Thanks to the status of a candidate country for joining the European Union, which was granted in Brussels in June, Moldova has the opportunity to advance more easily and quickly on the path of reforms. They are necessary for the functioning of the country, but also irreplaceable in order for accession to the EU to become possible in the near future. The merits for receiving this candidacy combine several main factors, such as: the impact of the West’s reaction to Russian aggression against Ukraine (IPN, June 2022), the results of the implementation of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement in 2014. 2021 and the positive image of the government of Moldova.

PrimoWithout the war started by Russia, any talk of eastward expansion of the EU would be met with resistance from skeptical member states such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark and even Germany. Second, few in Brussels would take seriously the accession requests submitted by the “associate trio”, of which Moldova is a part, if they had not been in the process of implementing the association agreements for almost 8 years. Through these agreements, many approximations to European legislation are already being carried out, which affect national industry policy. and, Third, it is virtually unlikely that Moldova would have applied for membership and the EU would have considered it quickly and with a favorable outcome if Moldova had been governed by pro-Russian players or political forces influenced by oligarchic interests. The fact that the government in Chisinau inspires confidence in the eyes of the West allowed Moldova to join Ukraine, avoiding the fate of Georgia, which received the status of a “potential candidate” due to the undermining of democratic institutions, which is now practiced by oligarch Bidzin. Ivanishvili.

In order for the proximity to the EU made possible by the candidacy to begin to produce changes at the institutional level with positive political and economic effects, governance must overcome the constraints created by the crises, using governance based on inclusion, transparency and meritocracy. Maia Sandu’s extreme popularity in the West or the Party of Action and Solidarity’s dominance in the legislature could be used to advance a reform agenda. But attention should be paid to the fundamental directions of the policy, many of which were indicated in the assessment of the European Commission, on the basis of which Moldova received the green light for EU candidacy. Justice reform is stagnating, the agricultural sector is in a tailspin, the high level of infection with COVID-19 is reviving, Ukrainian refugees need new resources, the situation in the gas sector is generating new debts, and inflation is becoming uncontrollable, the government is losing its political legitimacy, and so dilute, carry out reforms of secondary importance (“university reform”). In other words, the authorities do not understand that during a crisis, state institutions should deal with urgent issues, and not expand into areas irrelevant to public and national interests at the moment. The real agenda of the population and the political agenda of the government must be synchronized so as not to create contradictions and reduce the fall in popularity of one of the most coherent pro-European governments in all the years of Moldova’s independence. Otherwise, failures in management will affect the chain not only on the image of the government, but also on the image of European partners. The latter will have to take on part of the responsibility for the actions of the government in Chisinau, because they offer him financial assistance without putting forward conditions that would allow minimal quality and profitable pressure.

Quick reforms versus quality reforms

The crises that the region of which Moldova is a part of and the EU are facing at the same time indicate that joining the EU cannot be seen as a quick goal for various reasons.

First, the geopolitical focus of the EU is focused on ending the Russian war against Ukraine and solving its numerous consequences (refugees, reconstruction, alternative ways to export grain, etc.). It is clear that the enlargement mechanism has been launched, but it has not yet produced serious effects even for the (relatively small) states that have been negotiating for accession for a long time (Montenegro since 2012 and Serbia since 2014). Accession to the EU takes time and significant progress, even if the issue is often decided on the basis of political calculations.

second, the Moldovan side has requirements that must be fulfilled. Currently, there are 13 conditions that appear to be a prerequisite for promoting the deepening of relations with the EU in view of the received candidacy. Most of the demands put forward are either too general (fighting corruption, etc.) or extremely complex (local government reform). For this reason, it is premature for the government to start discussing the possibility of accession negotiations. Instead of rushing or, worse, forcing reforms, the authorities can do a critical self-assessment, using the results of a questionnaire previously submitted to the EU, to identify concrete steps and realistic timelines for their achievement by December 2022 and beyond. date. If Brussels wants qualitative changes, it will focus not on the speed of reforms, but on their stability and irreversibility. This will help reduce geopolitical polarization. The population will positively evaluate the changes effectively and with due return, associating them with European integration.

The third aspect it is important to combine new and old mechanisms for relations with the EU. More precisely, it is necessary to find creative solutions to combine the actions related to the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU with the fulfillment of the requested requirements in order to bring Moldova closer to the accession negotiations. This would mean that the Association Agenda and national programs for the implementation of the Association Agreement should be balanced and synchronized with an emphasis on the fulfillment of the 13 conditions. Before the start of accession negotiations, the transposition agreement with the EU serves as a unique platform for connecting national legislation and practice to the European one.

Last but not least, the fourth aspect It is important to prevent the government from politicizing the procedures related to the candidate for EU membership. The government recently suggested that the formation of a future team of Moldovan negotiators could be possible, depending on progress, closer to 2024. That’s when the presidential elections will be held, in which the current president, Maia Sandu, will run for a new post. election. If the government’s intention is to adapt the reforms demanded by the EU to its electoral needs, then they will inevitably increase the risks associated with the reduction of transparency and participation in the process of achieving reforms. The party’s election calendar should not be prioritized at the expense of quality reforms, primarily because this may cause resistance or backlash from the public, which, due to the current crisis, continues to be impoverished, becoming increasingly vulnerable to anti-European positions. populist appeals.

Dispersion of popularity against the need for national dialogue

Unlike many external partners, the Moldovan public evaluates the government’s activities not by its noble intentions, but by concrete results and actions related to reducing the consequences of the current crisis. Although in practice the government is taking measures to mitigate the effects of the proliferating emergencies, this demonstrates certain structural weaknesses. They refer to the complete lack of desire to establish inter-party cooperation with the forces (from the extra-parliamentary environment) that make up the pro-European followers of the reforms. With the exception of some members of civil society, who were still co-opted by the government to neutralize criticism of government policies and gain some legitimacy in the reform process, the ruling party is somewhat politically isolated at home. The reason for this self-isolation is not necessarily and exclusively geopolitical, but rather stems from the non-cooperative PAS style of governance inherited from President Maya Sandu. That is why political support from the EU and other Western partners played a saving role for the government, which has so far managed to avoid mass protests. Despite this, recent polls show that Maia Sandu’s prolific foreign activism is no longer able to compensate for PAS’s falling popularity, estimated at 22.6% of voters compared to 26.3% for the Bloc of Communists and Socialists. Read the whole article and comment on Contributors.ro