The events that took place in the Russian Federation on June 24 exceeded any imagination and will have long-term consequences. I was dealing with the succession of power struggles now taking place in the Kremlin system of power, a rare moment when human and power relations, about which very little was known, came to the surface. When Prigozhin left Rostov-on-Don, in the evening of the same day, the half-open door through which all this was visible closed, and we returned to an earlier period, when news travels very hard, interpretations are based on assumptions and Any analysis on the subject of that , which is currently happening in the Russian Federation, risks being a failure from the very beginning.

To understand what actually happened on June 24, some preliminary observations are necessary.

The war in Ukraine, at least for now, is a disaster for the Russian Federation. The responsibility for this catastrophe is borne by the highest dignitaries in the military-political apparatus: Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov.

Defense Minister Shoigu is at the origin of the orders, which turned out to be disastrous, but he was distinguished by his absolute loyalty to Putin. Shoigu has an engineering degree, has not served in the army, and is originally from Tula, a place closer to China than to Europe. His background is the best guarantee for Putin that he will not interfere in political games in Moscow.

Shoigu’s incompetence is exceeded only by the incompetence of Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff. It was Gerasimov who convinced Putin that the invasion of Ukraine would last no more than a few days and that with the capture of Antonov Airport at the first moment of the start of the war, Ukrainians would lay down their arms and applaud. Russians Gerasimov is the author of the military doctrine that bears his name and postulates that wars are no longer fought on the battlefield, but on the informational level, and “hybrid war” is the future. The war in Ukraine has so far proved that information warfare is only a secondary tool, instead the presence on the battlefield and the behavior of the military are decisive.

Russia had to deal with authoritarian political leaders who relied on incompetent military leaders. Because of them, the first stage of wars was usually disastrous. In 1812, Napoleon was able to advance quickly in Russia, being unstoppable by the lack of strategy, only to change the leadership of the army, which contributed to the Russian victory. During World War II, Stalin replaced Marshal Kulik after noticing that German troops were advancing rapidly and unopposed toward Moscow.

Instead, Putin has kept the military leadership of the Russian Federation intact since the start of the war in Ukraine, even after successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Kharkiv or Kherson direction last fall. It seems that Putin is a prisoner of his own false propaganda and calmly listens to Konashenkov’s daily military report on state television before going to bed.

The strategy implemented by Shoigu and Gerasimov since November 2022 also turned out to be completely uninspired. Mass bombing of cities and energy infrastructure aimed at demoralizing Ukrainians had the exact opposite effect. The Russian arsenal was exhausted by airstrikes, which were mainly intercepted by Ukrainian air defense. Instead of ending this strategy, Shoigu and Gerasimov threw more and more sophisticated munitions into the fray in a futile military effort.

This is the moment when Evgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner’s group, appears on the stage. He realized the catastrophic incompetence of both and the need to use the classic tactics by which infantry and artillery dominate the battlefield.

Shoigu and Gerasimov, on Putin’s initiative, resorted to Wagner’s group to capture Bakhmut. After 9 months of persistent fighting with great human losses, Wagner conquers Bakhmut. Prigogine was given virtually unlimited powers, including unlimited access to recruit prisoners. The inevitable happens: Prigozhin competes with Shoigu for access to more ammunition. Since the number is limited, Prigozhin begins to publicly express his displeasure. Vladimir Putin did not interfere, as he believed that this was ultimately a personal dispute, and always tolerated the infighting in the inner circle of power, not interfering, so that no one had higher claims.

When the dispute became even more visible, Soigu took a radical step: all private military formations, including and especially Wagner, were subordinated to the Minister of Defense. Prigozhin is even more opposed to this measure. This is the moment when the authorities from the Kremlin intervene directly, trying to mediate between Prigozhin and Soigu. On Friday, June 23, there will be a final discussion on this matter. Prigozhin again demands arms, full autonomy and Shoigu’s resignation. Since all three conditions were difficult to fulfill, Prigozhin took measures on June 24.

Vladimir Putin is a typical bureaucrat who takes his time and does not like sudden changes. So is Soigu. Prigozhin is the complete opposite of a bureaucrat: quick changes, instant decisions, as few papers as possible. That is why negotiations with Prigozhin were doomed to failure. If Putin’s bureaucratic side had not won, another leader would have decided to hand over operational command of the war in Ukraine to Prigozhin after the failed takeover of Kyiv in the spring of 2022. A decision that would completely contradict the resistance to change that now dominates the Kremlin leadership.

Stalin liked to create competition within the Kremlin leadership so that no one would dominate, also in the armed forces, while encouraging Zhukov and Konev to be the first to reach the center of Berlin to cover themselves in glory. At the moment when the confrontation between Shoigu and Prigozhin became public and constantly flared up, Putin, on the other hand, preferred not to interfere. The same thing happened on June 24: he refused a direct conversation with Prigozhin, at his request, and did not participate in the negotiations that ended the march of Wagner’s troops to Moscow.

So far, Putin’s regime has been based on an unwritten contract: fundamental rights and freedoms are limited, in exchange for the full security of citizens. Because of what happened recently, that contract no longer matters, as Samata de Bendern pointed out Guardian. The invasion of Russian paramilitary formations on the border with Ukraine, especially in the city of Belgorod, showed that the Russian Federation cannot protect its own borders. The capture of Rostov-on-Don without any reaction from the Russian military, and then the march of units of the “Wagner” PMK to 200 kilometers from Moscow again showed the ineffectiveness of the Russian defense forces. The weakness of the Putin regime was exposed in all its glory. Anne Applebaum c Atlantic tried to explain the enthusiasm with which Wagner’s mercenaries were met in Rostov-on-Don: Putin’s regime cultivated apathy, political disengagement, for years Russian propaganda proved that nothing important is happening and should not happen, and suddenly Prigozhin and Wagner’s mercenaries break the monotonous rhythm of everyday life , thus breaking the artificially supported lie: something is finally happening. Perhaps this is also an explanation that Chekhov would have accepted without reservations, but one can also trust another: a resident of Rostov-on-Don, when asked why such enthusiasm is shown towards Wagner’s mercenaries, answered: “because we do not want our the city was the second Belgorod.” That is, ordinary people realized that the state no longer gives them the security they were used to, and Wagner’s mercenaries were seen as a substitute for the state, which ensures order. A very alarming signal for the Putin regime.

Putin’s monumental mistake was that the repressive apparatus was felt everywhere in the Russian Federation – except for Wagner’s group. Prigozhin was left free to do what he wanted. While he acted in Africa in the interests of the Russian Federation, the non-aggression pact with the repressive apparatus worked very well. When Prigozhin begins to criticize Putin’s regime, crosses the red line and declares that the war in Ukraine is a mistake and personal ambitions, there was no one in his circle who would support the Kremlin’s theses, who would try to compromise him. Prigozhin was allowed to enter the inner circle of power, without any control over him (after all, all members of the Kremlin’s power circle can be blackmailed at any time). According to Vladyslav Inozemtev, expressed in New newspaper EuropeAfter returning to power in 2012, Putin destroyed the existing system of power, which guaranteed the balanced functioning of power, even in a corrupt form: “the state is me” became the only justification for the exercise of power. For this reason, Putin has not become stronger, but more vulnerable. In the event of an appeal, the “system” can no longer defend it, because it has disappeared. The “system” was replaced by a narrow circle of like-minded people who can always welcome a new leader.

By now, about 25,000 of Wagner’s mercenaries had taken part in the June 24 uprising. There are also approximately 32,000 demobilized mercenaries, the vast majority of whom are former prisoners released to fight in Ukraine. These are people with armed experience, disillusioned, who can rebel against the regime at any time. Another signal that the Putin regime may face big problems in the near future.

As Robert Farley very rightly points out 19 Forty five, it is currently unknown what the level of support for Prigozhin was among the Russian political and military elite. However, there is no doubt that this support was there. It is not known how the June 24 uprising will affect the course of the war in Ukraine. On June 26, the Russian military commander ironically commented on the advance of Ukrainian troops in the Kherson region: “Tuvyn tactics” (an allusion to Soygu’s birthplace). An attitude that indicates that the chain of hierarchical military command is showing signs of being seriously affected by Wagner’s mercenary rebellion. What Prigozhin said about Shoigu is true, and that is why the operations of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine have so far failed, while Wagner’s actions were ultimately successful. – Read the entire article and comment on contributors.ro