Russian military aggression against Ukraine has a profoundly detrimental effect on the stability of Russia’s geostrategic interests in almost the entire post-Soviet space. Members of the Customs Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization are reassessing their relations with the Russian side. This is due to the “devaluation” of Russia’s geopolitical reputation, as well as the spread of the consequences of Western sanctions on the Russian state’s trading partners. The exception to this trend is Belarus, which after the suppression of post-election protests against Lukashenka in 2020 was completely absorbed into the orbit of Russian influence. In addition, the Georgian government’s geo-economic opportunism, based on strengthening economic ties with Russia, leaves room for negative interpretations. At the same time, while condemning the occupation of 20% of the national territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) by Russia, Georgian authorities are promoting policies such as the “Foreign Agents Law” (Euronews, February 2023) that are leading the country closer to the Russian authoritarian norms or Azerbaijanis. This deviation risks weakening Georgian democratic institutions and jeopardizing European integration efforts. In other cases, the states of Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Moldova), the South Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Central Asia demonstrated unfavorable movements for Russia’s geopolitical positions.

With the growing uncertainty for Russia in the context of its aggression against Ukraine, cracks are appearing in the status quo surrounding the “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space. If the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is under the control of Russia, then in the case of the Transnistrian conflict (Moldova) and the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), everything becomes complicated for Russia. The separatist elites of Transnistria are forced by the circumstances of the war to accept agreements with the constitutional authorities of Moldova (mutually acceptable) in order to ensure their political and socio-economic survival. This growing dependence of the Transnistrian separatist regime on Chisinau’s decisions paralyzes Russia’s room for maneuver. Aware of the potential costs of a separatist regime, Moscow seeks to use the Russian military presence in the Transnistrian region in its information war against Ukraine and Moldova. The situation is different in Nagorno-Karabakh, where under the pressure of Azerbaijan’s attempts to restore territorial integrity, the Russian peacekeeping mission faces a serious image crisis in Armenia (Reuters, January 2023). Without Armenian-Azerbaijani political support, Russia may lose its strategic advantage for Armenia, where there is already growing public demand for an international peacekeeping mission instead of a Russian one. Thus, Russian positions on these two “frozen conflicts” are greatly weakened and conflicted, and the success of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 could further worsen the state of affairs for Moscow and its leverage over these conflicts.

The crisis of Russia’s geopolitical reputation

Two parallel processes affect Russian strategic interests in countries where the Russian language is still the lingua franca. On the one hand, there is growing interest in increasing economic sovereignty in relation to Russia. And on the other hand – political emancipation and an attempt to get out of the geopolitical shadow of Russia, in some places pursuing the goal of diversifying sources of security.

In the first case, the countries of Central Asia are looking for ways to strengthen ties with the EU and the USA. Reducing dependence on Russian critical infrastructure and energy sovereignty are areas of common interest with the EU. European decision-makers are determined to invest in projects that will connect the Central Asian region to pan-European transport and energy routes (Euroactiv, November 2022). In this sense, through the global European platform (Global Gateway) with a budget of about 300 billion euros, the EU enters into an undeclared competition with Russia and China for influence in Central Asia.

The second process concerns Armenia and Azerbaijan, which together with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia joined the European Political Community (EPC), launched in Prague in October 2022. The separation of the EU from Russia in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine represents a “window of opportunity” for Armenia, which has expanded its dialogue with the EU beyond the security sphere. With the assistance of France, the Armenian side agreed with the EU on the deployment of a civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA), which began operating on the territory of Armenia in February. Yerevan must establish a political and diplomatic balance for the coexistence of the EUMA with the forces of the Russian military base, which has been operating in Armenia since 1992. Azerbaijan pays attention to strengthening the energy dialogue with the EU, which will give it access to the European market, which is looking for natural gas to replace imports from Russia. To avoid future episodes of gas exploitation, the EU cut Russian pipeline gas supplies to below 10% in October-November 2022 (from 40% of total imports in 2021). By increasing its energetic role in Brussels’ strategic calculations, Baku obscures sensitive topics related to the persecution of the opposition or civil society. Gas can help the Azerbaijani government expand its circle of friends in Europe. Scandals related to cross-border political corruption in the Council of Europe (2.9 billion dollars in bribes), with accusations of the involvement of the Azerbaijani side, seem to be out of the EU’s attention.

The examples analyzed above show that the weakening of Russia’s geopolitical importance in regions previously considered under Russian influence prompts regional state actors to diversify the balance of power, turning to the EU and other Western players.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a complication for Russia’s positioning

Created as a result of tripartite agreements mediated by Russian leader Vladimir Putin in November 2020, the Russian peacekeeping mission (1,960 troops) in Nagorno-Karabakh is on the verge of being discredited due to its failure to ensure the functioning of the Latsyn Corridor. Beginning in mid-December 2022, the Azerbaijani authorities blocked the normal operation of the Latsin Corridor under the pretext of environmental protests. This route is important for transporting people and goods between Armenia and the separatist region. At the first stage of the blockade, the same responsibility for blocking the route was borne by Russian peacekeepers. However, following an action taken by the International Court of Justice of the United Nations (UN) in February this year, only Azerbaijan is recognized as the party responsible for preventing access to Nagorno-Karabakh (ICJ, February 2022). Both the EU and its member states, as well as the US, are pressuring Baku to not comply with the UN court ruling, which is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the separatist region, populated mainly by ethnic Armenians.

Against the background of the refusal of the Azerbaijani side to restore the connection between Armenia and the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian peacekeepers are in no way involved in the forced unblocking of the Latsin Corridor. Being in a wait-and-see position and under pressure from the Armenian public, Russia is avoiding steps that would favor either side and harm its drastic actions. Russia’s calculations are dominated by the need to keep its peacekeepers in the region after the mandate expires in 2025. Providing an effective peacekeeping mission does not meet this goal.

The fragile balance around the region and, accordingly, the status of Russian peacekeepers depends on the actions of the Azerbaijani side, which has declared a strategic goal of taking control of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku insists that Armenia will use Lacin to supply weapons to Nagorno-Karabakh, in violation of the tripartite agreements concluded with Russia in 2020-2021. Under this pretext, the Azerbaijani authorities demand to introduce a customs checkpoint on the border with Armenia, at the entrance to the Lachin Corridor (Interfax, March 2023). Without this corridor, the separatist region cannot survive, and Azerbaijan’s control of this critical infrastructure will increase Armenia’s dependence on Russian peacekeepers. One way for Yerevan to increase its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow and Baku would be for the EU to create a border assistance mission at the entrance to Lachin, similar to the EUBAM mission in the Transnistrian segment. This mission will help manage flows between Armenia and the separatist region involving the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides without Russian mediation.

Russian scenarios for the Transnistrian region

Concerns about the destabilization of the separatist region of Moldova (Transnistria) have returned to public attention after Russia spread unsubstantiated allegations that Ukrainian authorities were planning a military attack. Oleg Serebryan, the vice-prime minister for the reintegration of Chisinau, rejected any scenario in which Chisinau and Kyiv would coordinate a military intervention in Transnistria. At the same time, the Moldovan authorities recognize the legitimacy of Ukraine’s decision to strengthen its military presence along the Transnistrian segment to protect against the Russian threat.

The risks associated with Russia’s ability to instrumentalize the Transnistrian region, with or without the knowledge of the separatist regime, to achieve tactical goals in the war in Ukraine or to increase instability in Moldova are real. In the spring of 2022, Russian special services were suspected of organizing a series of light explosions at critical infrastructure facilities in Transnistria (Riddle, May 2022). The separatist administration in Tiraspol declares that it will not renounce its neutrality regarding the situation in Ukraine. At the same time, political and economic elites in the region follow instructions from Moscow, which gives them leverage in negotiations with the constitutional authorities in Chisinau. Therefore, even if it could increase the tension on the border with Ukraine, the administration of Tiraspol wants to conduct military exercises together with Russian peacekeepers in March-May.

The development of the situation around the Transnistrian region can be viewed through the prism of three main scenarios. The most positive scenario is “keeping the status quo” (scenario 1), which assumes that the Transnistrian region remains neutral, instead leaving open the existing channels of foreign trade. Russia maintains its status in the region unchanged, and Ukraine and Moldova continue to monitor the situation in Transnistria to prevent escalation. The second scenario the main factor that must be taken into account is the case when Russia uses material and human resources from the Transnistrian region to carry out non-military provocations on the territory of Moldova. This scenario is useful for Russia only if it chooses to support subversive actions against the constitutional authorities of Moldova. If the protests of the populist opposition with Russian ties get out of control and seek to change the constitutional order, then the use of Russian saboteurs located in Transnistria is very likely. Third the scenario involves major challenges involving Russian military forces stationed in the region. The object of provocations will be Ukraine, but the main costs of such a decision by Moscow will fall on Transnistria and Moldova. This would include the destruction of critical infrastructure in Transnistria, with implications for the security of military personnel in Kobasna, and the refugee crisis in Moldova. At the moment, the prevailing scenario involves the preservation of the current situation, but in the event of radical changes in the situation, the other two will have to be taken into account. Read the rest of the article on Contributors.ro