The way in which European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) would have prevented an accident at Tempe describes “K” of the Commission representative, which quotes in detail the Commission’s dossier on the timing of the delays in the harmonization of Greece with European law. At the same time, this explains why the absence of a mechanism is not an excuse for an event. Railroad safety has traditionally been provided by a signaling system that prevents trains from entering dangerous tracks and thereby colliding with them. The condition is that train drivers always watch for red danger signals. This is an old type of rail system that is still in operation in Greece.

However, to provide a much higher level of safety, modern systems have been designed with equipment that automatically stops a train when it is about to pass a red traffic light. In addition, they ensure that the train always maintains a safe speed on its way and thus allows it to stop in time when the signal requires it. The European standard system for this function is ERTMS, which consists of two subsystems: A) proper signaling and control system (ETCS) and b) a radio communication system called GSM-R (both for voice telephone conversations between the driver and the signalman, and for the automatic transmission of these signals).

Essentially, ERTMS eliminates the human factor in operations, as the train automatically stops if the driver cannot properly respond to the signal. ETCS (European Train Control System) is a system in a train that:

• Automatically updated by infrastructure for maximum safe speed (zero on red).

• Informs the driver (via the cab screen).

• Automatically stops the train if the speed is exceeded and the driver is idle.

“Because the signal is displayed in the train cabin, safety does not depend on whether the driver observes external signals, which is difficult at high speeds. Information about the state of the signals enters the train either through the GSM-R radio system or electronic beacons (balls) that are fixed on the railway tracks, ”explains the representative of the Commission“ K ”to the question in order to answer the question of what ERTMS would practically offer if she was already working.

However, in the absence of ERTMS, secure networking is not left to chance. This is provided even by old-style national alarm systems. They can be electronic, electromechanical, or even purely mechanical, but they all ensure that the tracks and track signals are set up so that trains do not run on conflicting tracks. The very fact that they do not eliminate the risk of human error by not including automatic train protection systems requires single-track operations to take the strictest measures to ensure that trains traveling in opposite directions are not on the same track. plot at the same time. This is usually achieved through a system of tokens.

The absence of a system is no excuse, the EU representative notes.

“All rail systems must also be designed to operate in “degraded” or emergency situations where parts of the normal signaling system are not available. In such cases, a thorough risk assessment should be carried out and risk control measures should be strictly followed in accordance with the procedures set out in the infrastructure manager’s security management system. For example, trains that move at a reduced speed and can easily stop even “in full view” of another train. That is, single-line operation requires simple but reliable means of protection. It is important to note that although ERTMS provides benefits, the safe operation of railways can and should be ensured through the use of other signaling systems, even if they are old-fashioned,” the Commission representative notes.

Delay time

According to the Commission’s dossier:

• Greece completed the transposition of the Railway Safety Directive (EU) 2016/798 on 10/23/2019. During the compliance check and after receiving information from the European Railway Agency (EOS), it was found that there is no operational investigation body in Greece.

• In July 2021, the Greek authorities informed the Commission of their intention to establish a multidimensional investigative body to ensure the use of experience and the effectiveness of investigative procedures. However, the process was not brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The Commission is in contact with the Greek authorities on this matter.

• EOS and the Railway Regulatory Authority, following an audit of the latter in 2020 and 2022, agreed on an action plan to be implemented by 30/06/2023. Key shortcomings and findings call for action by the Greek authorities. Clarification: This was not a security check of the railway system. It was an inspection by the Office itself, which is responsible for security oversight.

• In March 2022, the Greek authorities reported the difficulties encountered in the development of ERTMS and announced that the system will be put into operation in some parts of the network later than planned. The Commission adopted in principle the Greek plan for the following sections: Acharnes-Gefyres line from 2020 to 2022, Titora-Acharnes line from 2020 to 2023, Domokos-Paleofarsalos-Thessaloniki- BG/EL border line (Kulata-Promachonas), with 2020 to 2023.

• According to the information transmitted by the Greek authorities to the Commission Services in January 2023, the European Train Control System (ETCS) level 1 line is under construction, with completion expected in 2023.

• GSM-R (Radio Communication between Infrastructure Manager and Driver) completed and put into operation by the Hellenic Railway Regulation Authority. On the line where the accident occurred, ERTMS has not yet been installed or licensed. We understand that the existing national alarm system has undergone maintenance and has therefore been decommissioned. As a result, the control and management of train traffic was completely manual.