Opposition in Türkiye has never been as optimistic as it is today. Despite the many hardships of the past two decades, it seems that for the first time, so many factors have come together to make his re-election impossible. Tayyip Erdogan and AKP.

The economy suffered irreparable damage after the fall of the pound sterling in 2018, while no government initiative managed to stop the national currency from falling. Poverty is on the rise, hitting even the ruling party’s electorate, and worries about Erdogan’s authoritarian methods are growing. OUR earthquake that hit the country in February and caused more than 50,000 deaths and untold destruction seems to have been the final straw.

Ironically, another earthquake in 1999 contributed to this. AKP rise to power. After the catastrophe of that era exposed the moral poverty and incompetence of the traditional parties, Erdogan’s party emerged for the first time as a credible and honest political alternative. Today, that aura of efficiency has dissipated. Judging by the pulse readings, everything shows that Turkish voters they are ready to end the AKP’s 21 years in power and its authoritarian rule.

This prospect is certainly exciting. However, the euphoria is premature. If the opposition wins, it will face the same structural problems that have plagued the country for years. Türkiye may get rid of its authoritarian leader, but it will remain deeply troubled.

One of the words the opposition continues to use is “reconstruction.” The six parties that make up the coalition do not agree on everything, but they have outlined their goals for this reconstruction. The two parties are led by former top AKP officials. One of them, Ali Babacan, developed the original economic policy of Erdogan’s party. Ahmet Davutoglu, for his part, is considered the initiator of the AKP’s diplomatic strategy. With these two personalities, Erdogan’s party has managed to solidify its economically liberal and pro-Western parchments in the first decade of the new century.

However, a return to this approach is no longer possible. The global economic climate is no longer conducive to liberal policies, as it was with the reliance on foreign investment and trade liberalization in the early years of the SEP. Geopolitically, Europe’s attitude towards Turkey’s accession to the EU has changed radically, effectively eliminating such a possibility. In the wider region, American military and diplomatic hegemony is no longer willing to serve Turkish interests.

The Ankara government knew all of the above. The departure from Babajan’s liberal economic policies was prompted by the contraction of world markets a decade ago. In the field of international relations, the main reason for Davutoglu’s resignation from the post of prime minister in 2016 was that the ruling party no longer saw the government’s pro-Western stance as beneficial. With the growing influence of Russia and China in the region, the AKP decided to share its chances without completely abandoning its Western allies.

In recent years, the SEP has taken some pragmatic initiatives to improve the economy. Despite its shortcomings, the party was able to stay in power thanks to the widespread support of the population. This electoral base was created with great difficulty. With the exception of the Kurdish political movement, the AKP was the only party that sought to infiltrate society in this way by offering solutions to everyday problems. Without a clear alternative, many voters will elect the AKP again, despite promises from Kılıçdaroğlu to redistribute wealth.

The opposition’s harsh criticism of the AKP’s grandiose and unattainable economic plans is not accompanied by credible alternative proposals. Even an opposition victory will not put an end to the AKP’s splitting rhetoric. Far-right rhetoric can always be disastrous for the Kurdish minority, women’s and gay rights.

* Mr. Cihan Tugal is Professor of Sociology at the University of Berkeley in the USA.