I was in Chisinau as the ambassador of Romania in the last months of the mandate of Emil Constantinescu and in the first months of the last mandate of Ion Iliescu. I spent there the “year of Eminescu”, which was celebrated in the most unexpected places, including the high schools I visited in Gagauzia, in a way that cannot be imagined in Bucharest.

It was also the year when Transnistria, receiving the military and political support of Russia, strengthened its rule over “Bessarabia” (that’s how I will call the Bessarabian part of the Republic of Moldova). Scrap metal, mostly from the destruction of Romanian industry, produced weapons, and weapons created money and terror. The thermal power plant in Kuchurgan in Transnistria, which was supplied with Russian fuel, provided almost completely, but discretionally – depending on the pro- or anti-liberal nature of Chisinau’s politics, the electricity needed for “Bessarabia”. Energy blackmail was (and is) an important political lever for Tiraspol. To understand what Kuchurgan means, we note that its capacity is 2520 MW, while the total capacity of the Iron Gate (I + II) is almost 1420 MW.

It is useful to know that Transnistria’s giant thermal power plant exports electricity both to the “East”, high-voltage lines that cross Ukraine, and to the “West”, two lines that cross Romania.

One of them, according to Kuchurgan, has the first connection with Vulkanestya, in the south of “Bessarabia”, and the next – to Bulgaria. The second one has its first connection in Isakche, in Dobrudja, and the next one in Bulgaria. Consequently, the lines were designed and built to prevent electricity from being transported between Romania and “Bessarabia”. The distance between the two lines in the Isaccea area is less than 1 km; their interconnection, which would have cost about $700,000 in 2000, would allow significant power exports from Romania to “Bessarabia” and eliminate the energy blackmail practiced by Transnistria (read: Russia) with Chisinau.

Let’s return to the economic situation of the Republic of Moldova, which consists of two entities, the increasingly poor “Bessarabia” and the increasingly prosperous Transnistria, which are united by borders agreed by international treaties. The most natural mechanism for the survival of this perverted marriage, initiated by Stalin immediately after the Second World War, consists in the purchase of attractive objects in “Bessarabia” by Transnistria. The situation became almost routine, and no longer surprised anyone, until the decision of the court in Baltsy in the fall of 2000, which decided that the “Bessarabian” half of the Stanca-Kostesh hydroelectric system must be given to pay off some debts, from “Bessarabia” to Transnistria.

Thus, according to the decision of the court in Baltsy, Romania became a neighbor of Transnistria (read: Russia). The news came as a shock — at least to me. Since the term “Stânca – Costești” means nothing to the vast majority of Romanians, an explanation is needed.

Hydroelectric power station Stantsa – Kostesti

(Information taken from Wikipedia)

Among the unpleasant features of the Prut is the extreme variability of its flow. Among all Romanian rivers, the ratio between maximum and minimum flow reaches its maximum value in the case of the Prut. Its average long-term flow is 81 mts/s (cubic m/s); the maximum flow is 4700 m3/s, the minimum measured is 2.5 m3/s, so their ratio (4700 : 2.5) is 1880, which means a high risk of severe floods. To reduce this risk, a dam was built between Stanca (Botoşani County) and Kosteşti (Rishkan County). The reservoir created in this way is the second largest in Romania in terms of surface area, the first being the reservoir in Portil de Fier. Its volume is 1,400 million cubic meters (compared to 2,200 million cubic meters of Iron Gates 1).

The maximum height of the dam is 47 m, and the length is 740 m.

In connection with the reservoir, two units (power generators) of 15 MW each were built, one operated by Romania, the other by the Republic of Moldova; in general, the entire hydropower complex is managed on a parity basis.

If the reservoir is large, then the power of electric generators is modest – less than 1.2% of the power of Kuchurgan. Thus, the dam is important only for stored water, the production of electricity is negligible.

The reaction of the President of Romania

I tried to understand what the motivation of Transnistria could be. It could not be economic, i.e. electricity production, since the target was far from its borders, in a politically unstable area (the possibility of unification with Romania was a prospect actively promoted by Transnistrian propaganda) and relatively hostile – especially since the installed electric capacity was tiny compared to the power of Kuchurgan. The motivation of the interests of Transnistria (read: Russia) should be sought not in the economic sphere, but in the strategic one. I don’t remember if I thought about a possible terrorist attack, but it was clear to me that Transnistria is not aimed at either water sports or fishing. I knew the criminal regime in Tiraspol very well, I have been to Transnistria dozens of times, either to the Ilashk court, or to visit the Romanian school in Tiraspol, or for other similar reasons.

I immediately informed the Central Apparatus (the Minister of Foreign Affairs was Petre Roman) and the Presidency, but I did not receive an answer. Emil Constantinescu’s Bessarabian policy once again proved impossible to classify – but this topic deserves a separate analysis.

Shortly after the election of Ion Iliescu (I was still the ambassador), the president visited Vaslui, during which I asked for an audience – it was accepted; I broached the subject of the dam to him and he gave it his full attention. In addition, Bessarabian Foreign Minister Nicolae Tabecaru visited Romania shortly after he was received in Cotrocen, a reception in which I participated (I was still ambassador). Iliescu attacked the Stânca – Costești issue very forcefully, and Minister Tabecaru, visibly embarrassed, promised to solve the problem – which he did. After my recall from Chisinau (February 2001), I no longer followed the topic – therefore, unfortunately, I do not know its evolution.

Obviously, I wouldn’t be mentioning this episode if Russia hadn’t recently demonstrated its terrorist appetite for dam mining.

Finally, it is terribly bitter to compare the attention with which Russia (in the global sense, including the former Soviet Union) conducts its anti-Romanian policy in Bessarabia, and the cynicism, carelessness, laziness, incompetence, family profit with which Romania manages its interests on a national basis. – Read the rest of the article on Contributors.ro