the speed and direction of European integration, which is understood as a normative and economic project. Now the stakes of issues in the field of international security have increased significantly. The main challenge for Brussels is today and will remain in the future: what are the practical consequences and implications of the new military, geopolitical and geoeconomic situation in Europe for the EU’s policy towards the Union’s immediate neighbors on the continent?

A number of transnational structures already connect EU member states and European countries outside the EU. These include, on the one hand, older institutions such as the Council of Europe (CoE), the OSCE, the EEA or the EU-Turkey Customs Union, and on the other, the latest innovations such as the Black Sea Synergy, the Eastern Partnership Program (PaE) or the Lublin Triangle . Some of these structures have either been in the past, such as the Council of Europe, or currently include Russia as a member, such as the OSCE. But they were not enough to prevent a dramatic escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022. A somewhat similar story concerns the recent military confrontations between Armenia and Azerbaijan – countries that are equal participants in, among others, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Eastern Partnership

Recent fateful events in Europe point to the need for more than just cosmetic changes in the EU’s relations with European countries outside the EU for two reasons. First, previous approaches and initiatives by Brussels have proved insufficient to reduce or counter the tensions in Eastern Europe that led to the war. They were needed in 2022 and still need to be reviewed today in light of their apparent failure to ensure peace in Europe. Secondly, the ongoing war and its numerous consequences around the world require new approaches and actions that can help save the Ukrainian state from destruction, and the European security order from destruction. A fundamental revision and reconfiguration – at least partial – of the previous EU policy towards countries outside the EU – but within Europe – is already underway.

The most notable change over the past two years was the promotion of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova in 2022, and Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2023, to the status of official candidates for full EU membership. While the Western Balkan countries have had the prospect of joining the EU for more than 20 years, the ultimate fate of the Associated Trio – namely Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – has remained unclear since the launch of the Eastern Partnership in 2009. In response to the attack on Russia’s and Ukraine’s application for accession in the spring of 2022, the European Commission took the initiative to persuade the member states of the Union to change their attitude not only to Kyiv, but also to Chisinau and Tbilisi. At the end of 2023, the European Council approved the start of negotiations on the accession of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova and accepted Georgia as a candidate country for the EU. In this way, Brussels finally clarified the elusive purpose of the three association agreements and their FTAs, which it concluded with the three countries back in 2014.

Another important institutional change in response to the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the creation of the European Political Community, an initiative that French President Emmanuel Macron symbolically launched on May 9, 2022. A total of 47 states, including Turkey has agreed to join the EPC, thus creating a new pan-European framework for consultation and re-establishing EU relations with European countries outside the EU. The creation of the CPE can be seen as an expression of a new sense of unity of European national interests in the face of Russia’s ill-fated attack on one of Europe’s largest powers. It may also signal a new sense of commonality between those EU and non-EU countries that support European values ​​and want to meet the normative challenge posed by Moscow as well as its various anti-Western allies.

The future prospects of CPE – in the narrow sense – and the possible impact of the reasons – in the broader sense – that led to its creation, however, remain to be seen. They will depend not exclusively, but mainly on the desire, capacity and success of the EU in deepening the Union’s relations, associations and, in part, its integration with European countries that are currently outside the EU. Since the latter consist of a heterogeneous group of states, new general initiatives such as the CPE can only function as a forum for discussion and communication. The EPC and older pan-European organizations such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE can be useful for launching or discussing an idea among dozens of participating countries. However, global initiatives such as the EPC will play a less important role in the concrete planning and practical implementation of legal, institutional and material improvements in relations between the EU, its Member States and non-EU countries in Europe.

The deepening of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in EU relations is not on the agenda only for those European countries most affected or threatened by a Russian military attack, i.e. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia. It is also mandatory in other European countries outside the EU – broadly speaking – from Iceland and Great Britain to Azerbaijan and Turkey. The main focus of such cooperation today is national and transnational security and stability. Fostering greater exchange, cooperation, and unity in various areas related to deterring, preventing, or at least limiting Russian and other anti-Western warfare in Europe – kinetic, hybrid, psychological, political, economic, or otherwise – has taken on a purely existential dimension. . Thus, it will decide not only the quality of democracy, but also the survival of European democracies and their various alliances – especially, but not only, the EU.

In addition, deeper and broader cooperation in areas not directly related to the protection of security, integrity and sovereignty of Europe will also contribute to the strengthening of the European community of states. The wide variety of areas in which Brussels and other EU capitals can and should take more effective trans-European action range from fostering industrial innovation to ensuring better social and environmental protection, as well as promoting greater gender equality, scientific progress and cultural exchanges. Advocating for greater cooperation and integration in these and other areas across Europe today is not simply an expression of the normative superiority of transnational humanism, Europeanism, and/or liberalism. It became a matter of self-preservation.

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