A series of accidents, deviations and service delays at different points of the railway network on February 28, as well as mobile phone calls to passenger train driver 62 the places where commercial trains were on the line constitute, among other things, the conditions that existed before the tragedy occurred. accident in Tempe.

According to the testimony of the stationmaster of Paleofarsalo, at 19:50 the stationmaster of Larisa informed him that a commuter train that was supposed to go to Thessaloniki had a problem (damage) at the height of the Zachareos factory and on the route. should have been single track. Dual traffic was restored when the reserve engine reversed the train at Larisa station.

Intercity 62 which was going towards Thessaloniki, was usually going to intersect with 63, which was following the opposite route, at Lianoklady for an exchange of drivers. However, due to the prevailing conditions, they crossed at Paleofarsalos station, where there was a change in the traction stock.

Train 62 left from there at about 22.40. He will follow the descent line to Larisa due to another accident earlier in the day due to the cutting of the electric motor cable. Then he should enter the climb normally.

Communications

According to “K”, Intercity 62 driver Giorgos Koutsoumbas allegedly called at approximately 10:46 pm, a few minutes after leaving Paleofarsalos station, his junior colleague, who was driving the commercial train that day. Their connection was not good due to the weak signal. Over the next few minutes, according to the same information, there were two calls from the driver of the commercial train to the driver of Intercity 62, but there was no answer. His own train stopped at Platy. One version of these calls that cannot be confirmed is that the driver of the passenger train was trying to figure out conditions on the rest of the network after Larisa, given the problems that arose that day.

“K” wrote that after his departure from Larisa, after 23.04 Koutsoubas called the driver of another commercial train, which was supposed to follow the route to Athens that day. At the same time, the driver allegedly replied that he and his colleagues had changed shifts and the train was going down with another crew. At the same time, as K wrote on Sunday in the same report, after the fatal journey of the passenger train began, Kutsubas contacted the head of the station at least three times to confirm the route. These reports were made by radiotelephone and may not be the only ones that have yet to be discovered.

Model 1001

In apology for arrested stationmaster evening shift in Larissa reports that he did not give the driver of Intercity 62 a form 1001, according to the protocol. This is a written instruction indicating how and where the train will move in the event of a red signal.

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According to the stationmaster Paleofarsalos, the model was written in triplicate. Two are issued to the driver and the head of the train, and the third is entered in the book of the head of the station. On the basis of the same indications, in appropriate cases, in the model or in the radiotelephone communication, the driver is informed whether he is moving uphill or downhill. This, it seems, was not said by the head of the station Larisa, judging by the recorded conversations that have already seen the light of day. In other words, it was not mentioned that it should “move in a double ascending line”.

The landlines of each station are recorded on site, and the corresponding telegrams and radiotelephone conversations are recorded at the OSE headquarters.