Vladimir Putin likely promoted Surovikin and allowed him to withdraw from western Kherson Oblast on the condition that he capture the rest of Donetsk Oblast with the help of Russian troops withdrawn from beyond the Dnieper, as well as mobilized troops transferred to the front from Ukraine, the Institute for War Studies notes (ISW) in its latest assessment.

This observation by Andrii Zahorodnyuk, president of the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies, is the most likely explanation for the resumption of Russian offensive operations, first around Bakhmut, and then in the southwest, in the Vugledar region, which began on October 28. outside.

These offensive efforts, however, do not make much sense from an operational point of view.

They are located far from operationally important locations, except for Bakhmut, and were launched during a difficult period (in dirty conditions) by poorly trained mobilized troops, before Russian commanders in the area had accumulated sufficient combat power for decisive operations.

It is likely that Surovikin ordered the offensive as a sign that he takes his obligations to Putin seriously.

What’s next in Donetsk

Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast will intensify in the coming weeks as additional mobilized troops arrive alongside forces withdrawn from western Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian forces in the area will have problems, and Kyiv will likely have to divert troops to defend against these renewed Russian offensives.

The Russians are unlikely to make significant operational gains despite their renewed efforts, although in theory they could capture Bakhmut in time at enormous cost.

The mobilized Russian military proved to be insufficiently trained, poorly equipped, and very reluctant to participate in hostilities. They do not arrive in cohesive units, but are sent mostly as individual or small replacement units as part of a force that has been fighting without rest for nine months, has suffered devastating losses in troops and equipment, and is largely demoralized.

The Russian forces operating in the Donetsk region include regular units of the regular armed forces of the Russian Federation, mobilized servicemen, troops of the Wagner private military company, formations of the BARS (Russian volunteer reserve), militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, fighters of the Chechen units of Ramzan Kadyrov, and volunteers battalions

A strange combination of forces

This strange mix of fighting forces would have significantly less effective combat power than a grouping of regular units of similar size.

It is highly unlikely that Surovikin will be able to develop it into a force capable of waging large-scale offensive mechanized maneuver warfare, especially since he does not even spend (or have the time) to create a coherent strike group before launching it. to attack

This strange combination of forces is likely to achieve some success due to sheer numbers, but the likely reinforced Ukrainian defenders will likely bring it to a standstill in the next few months not far from the starting points.

Ukraine is also likely to restore combat power from western Kherson and redeploy it to other areas for both defensive and counteroffensive operations.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) could hypothetically try to pursue the Russians across the Dnipro at various points, but are unlikely to do so, as the logistics of supporting Ukrainian positions on the east bank are very difficult.

Therefore, it is more likely that the Armed Forces will consolidate their control of the west bank, leave enough forces to deter any Russian attempts to recross the river, and redeploy forces to other areas.

A Russian offensive in Donetsk Oblast will require the UDF to redeploy some forces for defense in the area, but the UDF is likely to send at least some of its restored combat power either to reinforce the ongoing counteroffensive in Luhansk Oblast or to launch another counteroffensive elsewhere (we let’s not speculate where it might be, notes ISW).

Winter will speed up the war, not slow it down

Ukrainian forces continued to make limited gains in Luhansk Oblast and are likely to make further progress if reinforced by forces in western Kherson.

The Russians are also strengthening their defensive positions in the Luhansk region, but the SFU is advancing slowly, and there is no reason to expect that poorly trained, poorly equipped, and low morale Russian reservists will be able to stop the Ukrainian forces, emboldened by their victories, from advancing.

Therefore, a cessation or prolonged slowdown in hostilities over the next few months is highly unlikely. The Russians are categorically not trying to establish and strengthen defensive positions along the entire line, but are resuming offensive actions in the Donetsk region.

The Ukrainians will almost certainly continue the counteroffensive operations that are already underway. Both sides are already fighting in very dirty conditions. They probably won’t stop fighting when winter freezes the ground and makes it even more conducive to large-scale mechanized maneuver warfare.

Combat will increase, not slow down, as the temperature drops.

A serious mistake from a military point of view

Any truce or cessation of hostilities at this stage would be overwhelmingly in favor of Russia. Normally, Putin should want such a ceasefire, it would be in his interests.

He must realize that he must give his forces time to recover and allow reservists arriving in theater to integrate into their units, train, and prepare for serious combat.

He must want Ukrainians not to take advantage of the positive emotional charge of recent victories. Therefore, the fact that Putin continues to encourage his generals to attack under these circumstances is a serious military mistake.

This is likely due to the psychological factors that prompted Putin to order the invasion, but also—increasingly—to Putin’s need to demonstrate his resolve against a hard-line pro-war faction led at least at the level of public image. , Wagner’s financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Therefore, Putin is unlikely to seek a ceasefire unless it is accompanied by huge Ukrainian or international concessions.

Never interrupt your enemy when he makes a mistake

Napoleon told an anecdote that became famous: “Never interrupt your enemy when he makes a mistake.” This aphorism has never been more true – Ukraine and its supporters must take advantage of Putin’s mistake by continuing the counteroffensive under circumstances far more favorable to Kyiv than to Moscow.

Ukraine has by no means liberated the minimum territory necessary for its future security and economic survival, even with the victory in the western Kherson region.

The city of Melitopol and the surrounding territories, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the lands of the eastern bank of the lower Dnieper, the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are vital territories for Ukraine, ISV emphasizes.

Discussions about the future of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia after 2014 are premature.

Ukraine must clear tens of thousands of square kilometers outside these territories if it is to protect itself from future Russian attacks and restore a viable economy.

Ukrainians and the West should make every effort to liberate these territories as soon as possible before worrying about what lies ahead. Momentum is an important factor in war. Ukraine has it now. Kyiv and its partners should make maximum use of this, concludes the Institute for the Study of War.

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