When Bulgaria announced a long-term 13-year agreement last January to import 1.5 billion cubic meters of gas a year from Turkey, many in Athens wondered if this signaled a pro-Turkish turn by the Bulgarian government. To the extent that the agreement was limited by Bulgaria’s needs, Sofia’s position reflected a reasonable balance, given that more than 50% of Bulgarian imports must pass through two strategically important infrastructures originating in Western Thrace.

Bulgaria is in fact an equal partner of Greece and the Greek companies that built them (IGB), build (FSRU Alexandroupolis) and modernize (expansion of IGB capacity to 5 billion cubic meters per year). As an additional step to tighten Greek-Bulgarian relations, in February 2023 the Bulgarian government signed an agreement to consider the construction of an oil pipeline from Alexandroupolis to Burgas, which would allow it – although not until the end of 2024 – to become independent from Russia importing oil as it should. . In fact, last month in Athens, in the presence of two competent energy ministers, the work of a competent committee began, which will try to improve the pipeline project.

But Bulgaria’s unelected interim government, spurred on by what Bulgarian analysts say is the national gas network operator Bulgartransgaz, appears to have a much more ambitious program to strengthen ties with Turkey in a way that could even benefit Russia’s plan to turn Ankara into a regional gas hub. . , resurrecting a version of the Nabucco project.

This plan, which excluded Greece from the transmission networks of natural gas (NG) from the Caspian, was “defeated” in 2013 by the TAP gas pipeline, in a dispute that lasted about 5 years and was resolved in detail with the personal involvement of the then Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras. The TAP route also made possible the construction of the IGB pipeline, which, together with the FSRU of Alexandroupoli and the pipeline to North Macedonia, constitutes a strategic infrastructure that serves the Greek strategy of the so-called “vertical axis”, i.e. the relationship of the Aegean with the Baltic and the provision of F.A. from non-Russian sources in all countries of Central Europe and the Balkans. The IGB and FSRU of Alexandroupolis together constitute the critical starting point of the Greek “vertical axis”.

As the Prime Minister of Greece rightly noted during the presentation of the government program N.D. On April 26, if this “vertical axis” and the entire National Natural Gas System (ESFA) did not exist, Bulgaria would have run out of gas. after the Russian embargo in April 2022. The proven operation of the “vertical axis”, as well as the practical Greek solidarity when Bulgaria needed it most, seems to have gone unnoticed in certain circles in Sofia that played a leading role in the emergence of the “Ring” project. The Ring of Solidarity.

April 25 in the presence of the President of Azerbaijan, who is declared as a potential exporter of up to 5 billion cubic meters. / year, which will pass through Turkey and Bulgaria further north, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in Sofia on a specific pipeline network, the total cost of upgrading which is expected to exceed 700 million euros.

In his statements, President Aliyev stressed that “Azerbaijan plans to double the supply of natural gas to the EU market.” from 11 to 22 billion sq.m. / year until 2027, with EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simpson stressing in her video message that “this particular memorandum is of great importance. The European Commission will continue to work with Azerbaijan because the country has established itself as a reliable partner.”

According to Ms. Simpson, “it is necessary to continue investing in energy projects for independence from Russian sources, especially for Eastern Europe.” The Romanian minister said that we should not “forget the role of Turkey, as we cannot import much natural gas from Azerbaijan without Turkey”, while the Hungarian foreign minister stated that “without EU support, we will not be able to get the necessary amount of natural gas from Azerbaijan. Next time we would like to see Turkey here as well.”

In addition to being the presence of the EU. provides for the inclusion of these updates in the RepowerEU plans of these states, notably the absence of Turkey’s signature on a specific agreement. It is obvious that Türkiye, by its attitude, is looking for an appropriate balancing formula for the translation of Azeri F.A. through the 50% Russian pipeline Turkish Stream, which connects to the Bulgarian network at Malkoklar. Since the TANAR, through which Azerbaijani fuel assemblies pass, feeding the TAR, ends not at the Turkish-Bulgarian, but at the Greek-Turkish border (Ipsala), it is obvious that Turkey will have to use the Russian pipeline network to feed the “Ring of Solidarity” – and this, obviously, won’t come without a price.

Therefore, there is a very serious possibility that Turkey will consume these additional Azerbaijani quantities by promoting Russian FAs in the Ring. which will be called Turkish, as it was for many years with the “Turkish” gas that we received in Greece through the ITG pipeline before the start of TAP operation in 2021. In this case, the EU will finance – through the approval of RepowerEU national plans – an increase in predominantly Russian exports to the Union, only because some in Sofia do not want to use 50% of the Bulgarian IGB.

The possibility of non-transparency in these Turkish-Bulgarian deals is as high as the risk of VAT fraud being reassessed. from Turkey. After all, these well-known Turkish actions were the subject of a ten-year legal dispute between DEPA and Botas, for which the Turkish side was finally convicted in January 2020. In conclusion, the position of Azerbaijan is also curious, given its commitment to double the capacity of the TAP, from which they can pass through the IGB to Bulgaria, from scratch for the same cost, 5 billion sq.m. / year, which Bulgartransgaz wants to receive from Turkish Stream.

Dr. Theodoros Tsakiris is Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia.