Growing speculation in Russia about changes in the Russian military command probably indicates that Russia may soon restructure its military command after the failure of the Russian winter offensive, writes Institute for the Study of War.

On April 1, Russian media bloggers said that on March 30, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation recalled the commander of the Russian Air Force, Colonel General Mykhailo Teplinsky, from leave after the Russian agency replaced him with Lieutenant General Oleg Makarevich on January 13.

The Russian Ministry never confirmed Teplinsky’s dismissal, and it is likely that the Ministry of Defense sent him on leave in order to recall him to the Air Force Command if necessary.

Russian media bloggers claimed that Teplinsky immediately went to the headquarters of the Russian united group in Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar Territory, to take command of the Airborne Forces and was already planning operations.

Milblogger claimed that the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the former commander of the Central Military District (TsVO), Colonel-General Oleksandr Lapin went with Teplinsky to the headquarters of the United Group.

The Russian ministry officially replaced Lapin with Lt. Gen. Andriy Mordvitsev as CMD commander on February 17 following intense public criticism of Lapin’s handling of the Svatove-Kreminna line in the fall of 2022.

However, it remains to be seen whether Lapin will return to the post of commander of forces in Ukraine. Since March 27, Russian sources have suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense also recently dismissed the commander of the Eastern Military District (SVO), Colonel-General Rustam Muradov, in response to intense criticism of his command due to significant losses in offensive operations near Vugledar in early 2023.

ISW previously noted that intense Russian speculation about changes in military command corresponded to actual changes in Russian command, although not necessarily to the exact statements of Russian sources.

The Institute for the Study of War wrote that Russian, Ukrainian and Western sources indicated on April 1 that the Russian winter offensive did not achieve the Kremlin’s goal of capturing the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by March 31.

“The main efforts of the Russian troops were focused on the capture of the Donetsk region, and in early February, the Russian troops began a winter offensive operation on the line Kupyansk – Svatove – Kreminna – Lyman and on certain lines in the west of the Donetsk region,” ISW wrote.

ISW also recalls that the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) noted that Gerasimov failed to expand Russian control over Donbas during his appointment as commander of the combat operations TVD and achieved only minor gains at the cost of mobilized lives.

The British Ministry of Defense also writes that the general could go beyond the limit to which the Kremlin suffers failure.