The Republic of Moldova is facing a historic European decision get the green light to open negotiations with Ukraine on joining the European Union. This topic is included in the agenda of the last European Council in 2023 (December 14-15) and is a key moment for the Republic of Moldova, in the process of accession, which was accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Last month, the European Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations for the two countries.

However, a unanimous vote in the European Council is required and the decision is expected to be tense. Hungary, the main ally of the Kremlin in the European space, strongly objects to the start of negotiations with Ukraine, just as it has for some time blocked a package of financial aid to Kyiv or the next sanctions against Russia. In Brussels, several senior diplomats say Hungary’s veto-wielding prime minister could change his mind, as he has done in the past, with an interest in unblocking files of concern to Budapest. But this does not mean that Hungary or any other extreme right/left, populist or Eurosceptic regime cannot hold negotiations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova captive for various reasons.

The Republic of Moldova has taken as a goal integration into the EU by the end of 2030. This is a complex, lengthy process that will generate frustration and fierce resistance to change in the system. Structural reforms will have to be carried out and taken over by the political class under the pressure of anti-European and anti-reform forces grouped around the Kremlin and fugitive oligarchs Ilan Shor or Volodymyr Plahotniuk.

Keeping Chisinau in the European orbit after two rounds of elections in 2024 and 2025 and securing important popular support (which is now relatively high, but under the influence of pro-Russian propaganda and difficult economic conditions) represent key stages. The accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU needs allies and consistent support. We also need a favorable context both in the sense of Russia’s war against Ukraine and in the internal politics of the EU countries and the USA.

We carefully considered the steps, directions and actors that can affect the success of Chisinau’s accession to the European Union. They are important actors that can accelerate, delay or disrupt the European path of the Republic of Moldova, just as regional contexts and external political events, from the war in Ukraine to the US elections, can have a significant impact. How the influence map looks like now, before the start of the negotiations of the Republic of Moldova on joining the EU, we briefly show what Chisinau can and should do for the EU 2030, what and how much Romania can do (and where it can do (much) better), which depends on Brussels and the EU-27.

As for the Republic of Moldova to successfully complete each entry chapter and take full advantage of the EU’s transformative power

1. Preservation of political trust. Whether it is actions under the government or new elections, presidential elections at the end of 2024 and parliamentary elections in 2025, political trust is essential to advance reforms and dialogue with the EU. Maia Sandu currently represents the most important guarantor of the European path of the Republic of Moldova and has a very good image in Brussels and many European capitals, but the vulnerability of the Party of Action and Solidarity may affect the pro-European and pro-European party. most reforms even after 2025.

2. Support of the population. Reforms require public support. One of the most difficult challenges associated with membership: How the population perceives this process. Not as something bureaucratic, not because “that’s what the EU wants”. What becomes important is how politicians, communicators, mass media understand and then explain the information related to the reforms, their necessity, impact of entry and benefits. According to recent public opinion polls, 6 out of 10 Moldovans support joining the EU, but support was divided as the northern part of the country, Gagauzia and Transnistria suffered heavily from pro-Russian propaganda. In 2007, 75% of Romanians supported European integration.

3. Chisinau’s ability to cope with the hybrid war unleashed by the Russian Federation. The Kremlin maintains an increased influence on the media landscape of Chisinau (especially audiovisual, but more recently also online and social media), finances numerous local actors (including political parties) and actively supported protests against Maya Sandu. The Kremlin’s ability to influence Moldovan society also remains high. Anti-European propaganda aims to discredit the EU, adopting the narratives of the Kremlin (“There is no future in the EU” or “the EU is divided”, loss of sovereignty or accession will lead Moldova to war), but also the discrediting of the process itself.

4. Justice and the rule of law. There will be ongoing negotiations and accession, reforms monitored and controlled by Brussels, as well as the influential EU-27 countries. Justice reform it will be important but long-lasting. After joining the EU (2007), Romania had monitoring and constructive pressure directly from Brussels for 16 years through the MCV. We still do not have guarantees of irreversibility of judicial reform, but we have a much more active, pro-reform society and a sufficient number of professional and honest judges. For better or worse, the fight against corruption in Romania is the best example of recent decades in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also very important from whom the Republic of Moldova takes lessons from the Romanian anti-corruption experience.

5. Attraction of European capital. Economic development largely depends on the progress of reforms, but the attractiveness of foreign investment is much greater in a candidate country. Thus, capital investments and their attraction are important because they bring good practices, jobs, economic development.

6. Transnistria. For many years, the problem of Transnistria seemed insurmountable in the context of the expansion of the EU to the East. With Russia waging a conventional war on its borders and a hybrid war in its eastern neighbors, the EU understood the need to act quickly to unfreeze the enlargement process. Scenarios regarding the accession of the Republic of Moldova, including the so-called “Transnistrian problem”, appeared on the table, are being discussed and solutions are being sought. With an isolated Transnistria dependent on exports to the EU (⅔ in 2022) and a reduced negotiating position due to the diversification of energy sources in Chisinau, the leverage of the government in Chisinau increases significantly, including for the reintegration of the region.

What about Romania and what it can do better

7. The connection of the Republic of Moldova with the EU – to the energy market, to transport corridors, to the European space – is vital, and the main responsibility here lies with Romania. The main strategic goal between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, established in 2015, is the interconnection of natural gas and electricity transportation systems. Important steps have been taken, and the invasion of Ukraine and last winter’s energy crisis have accelerated the plans of both sides. The memorandum was signed yesterday provides specific details on the increase of transmission and storage capacity in the natural gas sector, key connections for the energy system, including the appointment of OPCOM Romania as the electricity operator in the MD.

Transport infrastructure. Romania has historical delays in building a decent transport infrastructure, which has significant implications for connecting the Republic of Moldova with European transport corridors. In recent years, there have been many contacts at the level of public decision-making bodies, with many promises, including for projects that now seem very far away (road and railway lines connecting Romania with Chisinau and then with Odesa), but the current picture shows that Romania has repeated itself up to this point.

Key communication paths are delayed or very delayed (given that the A8 motorway can be realized in a very optimistic perspective only after 2030, DX Tișița-Albița abandoned for a long period or the promised southern corridor to connect Galața with the A2 on standby) but also some good news (bridge from Ungen, although the auction is currently suspended, A7 – Autostrada Moldovei or DX Galati-Brăila). Smaller projects, which would significantly contribute to Ukrainian-Moldovan-Romanian relations, also show indifference (for example, the bypass belts of Galats or Barlad).

Rail is even more poorly managed, but in line with the lack of funding and attention to all rail projects in Romania. The Bucharest-Chisinau connection can take more than 12 hours, the average speed is less than 50 km/h, and Romania recently got its first new train in 20 years. Air may be the easiest, but from Chisinau you can only fly to Bucharest, often at quite high costs, in the absence of a budget operator. There are no connections with other cities in Romania.

The main shortcomings also remain in the customs administration. The pressure on customs at the border with the Republic of Moldova, especially regarding the movement of goods, remains high, with long queues and waiting times of tens of hours. The failure of the Romanian government to resolve this situation, including providing customs with minimum waiting conditions (parau There aren’t even decent toilets or waiting areas), is in deep contradiction with the optimistic declarations of officials from Bucharest.

8. Investments in the economy of the Republic of Moldova. Romania is the main commercial partner of the Republic of Moldova and the main export direction of the country, with a third of the total export of products, correspondingly the most important foreign investor. The upward trend of investments in the economy of the Republic of Moldova should be fixed in the medium and long term, especially since the gross amounts are relatively modest compared to the economic potential of Romanian companies (including state-owned companies). The Bucharest government recently announced that it would propose a bill to support investments by Romanian companies in the Republic of Moldova through state guarantees and loans, but the topic has disappeared from the public agenda.

The investment potential of the Republic of Moldova is very high, both at the level of state-owned companies and at the level of private companies. The opening of chapters of negotiations with the Republic of Moldova opens up new investment opportunities for Chisinau, and Romania should offer a significant investment policy, especially in strategic sectors – energy, transport or agriculture. The Romanian investment support scheme in Chisinau should be put back on the public agenda and discussed with the business community.

9. Romania’s constant (and coordinated) support for Chisinau’s European course. The Republic of Moldova has a low administrative capacity, and negotiations and conclusion of accession chapters will require significant resources (both time and financial, but especially personnel). Bucharest can compensate for this lack of resources through continuous and coordinated support at the level of the coordination unit through a dedicated team/organization to assist Chisinau. Recently, the Senate of Romania voted for the establishment Department for Integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union, an institution that, if not calibrated and given the proper experience and responsibilities, risks becoming a political sinecure rather than a real support for Chisinau.

Political commitment and a cross-party solution to this centralization and coordination are needed in Bucharest. The creation of new institutions and departments on absurd grounds, as in the case of the department mentioned above, remains the result of non-constructive political competition that does not benefit Chisinau. One of the options is to strengthen the role of the coordinating unit of the already functioning body Romanian Diplomatic Institute (already experienced in this topic but with reduced staff and limited budget) in coordination with MAE and RoAid (and with appropriate financial and staffing allocations), or current Department of relations with the Republic of Moldova (but reformed, restructured and removed from the custody of political parties). –

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