OUR Wagnerattend Sudan It has secured privileged access to the country’s gold mines for years, but a Russian private military company is keeping a low profile after clashes erupted on Saturday between the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces (SOP) paramilitaries.

As far as Africa is concerned, the ambitions of the mercenary company founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a confidant of Russian President Vladimir Putin, are boundless. And there is no doubt that her goal is to emerge unscathed from the raging conflict.

naval base

During the regime of the dictator Omar al-Bashir, Russia was the only supplier of weapons to Sudan, which was subject to an international embargo. In 2017, General Bashir promised the Russians a naval base in the Red Sea.

But he never saw the light.

After the fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Khartoum moved away from Moscow somewhat.

But in October 2021, the head of the army, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, staged a coup. And the second in the hierarchy, Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, or “Khameti”, assured that a Russian base could appear there over time: “If any country wants to have a base off our coast, this base also serves our interests and does not threaten our security, whether either Russia or some other country, we will cooperate.”

Gold

The bowels of Sudan are rich in precious metals, most of which are mined illegally.

Many gold mines are controlled by DTY Khameti.

Wagner reportedly works through Prigozhin-owned company M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold, set up in Sudan in 2017. He also cooperates with the Aswar company, controlled by the Sudanese intelligence services.

A group of journalists from the Organized Crime and Corruption Research Project (OCCRP) said they found evidence of a contract between Meroe Gold and Aswar.

The Russian company was also exempted in 2018 from the 30% tax levied under Sudanese law on companies in the gold mining sector.

In contrast to how it operated in Mali and the Central African Republic, the company “remained opportunistic in Sudan rather than loyal to a particular faction,” Katrina Doxey of US think tank CSIS told AFP. This allowed gold mining to continue after the fall of Omar al-Bashir and the coup in October 2021.

Western headwind

The situation, however, has pushed him further into secret deals, as Khartoum is under sanctions and an arms embargo imposed by the UN in 2005 during the war in the state of Darfur (west), and the economy of Sudan is fading.

After the fall of Omar al-Bashir, Washington in 2020 removed Sudan from the list of states that it accuses of supporting terrorism. International aid resumed but stopped again after General Burkhan’s coup.

In 2020, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on two Wagner group companies and their executives.

Yevgeny Prigozhin “and his network are exploiting the natural resources of Sudan for their own benefit and to expand their influence,” argued then US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.

Influence

It’s not just about gold. “Disinformation campaigns targeting Sudanese social media users have been an integral part of Wagner’s tactics since 2017,” according to a recent report by the non-governmental organization Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Wagner is said to thrive on campaigns to destabilize and manipulate public opinion through “troll farms”. In early 2022, a Sudanese security official told AFP that “Russian specialists guarantee the security of communications and analyze (hosted content) social media sites for government agencies.”

The mercenary company also provides security services. “There is no doubt about the presence of Russian paramilitaries in Sudan,” wrote Russian researcher Sergei Shukankin in a 2020 report by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).

Side choice?

In February, during a visit to Sudan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defended Wagner’s actions in Africa as “developing at the request of governments” and “contributing to the normalization of the situation in the region.”

Does Wagner play a role in the clashes between the forces of Generals Burkhan and Khameti? “Today, there is not a single Wagner employee in Sudan,” Yevgeny Prigozhin assured in Telegram on the eve of Tuesday. And that’s been true “for two years now,” he added.

Analysts acknowledge that opportunism makes sense in this particular case. The Russians see it “like the Emirates and the Chinese: as long as their work continues and their influence remains, may the strongest win,” comments Roland Marshall of CERI in Paris.

Links between General Hameti and Wagner could play a role, said Colin Clark, director of research at the Soufan Center in New York. “But as with any hired company, credit goes to whoever signs the checks.”

Wagner has been through a lot of upheaval and is “probably looking for a way to get out of this storm while maintaining her interests,” said Katrina Doxey.

^{Source: APE-MEB, AFP.}