It is unusual for the head of the CIA to write a long article to explain his position on the most serious international crisis in which the American foreign policy department is involved. But this is what William Burns is doing today, in Foreign Affairs, in his own hand, quoted by La Stampa.

Let’s take a closer look at what it supports. Burns defines Russia’s war against Ukraine as a failure and declares that he believes that the transformation of Moscow into a vassal of China has already been achieved. But he also recognizes that we live in a world where the United States no longer has an undisputed advantage.

“The emergence of Chinese and Russian revanchism poses significant geopolitical challenges in a world where the United States no longer enjoys an undisputed advantage,” he says.

Burns is convinced that the era of the Cold War will truly end only on February 24, 2022, with the invasion of Ukraine, which, however, marks the entry into a deserted and undefined territory, a political “wasteland”, quoted by La Stampa and Rador Radior Romania.

• Read also: “It would be an own goal on a historic scale”: What the head of the CIA said about this year’s development of the Russian-Ukrainian war

Putin’s psychology

The first key to understanding how to live there is also to understand Putin’s psychology: his desire to control Ukraine stems from the belief that without such control Russia cannot be a great power, and he cannot be a great Russian leader. However, the intervention in Ukraine turned out to be a failure for Russia.

“The post-Cold War era ended forever when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. I’ve spent much of the last 20 years trying to understand the combustible combination of resentment, ambition and insecurity that Russian President Vladimir Putin embodies.

One thing I understood: it would always be a mistake to underestimate his commitment to controlling Ukraine and its elections. Without this control, he believes that Russia cannot be a great power, and he is a great Russian ruler. This tragic and brutal fixation has already embarrassed Russia and exposed its weaknesses, from its one-dimensional economy to its ‘inflated’ military prowess and corrupt political system.”

The Russian war also provoked a Ukrainian reaction that was hard to predict at this level: “Putin’s invasion brought about an amazing resolve and determination of the Ukrainian people. I saw their bravery with my own eyes during frequent military visits to Ukraine, which were interrupted by Russian airstrikes and vivid images of Ukrainian resilience and ingenuity on the battlefield.”

Technically, Russia and Putin have already failed, Burns believes

With this data in hand: “Putin’s war has already become Russia’s failure on many levels. His original goal of conquering Kyiv and conquering Ukraine turned out to be foolish and illusory. His armed forces suffered huge losses.

At least 315,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded, two-thirds of Russia’s pre-war tanks were destroyed, and Putin’s decades-touted military modernization program “turned out to be nonsense.” All this is a direct result of the bravery and skill of Ukrainian soldiers with the support of the West.”

And the costs for the Russian economy are just as high: it is already effectively a servant of China. “The Russian economy is suffering long-term consequences, and the country is deciding its fate as an economic vassal of China. Putin’s boundless ambitions have also worked for him in another way: they have pushed NATO to become bigger and stronger” (a NATO that was effectively divided and weak before a full-scale invasion).

How much the war weakened Putin domestically

Another cost we forget (thanks to Russian propaganda in the West and its useful idiots) is how much the war has weakened Putin at home: “His war in Ukraine is silently eroding his power at home.

The short-lived uprising launched last June by mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin offered a glimpse of some of the flaws underlying Putin’s carefully polished image of control.

For a leader who has painstakingly built a reputation as an arbiter of order, Putin looked remote and hesitant as Prigozhin’s rebels marched on Moscow. For many representatives of the Russian elite, the question was not so much whether the emperor has no clothes, but why he was dressed for so long.” Is he now dressed all the time? This remains rather doubtful.

In this context, Putin is determined to restore “Russian defense production — critical components come from China, as well as weapons and ammunition from Iran and North Korea — and continues to bet that time is on his side, that he can weaken Ukraine and can cause the anger of her Western supporters.”

But that’s not a well-founded belief, Trump or no Trump (who Burns obviously doesn’t name). The fact is that the American state is deeply convinced that, using the words of Burns, “the challenge for Ukraine is to undermine Putin’s arrogance and demonstrate the high price for Russia of the continuation of the conflict”, but here Burns surprisingly and completely publicly says something that we can expect: deep attacks behind enemy lines, no more obsessive pursuit of a direct hit.

“All Putin’s idiots around the world”

The high price for Russia is imposed “not only by advancing on the front line, but also by conducting deeper attacks behind the front and a stable conquest of the Black Sea. In this context, Putin may return to nuclear threats, and it would be unwise to completely rule out the risks of escalation.

But it would be just as pointless to be afraid of these risks.” It is no secret to almost all analysts how the threat of escalation is spread by all the Putin idiots around the world, from Moscow to the Western world and European “pacifism”.

The recipe for continued aid to Ukraine with arms and money serves American interests, not undermines them. And at a minimal cost (“less than 5% of the US defense budget”), a clear message is being sent to the real puppet master of it all: Xi Jinping’s China.

“The United States’ willingness to absorb economic suffering to counter Putin’s aggression — and its ability to mobilize allies to do the same — was starkly at odds with Beijing’s belief that America was in terminal decline,” and Xi Jinping was betting on it even more than Putin .

“One of the surest ways to restore China’s perception of American ignorance and inflame Chinese aggression would be to withdraw support for Ukraine.

Maintaining Ukraine’s material support does not harm Taiwan, even if it sends an important signal about the determination of the US to help Taiwan,” the head of the CIA concludes. If weapons exist, America exists, Europe and Taiwan are safer, and the axis of dictators is fenced off and condemned not to pass to the West. Otherwise, everything but peace would be possible, reports La Stampa (taken from Rador Radior Romania)