The scandal at the Romania-Kosovo match, which was interrupted for dozens of minutes due to the display of the “Kosovo and Serbia” banner, brought the issue of the small Balkan state back into the public spotlight. However, the behavior of pro-Serbian football galleries is secondary compared to the approach to the topic of representative power in Romania.

Gabriel Andreescu Photo: Personal archive

What the “experts” say.

There are four other EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo: Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece. We don’t have their problems. Spain lives with the situation in the Basque Country, where the majority of residents have always wanted and still want secession (about 40% for, about 29%, against in 2021). Slovakia’s position is motivated by the existence of about 450,000 Hungarians, most of whom live in the historical territory right on the border with Hungary. Cyprus has behind it the history of the territory captured by Turkey, which in 1983 became the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greece considers it its duty to support the Cypriot government of Greek identity.

Nothing like it in Romania. The country does not claim independence, has no territory with a Hungarian majority on the border with Hungary, and no territorial disputes with its neighbors. Why does Romania not follow the position of most of the countries of the European Union and the great strategic ally of the United States?

After the scandal with the “Kosovo and Serbia” banners, the newspaper truth he turned to some “experts” (a newspaper qualification), whose answers were published on September 17 under the headline “Why doesn’t Romania recognize an independent Kosovo?” (here). Rezvan Munteanu, a “specialized analyst on international relations”, claimed that by recognizing the state of Kosovo, the authorities in Bucharest indirectly recognize Transnistria as a state de facto and will set a precedent for the independence of Szeklerland (“so-called”, Mr. Muntianu uses the official phraseology). Former Foreign Minister Cristian Diaconescu referred to a 2008 parliamentary decision that linked the recognition of Kosovo to the recognition of Transnistria and the dangers of promoting secession. The former diplomat carefully adds: “the war in the former Yugoslavia, which gave rise to this secession, is a crisis, so without a clear popular consensus, against the background of the crisis, one can find arguments that cannot be used only in favor of the recognition process.” , but also to the detriment of the states that do it.”

The mantra is secession-human rights-territorial integrity

In the 2008 debate, Bucharest commentators placed the triad of Kosovo-Secuiesk-Transnistria under the authority of the “rule of law”, emphasizing how committed the Romanian state would be to international ethics. It was then reiterated that there is no right of secession enjoyed by any region of the state. Indeed, there is no right to secession. The 119 states that recognized the state of Kosovo as a result of secession by 2022 did not base their decision on such a right. Contributing to the stabilization of international relations, which were badly affected by the internal war in Serbia, the states did not challenge international law, but went to meet it.

International stability is based on three main principles: self-determination of peoples, respecting human rights and respecting the territorial integrity of states. They act simultaneously and, as a rule, support each other. In the 1990s, Serbia disturbed the balance between the three normative guidelines. If, after all, the international community prioritized Serbia’s territorial integrity, it would agree to a dramatic violation of human rights up to the level of genocide. Thus, it would contradict one of the principles of international law. Avoiding genocide was preferred over the territorial integrity of Serbia. The United States and most EU members gave more weight to people than to stone. As it was said (more abstractly), in certain contexts, a tolerant attitude towards secession and its support leads to better protection of human rights and ensuring international stability. The motivation, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeats to the public to this day, that the self-proclamation of the state of Kosovo did not comply with the principles of international law (see here), is simply fruitless.

The UN protectorate established in Kosovo for the past 15 years has ensured peace in this part of Europe and protected the life of states on the continent from the wave of Albanian refugees.

Nothing of the sort can fuel Romania’s fears. The land of Secuiesc (the historical land, not the “so-called land”) is located in the center of Romania. Separation is unimaginable. If the majority of the inhabitants of Harghita and Covasna wanted this, and the Romanian state playfully said yes, the so-called (sic!) state of Sekel region would have died in a few months. An inner enclave can have a completely blocked relationship with the world.

According to the logic at work in the emergence of the state of Kosovo, Serbia’s loss of its territorial integrity was balanced, “in the sense of law”, by increased respect for human rights that had previously been attacked by the worst form of violence, genocide. . In contrast to the separation of Transnistria from the Republic of Moldova (and by law, not only de facto) will only worsen the human rights situation in this region of Moldova. On the contrary, the unity of Moldova guarantees a better exercise of the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of the entire Republic. There is no principle of international law that would legitimize the secession of Transnistria. To compare the situation in Transnistria with Kosovo is simply ignorant. –

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