Russian officials are continuing their covert mobilization even as fall conscription begins, likely to further strain Russia’s already overstretched military apparatus in a way that will harm both recruits and conscripts, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) says in its latest assessment .

On Friday, Russian Telegram channels began to boast that the Kremlin is preparing for a second wave of mobilization.

They shared an image of a draft summons received by a St. Petersburg resident who was allegedly told to report for mobilization in January 2023, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that partial mobilization would be officially ended on October 31.

When Vladimir Putin could give the order

In addition, nationalist military bloggers reported that general mobilization will begin in December-January.

An independent Russian TV channel published an investigation on Friday showing that state structures and businesses continue to prepare their employees for mobilization by sending them to various training programs and training courses related to mobilization.

Another Russian TV channel noted that the military court of the Odintsovo Garrison of the Moscow Region mistakenly confirmed that the mobilization was continuing, despite the official announcement of its end.

The court allegedly accused the mobilized man of beating his superiors on November 13 “during the performance of his military service duties or in connection with the performance of such duties during mobilization”, indicating that the court acts on legal grounds. that the mobilization is still in full swing.

The Kremlin claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin did not need to sign a decree officially ending the mobilization period.

Huge pressure on the Russian education system

Continued covert mobilization efforts and preparations for a new wave of mobilization, combined with the current fall draft cycle, are likely to add considerable pressure to Russia’s already overstretched military formation apparatus.

As ISW has previously estimated, Putin likely ordered a halt to partial mobilization to free up the bureaucratic and administrative capacity needed for the November 1st generation of recruits.

However, it is clear that the Russian authorities have never completely stopped mobilization efforts, which means that mobilized Russians are forced to go through the training system at the same time as new recruits go through their own training cycle.

This is likely to result in even lower quality training for both recruits and recruits as they compete for insufficient training capacity.

Another wave of mobilization in the coming months will only worsen the situation and possibly worsen the overall quality of Russian troops that will be sent to the front line in Ukraine.