According to the latest assessment, the Kremlin may try to use false flag operations in Transnistria to undermine Ukrainian grain exports along the western Black Sea coast, argue that Russia must protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking citizens, and foment instability in Moldova. Institute for the Study of War.

Perhaps the Kremlin is instructing pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria to create information conditions for a possible mock operation in Transnistria as part of the Kremlin’s broader efforts to destabilize the Republic of Moldova.

On January 10, the Ministry of State Security of Transnistria (MDB) issued a press release stating that an “incident” occurred on January 7 in which “two citizens of Transnistria were transferred to the territory of Ukraine,” but the authorities are investigating the circumstances. incident”.

The MGB is a Russian-dominated organization commonly understood to be a “department of the FSB (Federal Security Service)” in Russia, presumably taking orders directly from Moscow.

On January 9, TASS published an interview with the President of Transnistria, Vadym Krasnoselsky, in which he stated that Moldova’s “militarization” threatens Transnistria, accused Moldova of disrupting negotiations with Transnistria, and emphasized Transnistria’s “broad” agreements on cooperation with Russia.

Krasnoselskyi’s interview was likely part of a disinformation effort aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future Russian campaigns in the region.

The press release of the Ministry of Interior from January 10 is probably also part of these efforts by the Kremlin.

The Kremlin may try to use false flag operations in Transnistria to argue that Russia must protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said on January 10 that it had summoned Moldova’s ambassador to Russia to protest Moldova’s “unfriendly actions,” including “politically motivated harassment of Russian and Russian-language media” and “cases of discrimination against Russia.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry threatened that in case of continuation of such actions, “the Russian side reserves the right to take additional measures in response.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry also claimed that there are reports in the mass media that Moldova intends to assist NATO in the training of Ukrainian forces on the territory of Moldova, which would mean Moldova’s “direct participation” in hostilities on the part of Ukraine.

Kremlin officials have recently stepped up references to “compatriots abroad” and “Russian peace,” terms Russia often uses to justify its right to protect its ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers abroad.

In particular, Russia used similar excuses when in 1992 it carried out a military intervention on behalf of the separatist Transnistria.

The Kremlin can use Transnistria to block the Ukrainian grain corridor

The Kremlin may also renew efforts to mobilize Transnistria to create instability in Moldova to undermine Ukrainian grain exports along the western Black Sea coast.

On January 10, Reuters reported that the Romanian port of Constanta shipped a record 36 million metric tons of grain in 2023, and that about 40 percent of those shipments were Ukrainian grain.

ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian attacks on assets of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (Black Sea Fleet) had led to changes in the way Russian ships operated and forced the Black Sea Fleet to move some ships from its main base in occupied Sevastopol in western Crimea.

Ukrainian attacks on Black Sea assets have also contributed to civilian use of Ukraine’s Black Sea Grain Corridor, as international support for the corridor continues to grow despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and military threats against it.

The Kremlin could use a false flag operation in Transnistria as an alternative way to keep countries from participating in the Ukrainian grain corridor, despite Russia’s weakened presence in the western Black Sea.