Is energy a matter of national security or not? We have shown the geostrategic importance of energy, and it remains to convince decision-makers that if it is part of national security and defense, it should be treated as such.

Cosmin Gabriel PakuraruPhoto: personal archive

At the beginning of each presidential term, Romania defines a National Defense Strategy (SNAP), which should generate sectoral strategies. Romania has not had an energy strategy for more than 15 years. Perhaps a better definition would be “Energy Security Strategy”, especially in this turbulent and tense period for the region in which we find ourselves. In addition, the National Defense Strategy, together with the sectoral strategies, must be modeled according to the external environment. The problem is that neither after the Covid-crisis nor after the attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, SNap should not be changed, because it is very complex. Geopolitical realities are changing and dictate changes or adjustments in security and defense strategies or industry strategies of all states affected by international crises. After February 2022, the risks, threats, vulnerabilities and dangers are different. And there are other possibilities! The war on the border has changed a lot, and Romania, as part of the European Union and NATO, has shown that it has adapted in some areas and been caught unprepared in others.

I repeat as soon as there is an opportunity: “Energy security of the country is an integral part of the doctrine of national security. Energy security is a condition for the existence of the Romanian state, an inalienable and inalienable international right, which derives from the state’s right to its energy resources and from European and Euro-Atlantic treaties, which should become one of the long-term management goals. Energy security involves ensuring the necessary energy consumption from the point of view of the availability of resources and the availability of long-term access.”

To this, let’s call this definition, we add Minister Burduzhi’s synthesis: “Energy must be safe, cheap and ecological.” (Sometimes I’m jealous that I don’t have this synthesis ability myself.)

Law 203/2015 on defense planning defines the duty of the President of Romania to implement the National Defense Strategy at the beginning of each mandate. The Military Strategy of Romania is also being developed.

In the National Defense Strategy, developed in early 2020, in which energy security is defined as part of expanded national security and which must be ensured, it is said that the Russian Federation is behaving aggressively, carrying out actions to militarize the Black Sea. Maritime region and the conduct of operations of the hybrid type, aimed at maintaining a tense and dangerous climate.

I think there is no longer any doubt that the hybrid war waged by the Russian Federation against Romania has at least four components: sabotage operations in the energy sector, cyber warfare, psychological manipulation operations and operations to corrupt some decision makers.

We cannot prove what the sabotage operations were in the Romanian energy industry, but if we do a historical comparative analysis from 2009 onwards, we can see that: Romania no longer has a reliable research institute for the energy industry, that the energy sector has degraded into in recent years, in companies coordinated by the Ministry of Economy or, depending on the circumstances, the Ministry of Energy, we see that no major investments and even renovations have been made, many production facilities have been withdrawn due to wear and tear, which has led to the failure to obtain environmental permits or ISCIR permits . Thus, starting from 2019, Romania could no longer meet its consumption needs, becoming a net importer of electricity and gas. In support of this sub-item, we also raise a few questions: Why has the export of gas from the 30 billion cubic meters (mcm) of Karagele gas resources stagnated, necessitating the arrival of Minister Burduzhi to restore it? Staying in the realm of Romgaz: why did this company in the spring of 2020 withdraw from the Alexandrupol joint ventures of the NLG Gastrade terminal, in which it was a partner with the Greeks from Desfa and the Bulgarians from Bulgartransgas? Why was the start of the Neptun Deep gas production project delayed for almost 10 years? How is it possible that after so many years the Iernut thermal power station was not completed?

Cyberwarfare experts tell us that more than 70% of cyberattacks have targeted the energy system, government agencies, and transportation infrastructure.

Let’s also mention some manipulation operations: Chevon and shale gas from Pungești or OMV – Petrom, pollution in Bucharest due to Elcen and “earthquakes” in the Gorj area or what is going on: NuScale – Nuclearelectrica and SMR- “expensive and not approved even in the USA” , which “make experience” for Romanians.

Regarding energy corruption, I’ll just remind you of the “smart people in energy” who broke Hidroelectrica’s bankruptcy procedure a few years ago, or the biggest scandal that is ongoing and will certainly extend to the previous years in which The DNA has its sights “a clan of guys with black under their fingernails” who systematically robbed CE Oltenia.

It’s nice to read some excerpts from SNAP, bearing in mind that it’s written in 2020!

“Romania must have its own resources, forces and means that correspond to its interests, profile and potential.”

“Controversies, including those of an armed nature, over access to natural resources will intensify. (…)”

“The potential for the escalation of existing tensions in the region, against the background of the strengthening of the offensive posture and aggressiveness of the Russian Federation in recent years and the improvement of the hybrid tools it uses, is a serious security problem in the national context. .”

“Distortions in the energy markets, as well as actions or, as the case may be, inactions that harm Romania’s strategic economic interests, combined with competing projects by some state or non-state actors, affect Romania’s efforts to ensure an adequate level of energy security.”

“Unwanted interference and hostile foreign takeover of economic operators of national interest and vital processes such as telecommunications, energy and ports can harm national security and public order. The infrastructure necessary for the smooth development of socio-economic life, in the absence of concerted and concerted efforts for modernization, digitization and optimal financing, is exposed to internal and external aggressions and can be brought to a non-functional state.

“Internal and regional events can also generate other risk factors (…) that have a negative impact on the economic stability necessary for the development of the Romanian state, in vital areas, with relevant infrastructures (including critical ones) – energy, industry, transport. (…)”

“The directions of action are aimed at (…) preventing and countering risks and promoting opportunities to ensure economic and financial stability, energy security and economic interests of Romania in the extended Black Sea region and the Balkans.”

There are also directions of action aimed at the energy dimension, such as: “ensuring energy security through operational adaptation and optimization of the structure of consumption of primary energy resources, development of energy production capacities, improvement of energy efficiency, development of projects aimed at ensuring diversification of access to resources and transformation of Romania to an important player in the energy market by capitalizing on the resources it has in the Black Sea, increasing interconnection capacity and competitiveness, including by implementing the goals of the Energy Union, reducing dependence on fossil fuels by using future innovations in energy production, including green, clean energy that will help solve the problems caused by climate change, because energy is vital for social sustainability.”

And the Military Strategy talks about the threat to critical infrastructures and energy security of the target states (the Russian Federation), as well as the fact that the national energy system is declared as an infrastructure that supports defense efforts. _Read the entire article and comment on Contributors.ro