A year has passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and there is no sign that this bloody war will soon end. Last week we had Biden’s visit to Ukraine and Poland and preaching Putin.

The message of the former was twofold: Washington is determined to support Ukraine until the end of the armed conflict, at least that is its commitment for the moment, while it wants to maintain a leading role in the fight against Russia and all sorts of revisionism and authoritarianism. I note here the increased role now recognized by the American factor in Poland becoming the nation chosen to take the reins in containing Russia against the reluctant Franco-German axis.

Most Eastern Europeans, with the exception of the Hungarians, accuse Paris and Berlin of not wanting to make decisions that could change the course of the war on the ground (doubtful anyway). And while the West’s front toward Moscow looks solid, there are obvious cracks in it that fluctuate with Russia’s behavior.

The structural difference lies in the consequences of the war and, in particular, in Russia’s role in the global security architecture. The hardest wing, expressed by Warsaw, London, part of Washington and the Baltic states, believes that only a democratic Russia can be a reliable interlocutor of the West and works not only for the victory of Ukraine, but also for its subsequent overthrow by the current resident of the Kremlin. Another point of view supports exemplary punishment of Russia in Ukraine (hence the ten sanctions packages), but considers an attempt, even indirectly, to change the regime in Moscow extremely dangerous, partly because it fears that the subsequent situation will be worse than the current one. And, of course, the reaction of Putin is taken into account and how far it can go if the intentions to remove him from power become public knowledge. As for the sanctions, although they damage the Russian economy, they are not capable of forcing Moscow to stop the war.

The problem is that none of the warring parties is working on an alternative plan.

The Russian President, for his part, did not move away from the position that Ukraine, with the help of the West, is an existential threat to Moscow, so it must be neutralized. A Ukraine that emerges from the war politically and economically independent and able to get back on its feet is not an option for the Kremlin. However, he is also not content with just annexing four regions of eastern Ukraine and still sets himself the unattainable goal of establishing a pro-Russian or, in any case, compatible power in Kiev. Since Ukrainian identity is now intertwined with anti-Russian sentiment, the only way to impose the will of Russia is through occupation, which, in turn, is very problematic.

On the contrary, however, according to some in the West, Russia has great opportunities to continue the war, internally the situation is under control and given the opportunity for further authoritarianism, and a year later the conflict with the West and the way Putin’s narrative about two different worlds is presented. Differentiating China’s position from subtly positive towards Russia – with stimulating injections into the economy and the provision of technology – to supportive (with the provision of weapons?) in case of its consolidation will give (another) wind in the sails of Moscow.

And Ukraine is fighting a brave battle led by a limited in this case president, but an excellent communicator, who, having become a victim of his country against the strongest occupier, constantly requires help and support, sometimes ungracefully, in an obviously fair fight. from his compatriots. However, in his own case, the goal of recovering Russian-held territories is considered non-territorial.

Ultimately, the problem is that neither side is working on an alternative plan, although it seems unlikely that they will achieve their publicly stated goals. China, which was about to present a peace plan, has lost all impartiality in recent days. There is no god on the horizon, and the gap between those involved widens over time in a war that becomes more and more of a proxy battle. Distrust of the intentions of both sides is so deep that they refuse even a ceasefire. Any attempt at a diplomatic settlement under the current circumstances is doomed to failure, and thus we have found ourselves in a perfect stalemate.

​​​​​Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Professor at the American College of Greece and International Affairs Analyst for ANT1.