When Russia invaded Ukraine on the morning of February 24 two years ago, no one knew how it would turn out. Writer and Russia expert Mark Galeotti has published an article in the British press in which he analyzes this bloody conflict for clues about what will happen next.

During the two years of the bloody war in Ukraine, more than half a million soldiers died and were wounded, more than six million Ukrainians left the country, and the front line has hardly moved for a year.

Looking ahead, decisions will need to be made on everything from the next weapons systems the West will supply Ukraine to whether Kyiv will adopt a more defensive strategy, but there are three key lessons and indicators for the future that point to where the war may go next , writes Mark Galeotti.

1. Listen carefully to what Putin says – there are always hints

For all his willingness to lie and deflect attention, Vladimir Putin tends to tell us what he wants. When he invaded Ukraine, he seems to have sincerely believed that he would win easily.

As he reiterated in the surreal first half hour of his interview with Tucker Carlson earlier this month, in which he laid out his view of Russian-Ukrainian history dating back to the 9th century, he doesn’t really believe there are two different countries.

Instead, he assumed that Ukrainians would agree almost without a fight to the installation of a new, more pliable government that wants to keep Ukraine in Russia’s sphere of influence. To some extent, this is still his stated goal. However, a certain nuance begins to creep into his rhetoric, which we should be aware of.

He still wants Ukraine out of NATO, but there are indications from some, both officials and think tanks, that he would be willing to see it join the EU.

If Russia is able to retain the territories it occupies, there are indications that as long as it remains neutral, the remaining Ukraine may be allowed some degree of independence. Of course, this is unacceptable neither for international law nor for Ukrainians. However, it proves that even Putin’s imperialist demands will change according to what he thinks he can get.

Putin enters 2024 from a strong position. His forces withstood a Ukrainian counteroffensive last year and have more ammunition. He hopes for political change in the West, especially if Donald Trump wins the presidency.

However, one should not hope for real readiness for negotiations, let alone for concessions. As next year unfolds, and if Ukraine holds its ground and prepares its forces to resume operations in 2025, if Western munitions production begins to increase, and if resolve remains, then we should watch for any sign that Putin is beginning to waver. If that happens, it could be a sign that talks are possible, but in the short term it will likely mean escalation or some sort of desperation strategy as they try to regain the initiative.

2. Human resources matter, but it’s a problem for both sides

Much of the debate in the West revolves around what weapons should be sent to Ukraine, and past complaints that the “right” weapons were not sent in the “right” quantities at the “right” time.

Of course, the pace, scale, and nature of military aid matter, but the truth is that there is no magic weapon that can single-handedly change the course of a war. When HIMARS and other long-range missile and artillery systems were first deployed, they were heralded as war winners. They certainly allowed the Ukrainians to hit Russian command posts and ammunition depots with greater range and accuracy when they were introduced in July 2022, but over time the invaders adapted.

From modern Western tanks to F-16s whose pilots have already been trained, they all offer incremental improvements to Ukraine’s military capabilities, but they are not a silver bullet.

This war was a brutal and bloody reminder that human resources are still important. There is a reason why both sides keep their combat losses a secret – Kyiv does not even tell its allies how many losses it has suffered.

More of Putin’s soldiers were killed or wounded – but Russia’s population is four times that of Ukraine’s, and Ukrainians suffer more casualties.

Boots in the field are a military resource that the West will not provide. Although the UK has trained over 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers through Operation Interflex, there is no serious group that would support sending troops to fight and risk a wider war with Russia.

The question of personnel is becoming increasingly difficult for both sides. Moscow’s claims that 1,000 to 1,500 Russians are volunteering for the army each day seem highly exaggerated, but ahead of the presidential election in March, Putin clearly does not want a repeat of the mass unpopular mobilization in September-October 2022.

However, unless he recruits more people, the chances of his forces being able to launch serious and sustained offensive operations in 2024 are slim, so this will be a key metric to watch.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian army’s demand to call up another 450,000 to 500,000 soldiers led to a culmination of tension between President Volodymyr Zelenskyi and his popular commander, General Valery Zaluzhny. Ukraine already spends more than a third of its GDP on defense, and the question is whether it can afford these additional soldiers.

Later, Zelensky fired Zaluzhny, and the new law on hiring is still being discussed. The fear is that as recruitment becomes more drastic and large-scale, it could begin, in the words of a European diplomat based in Kyiv, to “undermine Ukrainian morale and make any understanding with Putin less unthinkable.”

3. Victory and defeat now mean different things

We talk a lot and often about victories and defeats. At the beginning of the war, when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv, it was relatively easy to identify both: the very survival of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state was under direct threat. However, two years later, thanks to the extraordinary resistance of the Ukrainian people, it is much more difficult to define both.

Would a Ukrainian victory mean nothing more than the expulsion of every Russian soldier from every inch of occupied territory, including Crimea? This would not only be a difficult task, but would not necessarily put an end to the war, but would only move the front line to the state border. Putin could still regroup his forces for the next attack, simultaneously launching drones and missiles at Ukrainian cities and power lines.

Would the defeat of Ukraine mean the subjugation of the nation? This seems unlikely now that the Russian military has suffered such heavy losses. In the worst case scenario, according to both British and Ukrainian strategists, Russia can advance its territorial ambitions to the Dnipro River, which cuts through the territory of the country, occupying the entire eastern part. It would be terrible, not least for the Ukrainians who found themselves in the territory controlled by Russia. But it would not destroy the Ukrainian nation.

Currently, Ukraine is officially committed to a maximalist notion of victory, but even in Kyiv there are quiet voices that recognize that the country may face a terrible dilemma: continue the war indefinitely or accept the loss of territory in the name of the opportunity to move forward, especially with regard to joining NATO and EU? As one of the officials admitted, “now we are not approaching such a situation, but one day we may have to decide that the lives of Ukrainians are more important than Ukrainian land.”

It would not be easy. Zelensky ruled out any concessions. Moreover, it would even be against the Constitution, although there are ways around it – for example, not officially recognizing any Russian claims to the occupied territories.

However, since there can be no meaningful strategy without a clear vision of the goal, it is clear that in this third year of the war, we may witness cautious and restrained discussions aimed at establishing what Kyiv and its Western partners consider to be a significant and achievable success, concludes Mark Galeotti (News.ro)