No matter how you look at it, Tayyip Erdogan’s victory is good news for the Greek side. Any predominance of the opposition will dramatically change the climate in Turkish-American and Turkish-European relations, and not necessarily in favor of Athens.

Erdogan has the political capital to begin the process of normalizing Greek-Turkish relations. No one will be found in his own country to accuse him of obedience or laziness. If Ankara hopefully returns to a strategy of controlled military tension, then Athens will have the right to do everything possible to curb Turkish revisionism.

It is important to prioritize national goals compared to a neighboring country. Besides respecting existing borders and eliminating threats, what do we really want from Turkey? What about a country of 85 million people that has one of the twenty largest economies in the world and has powerful military forces operating in different regions? A country that has the confidence of a regional power and holds a broad vision that pits it against Greece.

The dominant school of thought argues that Turkey must remain close to the West in order to be able to put pressure on Ankara. Although it is based on a logical working assumption (“Turkey outside the West will be more dangerous”), the results of the recent elections show the future. Just look at the new composition of the Turkish Grand National Assembly: the Islamist-nationalist ruling coalition (AKP, MİP and smaller parties) won 336 seats, Meral Akşener’s nationalist Good Party 43, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Islamist Party 10, and the Islamist Party Eudaimonia. In total, Islamist and ultra-nationalist forces control nearly 400 of the 600 locations.

Turkey is turning into a more conservative, religious, nationalist, homophobic and xenophobic society. It is no coincidence that the Turkish leadership constantly reproaches the “West for colonialism and hypocrisy.” The incorrect assessment of the victory of the Alevi politician Kemal Kılıçdaroglu by a number of Western media indicates a misunderstanding that exists in Turkish society. Analysts and journalists believed that Erdogan would lose the election because politics follows the economy. This Western-centric way of thinking overlooks issues of identity that are crucial in today’s Turkey.

The more our country strengthens its deterrence capabilities and builds strong alliances, the more difficult it will be for Ankara to advance its plans in the region.

Another school of thought, somewhat unpleasant and pessimistic, admits that it is very difficult for the West to interfere in the political and social processes taking place inside Turkey. If he could, he would have done it already. Erdogan’s re-election strengthens a regime that abhors Kemalist secularism and seeks to return to a glorious past. This is not just an instrumentalization of religion and tradition, but something deeper. The Erdogan regime openly relies on a certain community of citizens who share common values ​​and beliefs. These are pious Sunni Muslims who were marginalized by the Kemalist regime. Pro-Erdogan Islamist thinker Hayreddin Karaman argued that “the values ​​of the majority should form the basis of legislation, and minorities should refrain from exercising some of their freedoms.” Now we have to deal with this Turkey. In practice, this means that the cultural gap between the West and Turkey will constantly widen.

However, the conflict between Greece and the new Turkey is not the final development. The more our country strengthens its deterrence capabilities and builds strong alliances, the more difficult it will be for Ankara to advance its plans in the region. We will not suddenly become friends, we never were.

However, it is reasonable to wonder if there is a way out of this situation. The answer is yes and no. There are disagreements that cannot be resolved because they go to the very core of Greek sovereignty. Therefore, our position here must be clear and unshakable. The informal moratorium on visiting arid islands does not help in this direction either.

Athens should focus almost exclusively on the issue of the EEZ and the continental shelf. Of course, on the basis of international law, but also with a sincere willingness to compromise. This possibility must be dedramatized in public debate, as Athens did the same in the case of Egypt. So let’s give Turkey a chance to prove to us that it can be a better neighbor. But so far, nothing more.

Mr. Manos Karagiannis is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia and Lecturer in International Security at King’s College London. His new book, Deterrence and Defense, is published by Papadopoulos.