Ukraine’s current counteroffensive won’t drive Russia out of Ukraine, but no one expects it to, but it has shown how the Russian military can be defeated not in 2023, but in 2024 or 2025, says General Richard Burrons, former commander of the United Kingdom’s Joint Forces Command in the article about Financial Times.

Ukrainian soldiersPhoto: Jonathan NACKSTRAND / AFP / Profimedia

According to the British general, Ukraine is unlikely to halve the Russian occupation by winter, which could be one of the most optimistic goals, but he notes that Ukraine can achieve victory in the next two years, hence the promise that the Western allies will support Kyiv “as long as necessary” “.

Kyiv, despite slow progress this summer, proved it could break through Russian defenses and made a major breakthrough on a section of the front in southeastern Zaporizhia Oblast at Robotyn after weeks of fighting in mined fields to get there.

The goal is to cut the “land bridge” to Crimea.

Russian troops are deployed over a large area, tired and without reserves, but if they simply do not surrender, it means that the war will continue for a long time.

Ukraine has enough air defenses to cover about a third of the country’s territory. The problem of the shortage of artillery ammunition was only temporarily solved by the US, and Ukraine will need until mid-2024 to create a sufficiently powerful air force, and at the moment it lacks basic mine clearance equipment.

According to Richard Burrons, it would be too hasty to throw the rest of the reserves into battle now.

The five most important steps on which victory over the Russian invasion is based:

  • First, Kyiv should not insist on achieving significant success on the battlefield until it has the means to achieve it. War is never best fought as a close affair: Ukraine must become stronger and Russia weaker, otherwise the situation will reach a stalemate.
  • Secondly, it is necessary to put relentless pressure on the Russian occupation throughout the winter. This means “bite and hold”, that is, advance at short distances to minimize casualties and remain covered by artillery and anti-aircraft defenses within the ammunition supply. The strength, will and reserves of Russian troops will steadily erode. If the morale of the Red Army is already weakened, weaken it even more.
  • Third, Ukraine must systematically weaken Russia’s military control over its territories until 2024 and beyond. The destruction of artillery weapons is important, as are strikes on deeper targets in occupied Ukraine. The goal is to destroy Russian military capabilities faster than they can be replaced in order to make Russia unable to withstand a stronger future Ukrainian offensive. Kyiv is restricted by the West from using its equipment and ammunition on Russian soil, but must still use its ingenuity and courage to strike hard beyond its borders.
  • Fourth, the Russian Black Sea Fleet must be neutralized as a base for Moscow’s devastating cruise missile attacks and as a constraint on grain exports. Ukrainian strikes can damage Russian ships faster than they can be replaced. By the spring of 2024, the Black Sea Fleet should not play a major role in this war.
  • The fifth and most important aspect is to recognize that this war affects the industrial defense capability of the West and Ukraine as a determining factor in military success. More could be supplied from Western stockpiles, but the Ukrainian campaign now depends on increased production by allied defense industries, and the munitions currently on newly expanded production lines are expected to be exhausted by mid-2024. This should be a major turning point in the offensive Kyiv’s ability.