These days, Romania occupies a position of strategic responsibility, which is unique from the point of view of the geopolitical consequences of the decision to remain or not in the coalition of EU member states that demand the extension of the ban on the import of grain from Ukraine after September 15. We are talking about Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia, which the Union gave permission in May to block the sale of corn, wheat, sunflower, and rapeseed on domestic markets, allowing transit for export to other beneficiary states.

The last-minute change came yesterday when Bulgaria announced its withdrawal from the coalition[1]finding in recent months that the ban had negatively affected Bulgarian sunflower oil producers, who no longer had enough raw material in the production process, which turned out to be unfavorable to the country’s economic interests.

At the opposite pole, Hungary has maintained its position as an adversary towards Kyiv and Moscow’s “lawyer”: since April of this year, it has banned the import of 25 Ukrainian products, including honey and meat.[2]and not just the crops that arrived in September to accuse the European Union of globalizing the war in Ukraine instead of “isolating” it[3]perhaps turning it into a frozen conflict that would suit Russian interests.

After the Russian Federation in July a year ago canceled its agreement on the Black Sea Export Initiative on the export of grain, concluded with the mediation of Turkey and the UN, Ukraine remained completely dependent on alternative grain export routes through neighboring countries: Romania, the Republic of Moldova. , Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. In the immediate aftermath, Russia speculated on the situation by repeatedly attacking Ukrainian ports on the Danube, Izmail, and Rhine with drones until one of those drones fell on Romanian territory in early September.

The context in which such a sequence of actions by Moscow took place is given by record volumes of grain production[4] reached in 2022 and 2023, the largest in its entire history, including the Soviet period: this year 153-155 million tons, of which 50-60 million tons will be exported[5]. Economists believe that the Russian Federation is actually seeking a larger share of the world grain market[6]precisely by hitting Ukrainian terminals involved in exports, while large-scale investments in own agriculture brought maximum results.

It is easy to see that this moment is one of the crossroads at a higher level, which is connected not only with the ongoing war on the territory of Ukraine, but also with the global economic competition for grain, in which Beijing plays a special role. referee. China was the main beneficiary of the Black Sea Grain Export Initiative, receiving 8 million metric tons through its ports[7] year, when the maritime corridor guaranteed by Turkey was in operation. The next beneficiaries in terms of quantity were Spain with 6 million metric tons and Turkey itself with 3.2 million metric tons[8].

Before the start of this war, China was also the main importer of grain from Ukraine, given the priority of the Chinese authorities to ensure food security.[9] population, a policy that has led to the creation of vast storage facilities far in excess of domestic needs, but capable of turning Beijing into the arbiter of the world grain market. Kyiv expected Chinese intervention in the direction of Moscow, as a result of which the export corridor through the Black Sea would remain open. This was a miscalculation, China has refrained, which does not mean that it will not import grain this year. Only not from Ukraine.

Romania is not a major player in this game of geopolitics and global grain trade, but now it finds itself in an unprecedented situation: 65% of Ukrainian grain exports currently go through the ports of Izmail and Reni, from where it is transported to the ports of Sulina and Constanta[10]. Another 30% of exports are accounted for by rail and road transport[11], through Romania and the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary. The practically current moment demonstrates the usefulness of the recent investments made in Romania’s port infrastructure on the Danube and the Black Sea, and a percentage of 65% gives Bucharest great importance in managing this grain crisis.

Russian drone attacks in August and September of this year on the ports of Izmail and Reni were aimed at closing the last gateway through which most of Ukraine’s grain can still be shipped to consumers around the world. This is a window of opportunity for Bucharest and Kyiv, which distinguishes Romania’s position from that of other European states.

Poland is under electoral pressure to keep its option of extending the ban on the export of Ukrainian grain, although the Polish sides have different views: on the one hand, farmers say that the infrastructure of the port does not allow the simultaneous export of Polish and Ukrainian wheat, while representatives of the Port of Gdańsk claim the opposite[12]. With parliamentary elections scheduled for October this year, Warsaw is likely to unilaterally extend the ban beyond September 15 this year and at least until the end of this year.

Through Florin Barba, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Romania also supported a position similar to the Polish one, which appeared to be sensitive to the complaints expressed by the Alliance for Agriculture and Cooperation.[13]formed by four representative organizations of Romanian agriculture, as well as in the lobby made by Hungary in Bucharest, just before the date of September 15 of this year, through the Minister of Agriculture of Hungary, Istvan Nagy.

What neither Romania, nor Poland, nor Hungary, nor Slovakia discussed was the black market for the grain they were selling at much lower prices.[14], quantities originating from Ukraine, amounting to hundreds of millions of euros. No action has been taken against this speculation in the European Union region, although it is certainly one of the “distortions” accused by farmers in four European countries. In Ukraine, an investigation has been launched against more than 300 companies[15] have been engaged in grain exports, but from September 2022 until now there have been no impressive results in any of these cases.

In general, the situation represents a set of problems against which only a comprehensive response can bear fruit, and a necessary measure in this regard is the involvement of the European Prosecutor’s Office to give a clear signal to those who profit from the consequences of the war. A simple extension of the ban “at least until the end of 2023” does not make sense, since there is no miracle solution “around the corner”, in the first half of 2024. –

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