Recep Tayyip Erdogan will soon begin his third term as President of Turkey. There will be a lot of talk about whether he regained power in a “free and fair election” (no), what this means for democracy in Turkey (nothing good) and whether his victory really benefited the stability of the region and the security of Greece (this not this way).

Since Erdogan won the first round on May 14, a lot of ink has been shed about what kind of foreign policy he will pursue. Perhaps the more pressing question was, “How far will he be allowed to escape punishment?” The answer to this question largely depends on how relations between Washington and Ankara develop.

The best motto for a dysfunctional US-Turkish alliance comes from a Council on Foreign Relations report aptly titled “Neither friends nor foes” (or from the modification the report’s author, Stephen Cook, made to the title in recent years, “There are more enemies than friends”). This feeling prevails in both countries. It was no secret that the Biden administration was hoping for Erdogan’s defeat. A week before the Turkish elections, members of Congress lambasted Erdogan and publicly expressed their hope for change in Turkey. Erdogan and the AKP have waged an effective campaign against President Biden, calling the opposition their preference.

From now on, there will be much talk of a “reset”, reminders that Erdogan has changed course, and in the past there will even be talk that he may have enough mandate to make bold foreign policy decisions.

It’s all nonsense. Erdogan will not change. He will, of course, pretend to have changed because he knows it often works for American diplomats who have short tenures and an innate belief that they will become a minister, assistant minister or ambassador who will finally achieve diplomatic breakthrough.

During Erdogan’s hegemony, no US administration has been able to talk him out of his deep-seated belief that time is on his side and that if he persists enough, America will back down. Despite signs that the pressure is working (Pastor Brunson’s case, Turkey’s recent cooperation in winding down some missions), the United States has not put — or even threatened to put — enough sustained pressure on Erdogan to take Washington seriously.

There is an opportunity to restart relations with Turkey, but it can only be used if Washington gets rid of its image of appeasement.

In fact, there is an opportunity to reset relations with Turkey, but it can be realized only if Washington gets rid of the image of a “appeaser” in relation to Turkey. Below are some immediate possibilities:

1. Russia: Tensions with Erdogan escalated into discord over how he got closer to Russia. The controversy surrounding the S-400 shocked even most of Turkey’s supporters in the US. And although it was initially hoped that Turkey would help support Ukraine, this was often a disadvantage, since it needs Russia on many fronts. If we want the war in Ukraine not to turn into another “eternal war”, Ankara must choose a side. Especially given Turkey’s economic woes, it should be clear that the role of a sanctions circumvention mechanism will come at a cost to Putin.

2. NATO: Everyone expects Turkey to turn quickly and Sweden become a member of NATO. Erdogan has drawn this question so skillfully and cynically that it is considered a serious concession on his part. Is not. This is a necessary – but not sufficient – step towards demonstrating Turkey’s solidarity with NATO. That the rest of the Alliance, especially the US, should make it clear that they are willing to effectively treat Sweden as an ally, whether Ankara approves or not, perhaps even sending weapons that would otherwise be destined for supposed allies like Turkey. Since we are talking about solidarity and NATO weapons…

3. Stop hostilities in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s intransigence over Sweden’s NATO membership has rightly angered Ankara’s Western allies, but the prospect of a Greco-Turkish war poses a far greater threat – an existential threat – to NATO. The cessation of flights should not be confused with a change in policy and the inability of the US and EU. Persuading Ankara to revoke the casus belli against Greece or withdraw its absurd formal challenges to Greek sovereignty is negligent to the extent that it relies on Greece’s exceptional restraint to prevent conflict in support of NATO . The Biden administration should openly condition its support for Turkey’s F-16s on an end to this belligerent behavior within NATO. Without such conditions, America would actually arm Ankara to wage war against America’s allies and partners.

Erdogan will only change if he is forced to. For the first time in a long time, he may finally realize that Ankara needs Washington more than Washington needs Ankara. The US now has significant leverage: the ability to influence IMF assistance, the F-16, the level of sanctions that will be imposed in the Hulk Bank case, energy diplomacy. If the Biden administration fails to use these levers, not only will the chance for a reset be lost, but relations will become even worse.

Mr. Eddie Zemenidis is Executive Director of the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC).