A military analyst at the Royal Joint Forces Institute in London explains why equipment in the Russian armed forces often works well only on paper, identifying two key problems: one related to the nature of the equipment and the other to the crew that uses it.

Anti-aircraft missile complex “Buk”.Photo: Oleksiy Zarubin / Alamy / Profimedia Images

Jack Watling, the analyst who estimated in late June that Ukraine had lost more soldiers in the war than the total number of infantry in the British army, begins his analysis published in a branch on his Twitter with a joke:

“A few years ago, some of [elicopterele] The Mi-24 assigned to the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force – NATO’s mission in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014) was undergoing maintenance. It was found that some of the screws that hold the rotor against the torque (the one in the tail of the helicopters) were cracked.”

No: Eastern European NATO countries, which were equipped with these Soviet-made helicopters, participated in the ISAF mission.

A British analyst says the situation has caused panic among some American officers, who have decided to ground all aircraft of the type over fears that poor quality control in the supply chain poses a security threat to all air forces stationed in the area.

Russian weapons, the heirs of the Soviet arms industry

“Mi-24 crews had to explain to their American colleagues that this is normal. This caused the helicopter to have 8 anti-torque rotor bolts, 4 of which often cracked. All 8 propellers are replaced after a few hours of flight regardless of their condition,” reports Watling.

“So, on the one hand, the quality of control in Soviet industry was bad. On the other hand, the design teams agreed with this and included additional components to create an effective and highly reliable attack helicopter. Russian weapons often have such improvisations,” he explains.

But this often becomes a problem when you try to integrate new things into old equipment and weapons. When Soviet helicopters were designed in the 1970s, they were designed for missile and machine gun attacks. But when man-portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS) began to become widespread, the Russians realized that they needed autonomous anti-tank missiles (ATGMs).

“The Russians have built some very effective ATGMs, some of which can be installed on the Mi-35. They have impressive penetration and range. This is a precision weapon. But the Mi-35 was built with the assumption that many of its components would fail during use,” explains Jack Watling.

As various components fail, helicopters and other equipment mounted on the new weapons suffer from vibration, making the targeting system difficult to use.

“The last time I was on the Mi-35, we moved away from the sensors in the front of the helicopter and used large field binoculars in the cockpit. The result was that we had a sufficient range of our ATGMs, but could not actually use them at such a distance.”

Mi-24 helicopter from the Air Force of Ukraine (PHOTO: Miguel Medina / AFP / Profimedia)

Differences between Western and Russian weapons systems

Watling goes on to explain the Russians’ problem with what the analyst calls “cognitive load”:

“The Soviet armed forces were conscripted, and the current Russian forces have a similar structure. When you buy a Russian weapon system, you usually get a nice diagram that tells you which buttons to press in the order needed for a certain result. For example, in a [sistem de rachete aer-sol] But you have a lot of buttons, and each button usually only does one thing. In addition, each operator has only one task.”

A British analyst says it’s fairly easy to teach someone how to use the system because they don’t need to understand it to use the controls. But using the system to a high standard is a challenge because you’re doing the integration.

“The computer does little for you. If something is out of the ordinary, you have to find a solution and the team has to do all the necessary actions in the right order. NATO systems tend to have far fewer controls, and what they do depends on the context. The system supports the user so they can focus on their judgment,” says Watling.

This type of system requires more hours of initial training, but creates much more effective new teams.

The Smerch volley fire system of the Russian Armed Forces (PHOTO: AFP / AFP / Profimedia)

Poorly trained crews are a big problem of the Russian armed forces

Regarding the Moscow endowment systems, Watling explains:

“If you have experienced Russian aircrews, Russian weapons systems are very effective and in some situations can be even more effective than NATO equivalents. But if you have soldiers on a short-term contract – and especially if you lose a lot of your more skilled personnel early – then the Russians are left with aircrews whose basic performance is not sufficient.”

A British military analyst says that this is how Russian anti-aircraft systems strike with drones. The problem is not that the Buk systems do not see and do not target them. “Ukrainian Buks are less powerful platforms, but they detect and attack drones without problems.” The problem is the crews.

The same goes for new non-weapon related systems that don’t work or are inaccurate.

“The problem with Russian weapons is more that they are used and operated by poorly trained crews, making them less effective than the sum of their parts,” concludes Jack Watling.

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