Ukrainian forces continue to attempt to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC) supporting Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnieper, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports in its latest assessment.

On August 13, Ukrainian troops again hit the bridge over the dam of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP), as a result of which the bridge became unfit for the passage of heavy vehicles.

Earlier, on August 10, the Southern Operational Command of the Armed Forces reported that the bridge at the Kakhovskaya HPP dam was unusable.

The Kakhovsky bridge was the only road bridge that could be used by Russian forces after successful efforts by Ukrainian forces to disable the Antonivskyi road bridge.

It should be noted that the ISW assessment was published around midnight from Saturday to Sunday, after which new images of HIMARS strikes on the Antonivsky Bridge appeared:

The mission is impossible, or at least impossible for Russian troops

Britain’s Ministry of Defense said Russian forces currently have no usable bridge to ferry heavy equipment or cargo across the Dnipro River into Kherson Oblast and must rely mainly on a pontoon crossing they have installed near the Antonivskyi road bridge.

Russian forces cannot conduct large-scale mechanized operations without a reliable GLOC.

Delivering sufficient ammunition, fuel, and heavy equipment for large-scale offensive or even defensive operations by pontoon crossings or by air is impractical, if not impossible.

If Ukrainian forces have damaged all three bridges and can prevent the Russians from restoring any of them to working order for an extended period, then Russian forces on the west bank of the Dnieper will likely lose the ability to defend against even limited Ukrainian counterattacks.

How do we know that the invading troops for the Dnipro got a knife to the bone

Indicators of the deterioration of Russian supply after the failure of Russian GLOCs across the Dnipro River can be:

• there is a shortage of fuel and ammunition among the Russian forces in the west of the Kherson region;
• abandoned Russian equipment;
• a reduction in the intensity and eventual cessation of Russian ground and artillery attacks;
• possible increase in the number of robberies of Russians;
• increased intelligence of Russian soldiers about the lack of supplies;
• an increase in the number of Russian prisoners of war captured by Ukrainian troops;
• and the absence of new heavy vehicles transported to western Kherson was noted.

Monitoring such indicators could last for days or weeks, depending on how well Russian forces managed to build up supplies on the west bank of the Dnieper and how well Ukrainian forces managed to find and destroy those supplies while keeping the bridges inoperable.

Putin’s henchmen fear that they are trapped on the wrong side of the Dnieper

The head of the Mykolaiv Region, Vitaly Kim, said that unknown units of the Russian military command had left the upper part of the Kherson Region and moved to the left bank of the Dnieper, which indicates that the Russian military leadership is worried about not falling into a trap. side of the river

Adviser to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Rostyslav Smirnov, also stated that Russia has deployed 90% of its air assault forces (presumably 90% of those deployed in Ukraine) to unspecified locations in southern Ukraine to strengthen Russian defenses or possibly to prepare for Russian counterattacks .

It is not known whether the Russian airborne assault units, which Smirnov spoke about, are concentrated exclusively in the Kherson region, or whether they are also stationed near Zaporizhzhia.

Are the Russians hoping to escape from Kherson by air?

It is known that units of the Russian 7th Airborne Division have been operating in the Kherson region since at least August 10.

The concentration of Russian airborne forces in the western Kherson region may indicate Russia’s attempts to use forces to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive, which it will likely be able to launch from the air if it fails to contain the Ukrainians or restore GLOC.

Airborne forces are easier to move by air than conventional mechanized forces, of course, although it may be difficult and very risky for the Russians to attempt to airdrop forces, given Ukrainian attacks on airfields in the Kherson region and Russia’s inability to maintain air superiority.

Moscow’s army, desperately trying to divert attention from Ukrainian counterattacks in the south

Russian forces are likely to change the priorities of their advance in the northeast of the Donetsk region in order to divert attention from the Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in the south of Ukraine.

Russian forces apparently scaled back their offensive east of Siversk and conducted sporadic and limited ground attacks, relying heavily on artillery shelling of the surrounding population beginning on 6 August.

However, since August 11, Russian troops have increased the number of limited ground attacks in the Siversk region.

These attacks, together with the continuation of offensives in the direction of Bakhmut, may represent an attempt to drag Ukrainian equipment and personnel to the Bakhmut-Siversk line in the northeast of Donetsk Oblast, in order to divert Ukraine’s attention from critical areas in the south, where Ukrainian forces have carried out combat operations. effective counterattacks and could create conditions for starting a counteroffensive.

Russian forces may hope to divert tactical and rhetorical attention from the south to reduce pressure on their own operations along the southern axis.

The main conclusions of the Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian troops continue to try to disrupt Russian land lines of communication that support Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnieper.

Russian forces are likely to re-prioritize their efforts in northeastern Donetsk region to distract Ukrainians from the Southern Axis.

Russian forces launched limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk, east of Siversk, and south and east of Bakhmut.

Russian troops launched a limited ground strike north of the city of Kharkiv.

The authorities of Russia and Ukraine accused each other of bombing the Zaporizhia NPP.

The Russian authorities do not pay Russian reservists and members of volunteer units for their service in Ukraine.

The Russian-backed occupation authorities are likely to face internal problems that complicate efforts to manage the occupation regimes and implement reconstruction projects in the devastated territories of Donbas.

Map of the war in Ukraine as of August 13:

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