In the context of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, a meeting in Sochi of the presidents of Russia and Turkey, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is scheduled for 5 August. DW spoke with Ukrainian expert Marina Vorotnyuk, research associate at the British think tank RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), about Ankara’s mediation in Ukrainian grain exports and how Turkey manages to balance Kyiv and Moscow.

DW: What are your expectations ofVisitErdoganfor Putin? How would you describe your personal relationship and how it has changed since Russia’s open invasion of Ukraine?

Marina Vorotnyuk: We don’t see any significant changes. You can try, say, reading veiled signals. For example, how much during the last meeting Erdogan kept Putin waiting in front of the cameras (an incident at the summit in Tehran. – Red.). We see that the agreement on the export of Ukrainian grain, which Turkey helped to conclude between Ukraine and Russia, has started to work. This is a golden opportunity for Russia and Turkey to try to present the important role they played in the negotiation process. There will be questions about the nuclear power plant that Rosatom is building in Turkey, there will be questions about energy, natural gas supply, of course, there will be questions about the Crimean Tatars and so on.

– The resumption of Ukrainian grain exports is a success, in the first place, Peru?

– Turkey’s position towards Ukraine and Russia is quite complex and ambiguous. Turkey, despite being a member of NATO, has always tried to play the role of bridge between the West and Russia. Turkey has its own strategic national interests, and it is not in its interest to take any overtly pro-NATO or pro-Russia position, as well as a pro-Ukrainian position. And, in principle, the fact that she was able to play the role of intermediary between Ukraine and Russia in this grain deal is probably evidence that Russia also sees Turkey’s role as quite useful to Russian interests and is trying to obtain its diplomacy and political dividends. The unblocking of Ukrainian ports is a very important event, and Turkey’s role here is really significant.

– What is Erdogan’s secret? How does he manage to sit in two chairs? On the one hand, Turkey supplies Ukraine with Bayraktar drones.“, and at the same time positions itself as an intermediary. And while Turkey does not impose sanctions on Russia – on the contrary,obviously helps Russia to achieve what–then the goods, which, due to sanctions, the West does not provide.

– This position is a reflection of Turkey’s strategic culture. Turkey has its own strategic interests, and it is in the interests of those interests to play the role of an equidistant partner for both Russia and Ukraine. That is, for Turkey there is no contradiction in supplying Bayraktars to Ukraine or, for example, to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where there are also certain clashes with Russian interests; or support opposing sides with Russia in Syria or Libya and at the same time buy Russian S-400s; allows Russian company Rosatom to build a nuclear plant in Turkey and buy Russian gas.

There are a number of factors that, at first glance, seem to contradict each other. But Turkey manages to continue this balancing act between Russia and the West. Did you ask what is Erdogan’s secret? Many often talk about some kind of personal “chemistry” between him and Putin: two authoritarian leaders who have a certain managerial style and can resolve some sort of conflict at the highest level, as they say, often confidentially. But we understand that, probably, the point here is not trust, but that there is a certain respect for the interests of each one. And that respect allows them to share spheres of influence in the region, including the Black Sea.

Many predicted that Turkey’s outspoken support for Ukraine would sooner or later become a “red line” for Russia and lead to a direct confrontation between Russia and Turkey. We still don’t see open confrontation.

– you mentioned about “Red line“. And where does Russia go in cooperation with Turkey?

– Turkey very carefully does not cross these “red lines”. Namely, the supply of “Bayraktarov” – yes, this is a bare nerve in relations between Russia and Turkey. This is Russian corn that Turkey is trampling on, but at the same time, Turkey is doing everything it can to not be too painful, trying to make up for it with concessions in other strategic areas. For example, trying to react very cautiously to Russian policy in the Black Sea. Despite the fact that Turkey is the most important player in the Black Sea, we still see that it allows Russia to dominate the Black Sea.

Turkey is trying to offer some definite dividends to Russia without adhering to sanctions, without closing its airspace to Russian aircraft after February 24, allowing Russian aircraft to fly internationally and inviting Russian tourists.

– We can say that Turkey benefits from the war between Russia and Ukraine, wins from it – politicallyand financially?

– Yea. She, without outright defying Russia, allows her to find loopholes to try to dilute sanctions, because Turkey is still a major player. Let’s not say that this is a first-league economic player, but nevertheless it is an important regional player – both in strategic and security terms. If Turkey questions the desirability of sanctions, then there are various states and various population groups, including in Western countries, Western societies that will listen to this narrative and also say, “why should we freeze in winter because the United States has unleashed an aggressive war in Ukrainian soil against Russia. Russia has been provoked and is reacting.” I have now expressed a narrative that is very popular, including in Turkey. There is a well-defined objective bias – anti-Americanism, anti-NATO sentiments. On the other hand, Turkey sympathizes with Ukrainian traumas. Of course, all these videos and photos from Ukraine do not leave the Turkish population indifferent.

– Several rounds of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have already taken place in Turkey. As much as Ankara can in the coming weekstry to gently push Ukraine to resume negotiations with Russiaabout a ceasefire?

– I am very pessimistic about this issue. To what extent can a mediator play a constructive role if the aggressor state is not ready to suspend its armed actions? I think we should understand Turkey’s limited position on this issue. As for Turkey’s attempts to push Ukraine into some sort of agreement, we are already seeing that, it is already happening. If you follow the vocabulary of Erdogan and other Turkish officials, they say it is very important to make peace and try to very gently circumvent the question of who is the main obstacle to peace. What Russia is doing now is just an attempt to buy time. An attempt to present itself as a trusted partner that cares a lot about world food security but actually continues to pursue its military objectives in Ukraine. And when Turkey tries to come up with a deal (on grain. – Ed.) as a path to fixation, it seems to me that this is a certain illusion.