The geopolitical atmosphere in Europe has irreversibly changed after more than a year of military aggression by Russia against Ukraine. During this period, the EU introduced 10 packages of sanctions against Russia. Since 2014, European individual and sectoral sanctions have been directed against 1,473 regime representatives (officials, politicians, oligarchs, journalists, etc.) and 207 organizations, causing reputational and financial damage to Russia’s foreign trade partners. Financial resources amounting to more than 320 billion euros, belonging respectively to the Central Bank of Russia and to oligarchs and intermediaries of Vladimir Putin’s regime, were also frozen. To prevent sanctions evasion, the EU created a new sanctions enforcement function (led by David O’Sullivan) and launched the Sanctions Coordinators’ Forum (EU February 2023). At the same time, the European public space is being detoxified from Russian propaganda by banning pro-Kremlin television stations (NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Channel One) and other Russian propaganda media (Sputnik and RT). . Also, the direct energy dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which if they reach the EU (oil), then with financial losses and through intermediaries (India, etc.) or in a liquefied state (natural gas), is also reduced as much as possible. . In December 2022, about 13% of gas imported by the EU was from Russia, compared to almost 54% at the beginning of 2021. In addition to sanctions against the Russian elite and the state for crimes committed against Ukraine, the West is preparing legal grounds to be able to try and punish the leadership led by Putin in international tribunals (UN, March 2023).

The separation that is taking place between the EU and Russia significantly changes the dynamics of power at the regional level. There is a deep reassessment of relations with Russia within the EU, as well as more broadly in its neighboring countries. Solidarity with Ukraine is the main criterion that separates the EU and its European allies from other regional players who lean towards Russia. It was the Ukrainian factor and Russian aggression that prompted the idea of ​​establishing the European Political Community (EPC). The new intergovernmental geopolitical platform, which does not involve any legal obligations for the participating parties, was born from the initiative of France and was implemented during the Czech presidency of the EU Council (July-December 2022). The official purpose of the CPE is to provide a platform for dialogue and cooperation in the field of security, stability and prosperity on a European scale. The result of this initiative is an attempt to strengthen the “circle of friends” of the EU, focusing it around solidarity with Ukraine and, accordingly, in the direction of ending Russia’s aggression.

CPE – an instrument of geopolitical assistance to EU neighbors?

The decision to organize a second meeting in Moldova (later in Spain and Great Britain) on June 1 has a more complex geopolitical implication. If it were not for the threat of frequent Russian airstrikes, the CPE meeting would have been held in Ukraine. However, the organization of the event in Moldova, a short distance from the separatist region where Russian military forces are stationed, shows the EU’s desire to demonstrate Moldova’s commitment to its geopolitical space. This shows that the EU wants to prevent the creation of a status quo convenient for Russia in a candidate country for EU membership. Moldova already receives political, diplomatic and financial assistance from the EU and its member states (Romania, Germany, France, etc.) to overcome the indirect consequences of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the EU is helping the government in Chisinau against destabilizing actions coordinated by Russia, which would be interested in the pro-Russian opposition capitalizing on the unpopularity of the pro-European government (about 25% public support).

In fact, the holding of the CPE in Moldova can be used by European actors to emphasize the destructive nature of Russian influence outside of Ukraine. The case of Moldova shows that Moscow’s goals are more diverse in terms of geography. Against the background of the vulnerability of the Moldovan state to various forms of Russian hybrid warfare (disinformation, energy blackmail, etc.), repeating the EU’s support for Moldova directly from the CPE platform could demonstrate a certain effectiveness of European foreign policy in the Eastern neighborhood. This act is also a measure of self-responsibility on the part of Brussels for the internal situation in Moldova. Therefore, the failures of the current government of Moldova will leave traces on the legitimacy of the EU.

The proximity of Moldova to Ukraine will also help to keep the Ukrainian topic in the field of view of the political leaders of 44 countries and at the EU level, as well as international journalists who will cover the event. In this sense, the CPE organized in Moldova could be devoted to Ukraine to a large extent, especially if the Ukrainian counteroffensive, expected in May, leads to a turning point. This would help overcome signs of fatigue from Russia’s war against Ukraine. One of the main beneficiaries of the event will inevitably be the ruling party in Moldova (Party “Action and Solidarity” and President Maia Sandu), who understand that the venue of the event is a credit of credibility and a significant image injection from the EU. Geopolitical issues and relations with the EU may be decisive in determining the winners of the 2024-2025 election cycles in Moldova.

The problematic topics of the CPE agenda are Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions

The European political community is in its infancy and cannot yet represent a reliable “geopolitical club” against Russian harmful influence in Europe. In addition to Russia’s war against Ukraine and Belarus’ strategic alliance with Russia, the EU’s eastern neighbors have other geopolitical problems. Azerbaijan uses aggressive and revisionist rhetoric against Armenia over territorial integrity, blocking a corridor with the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The ongoing tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan poses problems for the EU. The non-resolution of historical disputes between these states, but against their exploitation by Russia throughout the entire post-Soviet period, does not allow establishing a reliable and stable dialogue. Despite the fact that they are aimed at establishing peace, the diplomatic efforts of the EU, and in particular of the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, are gradually losing legitimacy because they do not provide effective solutions. Including the EU Civilian Mission, launched in February and operating since March, and thanks to the first meeting of the CPE in Prague, is not a sufficient tool to deter the military actions carried out or planned by Azerbaijan. However, despite the existence of the EU Mission in Armenia, military incidents continue to occur on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

Baku’s behavior may be due to the lenient position and cautious criticism of Brussels, which, in the absence of Russian gas, intensified strategic energy relations with Azerbaijan. While the regional and global energy market is reeling from the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russian hydrocarbons, Azerbaijan will be motivated to ignore the EU’s concerns. Energy dependence on foreign markets and the strategic goal of diversifying gas supply sources neutralizes the harshness of the EU. After the dramatic lesson in Ukraine, European institutions should understand that authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe with energy potential (such as Russia or Azerbaijan) have revisionist appetites based on historical arguments against their neighbors. Within the framework of the CPE in Moldova, the EU will have to demonstrate that its political and diplomatic contribution can provide an effective balance between the achievement of a genuine Armenian-Azerbaijani peace and the development of a non-transactional “energy pact” with Baku.

The situation in Georgia – an early warning of the eastern neighborhood?

Another issue on the EU’s table in its eastern neighborhood is authoritarian tendencies in Georgia. The phenomenon of “urbanization” (a Hungarian-style expression of Euroscepticism) is a trend emerging in a country where support for the EU and NATO reaches around 80-90% (IRI, March 2023). On the one hand, the government in Tbilisi (“Georgian Dream”), which has been in power for more than a decade, claims to have a pro-European agenda and seeks to meet EU conditions for candidate status, similar to Ukraine and Moldova achieved this in June 2022. On the other hand, representatives of the ruling party resort to aggressive and humiliating rhetoric against EU officials and MEPs, who are often accused of interfering in Georgia’s internal affairs.

In addition, the government’s parliamentary majority tried to pass restrictive legislation against civil society and the media, whose budgets depend on external sources for more than 20%. Even if, as a result of pro-European and anti-Russian protests (Politico, March 2023), the draft law on the “foreign agent” was canceled, the domestic and Western public believes that the document was inspired by the legislative practice of the Putin regime. The case reinforced the perception that the Georgian government is closer to Russia than to the EU, while the population is in the opposite direction.

The image crisis in which the Georgian government found itself has also deepened due to accusations against Ukraine and the EU that they will condition the European course by opening a new front against Russia. The rapid pace of intensification of economic ties with Russia brings back into the spotlight the risks associated with the restoration of old dependencies. The geopolitical intentions of the Georgian government are questionable. The EU is facing a serious dilemma regarding the granting of the status of a candidate country. If they fail to do so in 2023, the opposition can use an impeachment vote in the 2024 election to change power. Due to the fragmented nature of the pro-EU vote and political polarization, the rejection of the candidacy could be used by the government to accuse the opposition and the EU of abandoning the pro-European population. The EPC meeting presents a political opportunity for the EU to press for the full implementation of the 12 conditions, paying particular attention to justice and civil society. Although reducing the influence of the oligarch Bidzina Invanishvili is crucial for the functioning of Georgian democratic institutions, the EU’s condition for the adoption of deoligarization legislation should not be taken into account, as it could become a dangerous political tool against the pro-European opposition in Georgia. Read the full article and comment contributors. EN