It is not enough that the administration of justice be correct, it must also be swift. Delay in the completion of legal cases leads to a number of pathologies: uncertainty about the status of rights, perpetuation of lawless situations, encouragement of violation of legal obligations in the absence of immediate consequences, up to the actual denial of justice. In this article, we explore the relationship between delayed justice and economic growth. We take data from the European Commission’s EU Justice Ranking and cover 2012, 2016, 2017 and 2018.

To study the delay in the administration of justice, we apply the concept of judicial efficiency. By this we declare the ability of the country’s judicial system to respond in a timely manner to requests for judicial protection. The concept differs from the concept of judicial efficiency (judicial efficiency), which indicates the optimal management of resources to achieve the best possible result. Thus, an efficient judiciary is not necessarily efficient, as it can achieve the completion of court cases in a short time (efficient), but with large financial resources (inefficient). Finally, judicial efficiency is calculated on the basis of the average time taken to resolve court cases.

Data on civil dispute resolution times in the first instance show that Greece is the slowest country in adjudicating disputes, between 450 and 600 days, followed by Italy and France. In Germany, the settlement time is about 200 days, followed by Denmark and Sweden. In Austria and the Netherlands, the shortest estimated settlement time is 100 days or less. The rating does not change much when we add data from other jurisdictions, but administrative justice shows much longer settlement times. While countries such as Sweden maintain levels below 200 days, they are higher in most countries, and in countries where political dispute resolution times have been long, administrative dispute times rise sharply. Thus, Greece presented for 2012 the highest time period of about 1500 days, which was gradually reduced to about 550 days until 2018. High settlement times are also represented by Italy and Portugal.

One factor often attributed to the delay in justice is “savagery”, leading to an excessive number of applications for judicial protection. However, Greece ranks close to the European average with a ratio of about 2 cases per 100 inhabitants (2016-2018) (Belgium and Poland also have a higher EMO, while the Scandinavian countries show the lowest rate, less than 1 case). per 100 inhabitants). Another popular association has to do with the number of judges, as an increase in the number of judges is expected to lead to an increase in the efficiency of the judiciary. However, the data do not support this conclusion, and in some cases show the opposite. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands are among the countries with the lowest ratio of judges per capita, albeit among the countries with the shortest dispute resolution times. Greece, in fact, exceeds the European average (EMO) for trial judges, quite close to Germany and Hungary, but surpasses Germany in the total number of judges.

On the contrary, there is a correlation between the delay in justice and the number of non-judicial personnel of the courts, such as administrative and technical staff. Many countries with high resolution times, such as Italy, Greece and France, have a small number of non-judicial personnel. On the other hand, countries with low settlement times, such as Germany and Austria, are well above the EMO, with the exception of Denmark and Sweden (2016 data). Finally, perhaps the most interesting consideration is the relationship between settlement time and the state budget for justice. The data show that while adequate funding is important for an effective justice system, it does not have to be high. Some countries manage to keep costs low without affecting the speed of justice. This demonstrates the importance of judicial efficiency and suggests that the funding factor becomes less significant as long as other (organizational and operational) factors do not lag behind. Otherwise, low funding pulls other parameters to worsen settlement time (Greece and Italy below EMO).

Data on civil dispute resolution timeframes in the first instance indicate that Greece is the country with the slowest court resolution rate in Europe.

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the study of the relationship between settlement time and development. By the term “development” we mean the product produced (GDP), as well as the levels of education, health, environment and housing, as well as life expectancy. Comparing time to move in with country-by-country Human Development Index (HDI) scores (which use measures such as educational attainment, life expectancy, and income), we notice that most countries with a high HDI index have shorter time to move in, for example Denmark. , Sweden and Germany, although the reverse does not seem to be the case either. The correlation becomes more apparent when we compare court efficiency with countries’ GDPs: many countries with low settlement times are accompanied by high GDPs (Denmark, Sweden, Germany). But again, the opposite is not necessarily true: Italy, Greece and France are countries with higher GDP but slower justice than Hungary and Romania. We find a similar correlation with levels of judicial independence. Almost all countries with a high level of judicial independence (over 70% of positive results) have short settlement times (Nordic countries), while most countries with levels close to and below EMO, such as Greece, also have higher delays . Finally, we note that countries with high per capita health spending (over $4,500) are also among the countries with the fastest settlement times. As with the previous parameters, the opposite is not always true: France, Italy and Greece show high health spending but low judicial efficiency.

Our findings are that there is a positive relationship between judicial performance and HDI, GDP, perceived independence of the judiciary, and public health spending, but this relationship has not been confirmed, and vice versa. The latter can perhaps be explained in the light of the data discussed above: many countries manage to maintain high judicial efficiency, despite the reduction in public spending on justice due to high judicial efficiency, fewer judges, judicial staff, etc. and, therefore, less need in financing. Another reading is that making the judiciary more efficient contributes to wealth creation. However, the study confirms the general conclusion drawn in the literature on the subject: the factor of forensic efficiency goes hand in hand with the factor of development. The multifactorial nature of judicial effectiveness naturally warrants a country-by-country study, but more general findings suggest that solutions are not often found or exhausted where we would normally expect them to be.

Mr. Athanasios Peftinas is a Juris Doctor at the University of Oxford.

Mr. Theodoros Panagiotidis is a professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Macedonia.