Moldova is experiencing very serious political and socio-economic turbulence. The population’s attitude towards the authorities is deteriorating, but not because of corruption scandals, but because of the inefficiency of the authorities. The authorities are overwhelmed by crises, but try to combine the search for effective solutions with constant reference to external factors as the main culprits in the emergence of crises. On the one hand, the authorities are telling the truth, because many crises (humanitarian, security, energy) were either created or exacerbated by Russian military aggression against Ukraine. On the other hand, focusing on the Russian origins of the crises helps the government limit domestic public criticism and strengthen its external alliances with Western powers. However, the population is susceptible to protests, which the pro-Russian opposition and kleptocratic groups take advantage of. While the latter want to stop the judicial reform, the pro-Russian parliamentary opposition wants to take power (through democratic elections) in three waves: local elections (2023), presidential (2024) and regular parliamentary elections in 2025. This scenario is already openly announced as an alternative, if the government survives politically this winter.

Governance is a challenge and its resources are limited. From a political point of view, the government is having trouble managing the multiple crises the country is facing simultaneously. The rising cost of natural gas (energy poverty), the effects of drought (food security), the financial pressure on the administrative apparatus caused by the refugee crisis (military aggression of Russia against Ukraine) are generating public discontent. This leaves an impression on the popularity of the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) and its political figures. Thanks to an active foreign policy and political help received, including from the European People’s Party, Maja Sandu still manages to remain at the top of the list, but in any case relatively weakened. Economically, even if there is no food shortage, the population experiences inflationary shocks of about 34% compared to the previous year, which reduces its purchasing power. After economic growth of 13.4% in 2021, linked to the normalization of economic activity and stabilization of the political situation, the economy may shrink to 1% in 2022 (GET, August 2022). According to other estimates, an economic recession could put up to 10% of the country’s GDP at risk (UN, September 2022). In the field of security, Moldova’s special services see a reduced likelihood of threats from the Transnistrian region, which has never been so dependent on Chisinau’s decisions (import-export activities, gas supply). In any case, the Russian military presence in the immediate vicinity should be taken seriously as a source of concern. This will contain the potential for high instability until Ukraine finally ends Russian aggression throughout Ukraine.

Legitimacy of the authorities and anti-government protests

The cumulative effects of the crisis hit the government’s popularity. According to the latest polls, 30% of the population now believe the country is moving in the right direction, compared to 52% in September 2021 (iData, September 2022). The Party of Power (PAS) ranks second in the list of electoral preferences (19.4%). Ahead is the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (20.8%), and in third place and close to PAS is the Shor party (16.7%).

The popularity of the socialists and Shore’s party is taking place against a background of serious defects of integrity. The leaders of these formations are being investigated for large-scale corruption crimes, illegal enrichment or illegal financing of parties (Ihor Dodon, Ilan Shor, Marina Tauber). Ex-president Dodon is also accused of treason in favor of Russia. While the regulator of the audiovisual media market is independent from the interference of informal groups, led by persons appointed by the PAS, the perception crystallizes that some media sources (which are considered independent) avoid critical evaluation by the government. Reluctance to criticize the government can be seen both in journalistic and non-governmental circles. Despite the fact that it is a kind of self-censorship, the refusal to criticize the ruling party is considered a fair measure, since it does not allow the pro-Russian opposition to exploit public discontent caused by socio-economic problems and various mistakes of the authorities (strategic communication). Thus, the maintenance of national stability and security is put first, while pluralism and critical thinking are benignly relegated to the background.

In addition to the immunity from criticism provided by the majority of pro-democracy actors in the country, the government of Natalia Havrilica and President Maja Sandu enjoys tremendous openness from Western actors. Critical reporting by some credible civil society and journalists is in the minority and seems to be overlooked (notably in the European Union and the US) by more pressing risks of Russian origin. This probably leads to anomalies in public perception, with EU membership having three times as much support (60%) as PAS (less than 20%), which has facilitated efforts to obtain candidate status (in June 2022). However, due to threats related to the possibility of subversive actions by Russia in Moldova (IPN, August 2022) due to anti-government protests, the PAS-Sandu tandem has the opportunity to hinder the mobilization of protest sentiments in society. In this way, the population is encouraged to show solidarity with the authorities (“the rally around the flag”). Otherwise, it can be associated with the “corrupt” opposition, which consists of pro-Russian forces (socialists, communists) and kleptocratic groups (Sor Party, Vyacheslav Platon, Gheorghe Kavkaliuk) linked to the fugitive oligarch Volodymyr Plahotniuk (IPN, August). 2022). To avoid possible discredit, the extra-parliamentary pro-European and pro-reform opposition (Platform DA) refused in any way to support the protests organized by the Shore party (September 18).

Is Russian gas a simultaneous weapon of Chisinau and Russia?

Moldovan authorities are convinced that gas supplies can be resolved this winter if Russia decides to cut off supplies. Moldova is looking for alternative procurement sources (Romania, Azerbaijan). However, unlike the cessation of gas supplies to Europe (IPN, September 2022), in the case of Moldova, Russia can use as the main reason the Moldovan side does not fulfill its contractual obligations. The main commitment voluntarily undertaken by Kishinev is to conduct an audit to resolve the problem of old debt for natural gas consumed in the territory under the control of the constitutional authorities. The debt referred to by Gazprom is about $800 million, which MoldovaGaz must repay (Gazprom owns 50% of the shares). The Moldovan authorities do not want to recognize the debt until it is confirmed by a credible international audit. In this sense, through direct negotiations (not on the basis of competition), possible due to the state of emergency, two companies (from Great Britain and Norway) are to conduct an audit, the results of which will be presented outside the deadline agreed with the Russian side in October 2021 (May 2022). Moscow did not respond to Moldova’s requests for an extension of the inspection period, which, according to the Moldovan government, makes the scenario of gas supply termination possible. Meanwhile, the pro-Russian opposition insists that President Sandu should travel to Moscow to negotiate a better gas price. According to the latest polls, this idea would be supported by about 70% of the population, including those who previously protested in the Gagauz autonomy and who are associated with the Shor party protests.

However, even during the negotiation of the contract with Gazprom (October 2021), the Moldovan side used the “Transnistrian element”. Russia was also persuaded to agree to sign a contract with Moldova (Riddle, October 2021) so as not to harm the supply of Russian natural gas to the Transnistrian region. There is no other legal way to deliver gas to Moldova, including the separatist region, except for the regulation of the gas import contract by the competent constitutional bodies. Read the full article and comment on Contributors.ro