The nature of the regimes in Turkey and Iran underlies their peculiar reconciliation, and NATO has another reason to reconsider its position in the face of an intrepid Erdogan. This score is expressed in “K” by Benam Ben Taleblowsenior lawyer at Foundation for the Defense of Democracies – FDD Based in Washingtondescribing it how Ankara helps Tehran bypass Western sanctions.

Are there any indications that Turkey is helping Iran “break” the sanctions?

Turkey under Erdogan looks more than tolerant. He hates sanctions and even tacitly encourages Iranian illegal networks. Over the years, many sanctions easing programs involving Iran and Turkey have been implemented, with common denominator practices such as the use of third party companies. The ultimate goal is to cover up either Iran’s role in making illegal profits on Turkish soil, or the role of Turkish private companies helping Iran sell oil to outside clients. In short, Iran is using Turkey as a means of accessing the official financial system, with advantages such as energy profits as a backdrop, and this is something that enforcement and enforcement officials should consider when evaluating Turkish-Iranian relations. In addition, given the influx of foreign income into Turkey, the data in the areas of direct investment, beneficial ownership, stock exchanges, foreign-owned companies, and real estate-controlled enterprises should be examined more closely.

Why is Turkey interested in privileged relations with Iran? Are the reasons more economic or geopolitical?

While seeking rapprochement between the two biggest powers in the Middle East makes sense, relations between Turkey and Iran are defined as close friends given their competition in some areas and their cooperation in others. But the violation of sanctions, especially when it is ongoing national security behavior that affects elements of the Turkish state or the politically connected private sector, goes beyond a narrow interpretation of geopolitics. In particular, it is about the nature of the two regimes, in Ankara and Tehran, and their constant readiness to look beyond convergence or divergence, when, on the one hand, the profit motive, and on the other, the ideological tendency to make American economic pressure ineffective.

What does Ankara’s reconciliation with Tehran mean for Turkey’s relations with the US?

As long as Turkey continues to serve Iran as a place for money laundering and sanctions evasion, the relationship of any Western alliance and NATO structure with Turkey should be de facto and seriously reviewed, as well as Washington’s bilateral relations – Ankara.

It is impossible to give free rein to a state that conducts terrorist operations and implements plans to ease sanctions at the expense of the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. To be clear, Turkey is not the only regional nation in need of major improvements in this regard. But it is the only member of an allied structure such as NATO with such characteristics, and is being promoted by many as having a role to play with respect to Iran.

In practice, do you see the West tightening its grip on Turkey, or is its strategic importance to NATO such that it offers a form of “immunity” in the eyes of the Euro-Atlantic alliance?

While it is likely that Washington will broaden the agenda with Ankara to take more into account the circumvention of sanctions and Turkey’s strengthening of the Iranian energy-selling and terrorism apparatus, Turkish officials such as Erdogan are clearly determined to continue taking risks that could lead to them further from the western path. Many of the reasons for this new boldness have to do with the war in Ukraine, the onset of diplomatic charm in the region, and the growing perception of Turkey’s geostrategic importance.